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ABSTRACT
The aim of this research was to investigate the nature of the out-of-the-loop (OoTL)
phenomenon in highly automated driving (HAD), and its effect on driver behaviour
before, during, and after the transition from automated to manual control. The work
addressed questions relating to how automation affects drivers’ (i) performance in
transition situations requiring control- and tactical-level responses, (ii) their behaviour
in automation compared to in manual driving, (iii-iv) their visual attention distribution
before and during the transition, as well as (v) their perceptual-motor performance
after resuming control. A series of experiments were developed to take drivers progres-
sively further OoTL for short periods during HAD, by varying drivers’ secondary task
engagement and the amount of visual information from the system and environment
available to them. Once the manipulations ended, drivers were invited to determine a
need to resume control in critical and non-critical vehicle following situations. Results
showed that, overall, drivers looked around more during HAD, compared to manual
driving, and had poorer vehicle control in critical transition situations. Generally, the
further OoTL drivers were during HAD, the more dispersed their visual attention.
However, within three seconds of the manipulations ending, the differences between
the conditions resolved, and in many cases, this was before drivers resumed control.
Differences between the OoTL manipulations emerged once again in terms of the
timing of drivers’ initial response (take-over time) in critical events, where the fur-
ther OoTL drivers were the longer it took them to resume control, but there was no
difference in the quality of the subsequent vehicle control. Results suggest that any
information presented to drivers during automation should be placed near the centre
of the road and that kinematically early avoidance response may be more important
for safety than short take-over times. This thesis concludes with a general conceptu-
alisation of the relationship between a number of driver and vehicle/environment
factors that influence driver performance in the transition.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Vehicles with increasing degrees of automated capabilities will become ubiquitous
in the coming decades, with vehicle manufacturers, technology start-ups, and giants
alike having demonstrated interest and progress in the race to higher levels of ve-
hicle automation. Indeed, many large vehicle manufacturers are already equipping
production vehicles with lane keeping systems (Lincoln, 2014; Acura, 2014), traffic
jam assistance (BMW, 2013) and highway steering assistance (Toyota, 2013; Volvo,
2013), and some manufacturers have committed to bringing the first generation of
self-driving vehicles to market by the end of the decade.
Vehicle automation is proposed to have a number of benefits, including an increase
in the flow and capacity of the road network (Kesting, 2008; Ntousakis, 2015), a wide
range of economic benefits (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2013), an increase in shared
mobility (Fagnant, 2013), and a reduction in energy consumption (Anderson et al.,
2014). Human error is thought to be a contributing factor to over 93% of road accidents
(Treat et al., 1979; Sabey and Taylor, 1980), and a further assumed benefit of vehicle
automation is that, by relieving the human driver of parts of the driving task, human
error would be suppressed, reducing road traffic accidents. Yet, this claimed benefit
is potentially a red herring. Human error typically arises out of poor human-system
interaction, because of a combination of active failures (e.g. drivers failing to detect a
hazard) and latent conditions (e.g. the human-machine interface is designed poorly;
Reason, 1990). Vehicle automation is in its infancy, and it will be some time yet until
all human responsibility for, and interaction with, the driving task is supplanted,
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highlighting the paradox that automated systems will still be joint cognitive systems
between man and machine (Bibby et al., 1975; Bainbridge, 1983). Therefore, while
such interactions exist, so too does the possibility of human error and the importance
of human factors.
To realise the full potential for vehicle automation for improving road safety, it is
necessary to scrutinise how automation impacts on drivers’ cognitive and physical
abilities to interact safely and appropriately with the driving task (Parasuraman et
al. 2000; Merat and Lee, 2012). A primary example of such an interaction is the
resumption of manual control when the automated driving system either fails or
reaches some functional limit, otherwise known as ’the transition’.
Indeed, there is a growing concern within the human factors community regarding
the potential adverse effects of automation on drivers’ return-to-manual performance.
Studies have speculated that a number of psychological factors are pertinent to
understanding the effect of vehicle automation on driver behaviour, including trust
(Lee and See, 2004; Hergeth et al., 2016), locus of control (Stanton and Young, 2005),
complacency (Bagheri and Jamieson, 2004; Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010), mental
models (Moray, 1990; Sarter et al., 2007; Flemisch et al., 2012), driver state (Rauch
et al., 2009; Neubauer et al., 2012; Jamson et al., 2013), mental workload (MWL; De
Waard, 1996; Collet et al., 2003), and situation awareness (SA; Endsley, 1995a; Merat
and Jamson, 2009; Kircher et al., 2014).
There have been some attempts to manage these issues during automation and the
transition through, for example, adaptive automation disengagement systems (Merat
et al., 2014) and haptic shared control (Abbink et al., 2012; Mars et al., 2014). Others
have used uncertainty warning alerts (Beller et al., 2013; Lorenz et al., 2014) and
multimodal human-machine interface (HMI) designs (Pavilinsky and De Winter, 2016).
However, the effectiveness of these interaction designs is limited to the automated
system and traffic scenarios in which the interactions are observed, all of which impose
varying levels of mental workload.
Human factors research has developed a multitude of models to describe the
driving task from the perspective of the driver. These can be divided into functional
models and descriptive models. Functional models represent performance via various
concepts such as motivation, information processing, and risk, and emphasise drivers’
cognitive abilities, which give them greater predictive power, yet limit their descriptive
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depth. In contrast, descriptive models attempt to describe some or all aspects of
the driving task with respect to the driver’s role but are limited in their ability to
predict performance. The following section will focus on functional models of human
information processing to outline how this thesis conceptualises human performance
for the driving task, while the subsequent section will focus on descriptive models to
draw attention to the role of the driver in the driving task, and how this related to
vehicle automation.
1.2 Understanding human performance
Information processing is the combination of psychological and motor processes that
humans use to perform tasks. Implied in information processing theories is the concept
of a limited processing capacity (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Kahneman, 1973; Posner, 1978;
Wickens, 1984). Kahneman (1973) specifies the metaphor of a single undifferentiated
capacity from which mental resources are available for task performance, and proposed
a serial processing model. On the other hand, Wickens (1984) introduced the idea of
a multiple processing model, drawing a clear distinction between the metaphors of
capacity and resource, defining capacity as the maximum or upper limit of processing
capability, while resources represent the mental effort supplied to improve processing
efficiency. Another critical assumption is that this capacity may also change according
to whether the operator is fatigued or distracted, as using mental resources requires
effort, and this is limited (cf. Malleable Resource Theory; Young and Stanton, 2002;
Young and Stanton, 2004).
Wickens’ (1984) information processing model builds on single resource theories
(Kahneman, 1973; Norman and Bobrow, 1975), and presents a qualitative account of
the different psychological processes involved in how humans interact with systems.
The model incorporates these processes into a series of processing stages or mental
operations to characterise the flow of information humans require when performing a
task. This involves perceiving sensations, transforming data and choosing actions in
response. Processing requires mental resources at each stage (see Figure 1.1). This is
discussed further in Section 1.4.4.
Based on Wickens’ (1984) model, information from the environment is first pro-
cessed by our senses and is held briefly in the short term sensory story (STSS). What
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Figure 1.1: A model of human information processing (redrawn from Wickens et
al., 2015, pg. 4).
is selected for sensory input is driven by attention (Yantis, 1998), either bottom-up
(exogenous, stimulus-driven, or passive) or top-down (or endogenous or goal-driven or
active). In the context of driving, information is most often selected and attended to
overtly by directing the eye to its spatial location, demonstrating a close link between
attention and eye movements (Posner, 1980; Crundall and Underwood, 1998).
Selected information from the STSS is then passed to stages of perception, where
the stimulus is identified, or recognised using past experiences that are stored in the
long-term memory, and it’s meaning derived. This stage is processed automatically,
requires little or no attention, and is driven by both sensory inputs and long-term
memory. Following recognition, information is passed to response-selection and
response-execution processes, where its implications for action are assessed, including
the choice of a response. Otherwise known as cognition, this stage is distinguished
from perception by the amount of time required to process information, as well as the
mental effort involved.
As with most closed-loop feedback systems, this information processing system is
in dynamic interaction with the external world and is driven by feedback signals and
attention, which are essential for efficient human-automation interaction.
Questions have been raised regarding the efficacy of the information processing
model, especially regarding its inability to explain and predict performance in low
task-demand situations, such as monotonous driving (Senders, 1997). Nevertheless,
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it still stands as a useful, simple, framework for interpreting human performance in
both simple and complex tasks.
With an understanding of how people process information to perform a task,
the following section will focus on descriptive models of driving and the role of the
human driver within the driving task.
1.3 Models of the driving task
Rasmussen’s (1983, 1986) model of human behaviour in complex system control
conceptualises tasks on the different levels of action selection and execution requiring
the interaction between an operator and a task. The model categorises performance
on three levels, namely skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based performance.
To take driving as an example, at the skill-based level a driver uses sensorimotor
skills to process information in the form of space-time signals, such as vehicle handling
around corners or driving along familiar routes. This represents automatic processing
without conscious control. At the rule-based level, a driver processes information in
the road environment (e.g. road regulations), which is then applied by feed-forward
control. This represents conscious control. Cognitive functioning at the knowledge-based
level involves drivers utilising mental models of the current roadway environment
and vehicle state, integrated with their goals, to make decisions regarding navigation.
Michon (1985) conceptualised the three levels in Rasmussen’s model regarding the
skills and control of driving tasks and defined them according to the time involved in
performing the task as well as the level of attentional control (Reason, 1987) given to
the (sub-)task. At the lowest level, (control level) tasks involve the controlling of the
vehicle’s lateral and longitudinal position on the road through braking and steering.
This level of a task occurs through automatic action patterns and within a time frame
of milliseconds. The intermediate level (manoeuvring level) involves tactical decisions
and manoeuvres by drivers to local situations, to achieve predetermined sub-goals,
such as following distance, overtaking, speed, etc. These tasks occur in a matter of
seconds. The advanced level (strategic level) involves drivers making and following
goals of driving, such as navigating to a destination and also developing specific
driving sub-goals, such as selecting a route. These generally take much longer to plan
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Table 1.1: Matrix of driving tasks according to Rasmussen and Michon (Hale et
al., 1990).
Planning Manoeuvre Control
Knowledge Navigating in strange town Controlling a skid on icy roads Learner on first on first lesson
Rule Choice between familiar routes Passing other cars Driving an unfamiliar car
Skill Home/work travel Negotiating familiar junctions Roadholding round corners
and execute.
Hale et al. (1990) mapped Rasmussen’s performance levels to Michon’s levels of
driving behaviour, to specify the dynamic interaction among driver behaviour activities
at different levels of the driving task (Table 1.1). Weller et al. (2006) presented a similar
model (Figure 1.2), with performance levels according to Rasmussen (1986) shown
on the left and the hierarchical control levels, according to Michon (1985), shown on
the right. Ward (2000) argues that, within this framework, driving is modelled as a
cascade system that includes input, output, feedback, and feed-forward processes. As
a feedback process, driving goals at the strategic level cascade down and influence
the behavioural responses at the tactical level, which in turn influence action-specific
behaviours at the operational level (Ward, 2000). The feed-forward processes relate
these levels to a hierarchical structure such that particular actions at the operational
level make up those behaviours at the tactical level, and those behaviours are used
to achieve the goals of driving, for example, arriving at a destination (Ward, 2000).
However, it can be argued that automation removes or reduces drivers’ feed-forward
control of the driving task, which may, in turn, impair their ability to anticipate events
on the road. Yet to what extent this impacts on performance in the transition to
manual control at the different levels of driving, is still unclear.
By deconstructing the driving task into its constituent sub-tasks, we can better
understand how changes to the relationship between the driver and the vehicle might
affect the performance of the driving task as a whole. However, much of the focus in
the literature has been on understanding the impact of automating various aspects of
the driving task on, how, whether, and when, drivers regain control-level performance.
Equally important is understanding how it affects drivers’ recovery of adequate
performance on the tactical and strategic levels.
These models consider the driving task as a three-way interaction between three
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Figure 1.2: Combination of performance levels according to Rasmussen (1986)
and the hierarchical control levels according to Michon (1985), reproduced from
Weller et al. (2006).
agents, the driver, the vehicle, and the environment. However, it can be argued that
an automated driving system is an additional agent introduced into these interactions.
Changing the structure of the driving task in this way requires a reassessment of
the driving model. While there have been multiple models seeking to describe the
driving task itself, and others that integrate ACC (see Boer and Hoedemaeker, 1998),
little objective research has been undertaken to establish the underlying cognitive
mechanisms and mental models that drivers use to operate a highly automated vehicle,
and how these mechanisms and models may be subject to decay. This is not altogether
surprising as developing an accurate mental model of the dynamics of a system
becomes increasingly difficult the more variables, and therefore interactions between
them, are present within a system (Matthews et al., 2004). To understand the effects
of automation on performance, the following section considers how humans interact
with automation, both generally and in the context of the driving task.
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1.4 Automation
In a contemporary sense, automation refers to
"the mechanisation and integration of the sensing of environmental variables (by artificial
sensors), data processing and decision making (by computers); mechanical action (by
motors or devices that apply forces to the environment), and/or "information action"
by communication of processed information to people." (Sheridan and Parasuraman,
2005).
Applied to driving, the above describes how an automated driving system can perform
some or all of the tasks or sub-tasks. Whereas in manual driving all sensing and
control is carried out by the human, in current automated vehicles, drivers and their
automated driving systems actively cooperate to achieve the primary task of driving,
the success of which requires maintenance of a shared situation representation/awareness
(cf. Christoffersen and Woods, 2002; Hoc, 2000; Stanton, 2016), "appropriate" reliance
on the automated driving system (Lee and See, 2004), and transparency between the
automated driving system and the human driver (Lyons, 2013). Strictly from the
driver’s perspective, this new and central role requires supervisory control1, where the
driver issues instructions with respect to the driving goals, which are then carried
out by the automated driving system. Of course, the degree to which continuous
supervision is required depends entirely on the capabilities and ’intelligence’ of that
particular system and the driver’s experience with it.
1.4.1 Automated driving
The concept of automated driving was first presented in a 1925 New York Times
article (New York Times, 1925), and was included in General Motors’ vision of the
future at the 1939 New York World’s Fair (Geddes, 1940), and after realised in the
GM Firebird Concept III, featuring automated steering (Electronic Chauffeurs, 1959).
Many examples of the early concepts of automated vehicle concepts relied upon
connection to some pre-existing road infrastructure (Guang Lu and Tomizuka, 2002).
However, the 1980s and 1990s saw projects focused on developing the hardware and
1Elsewhere referred to as human meta-control (Sheridan, 1960) and human supervisory control (Moray,
1986; Sheridan, 1992a, Sheridan and Verplank, 1978)
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software capabilities to enable automated vehicles to operate independently of any
infrastructure. These included Autonomous Land Vehicle (ALV) (Schefter, 1985), which
was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Vehicle for
Autonomous mobility thRough computer vision (VaMoRs) (Dieckmanns, 1989), Program
for European Traffic with Highest Efficiency and Unprecedented Safety (PROMETHEUS)
(Williams and Preston, 1987), and The Carnegie Mellon University Navigation Laboratory
(NAVLAB) (Goto and Stentz, 1987; Thorpe et al., 1991). However, some projects were
still fully infrastructure dependent, for example, Automated Highway Systems (AHS),
run by the PATH Program at The University of California, Berkeley (Shladover, 2006).
These projects were followed by three Challenges set by the DARPA: Grand Challenge
I in 2004, Grand Challenge II in 2005 (Buehler et al., 2007) and the Urban Challenge in
2007 (Buehler et al., 2009), which gave rise to a number of vehicles that were tested on
public roads, including Leonie (Wille et al., 2010), AutoNOMOS (Rojo et al., 2007), and
the Google Car (Markoff, 2010).
More recently, there have been a number of projects that have focused on the
human factors issues related to vehicle automation, while also implementing and
evaluating automated functions in vehicles, including CityMobil (Toffetti et al., 2009),
Automated Driving Applications & Technologies for Intelligent Vehicles (AdaptIVe) (Langen-
berg et al., 2014), Highly Automated Vehicles for Intelligent Transport (HAVEit) (Hoeger et
al., 2008), Designing Dynamic Distributed Cooperative Human-Machine Systems (D3CoS)
(Zimmermann and Bengler, 2013), and Kooperatives hochautomatisiertes Fahren, Coopera-
tive Highly Automated Driving (KoHAF) (ZENTEC GmbH, 2015).
1.4.2 Levels of automation
Over the years, several attempts have been made to create taxonomies or scales of the
degrees of automation (DoA), otherwise referred to as levels of automation (LoA).
Early versions, such as the widely used taxonomy presented by Sheridan and Verplank
(1978, Table 1.2), are more general and typically account for the locus of control (human
or automation) and how information is presented to the human. Parasuraman et al.
(2000) later adapted the Sheridan and Verplank taxonomy to account for four stages
of information processing (perception, analysis, decision-making, and execution) for
each level of human-automation interaction. Contextualising a classification in this
way allowed it to be used not only as a descriptor of human-automation interaction
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but also as a tool to choose appropriate LoAs for the relevant task. More application-
specific taxonomies include Riley’s (1989) model, which is applied to a mixed-initiative
human-machine system, and Endsley and Kaber’s (1999) model, which accounts for
levels of human-automation interaction in real-time control tasks.
Table 1.2: Sheridan and Verplank’s (1978) Levels of Automation.
Description
1 Human does the whole job up to the point of turning it over to the computer to implement.
2 Computer helps by determining the options.
3 Computer helps to determine options and suggests one, which human need not follow.
4 Computer selects action and human may or may not do it.
5 Computer selects action and implements it if human approves.
6 Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it.
7 Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human what it did.
8 Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human explicitly asks.
9 Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told.
10 Computer does whole job if it decides it should be done, and if so, tells human, if it decides that the
human should be told.
With the development of technologies bringing automated capabilities to the
driving task, attempts have been made to understand human-automation interaction
within the driving context. For example, Carsten and Nilsson (2001) sought to
categorise different Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) based on their
functionality and proposed four broad categories: (1) systems that provide information,
(2) systems that provide warnings or feedback, (3) systems that partly intervene,
and (4) systems that facilitate autonomous driving. While specific to ADAS, such
broad categories limit the value of Carsten and Nilsson’s categorisation. Flemisch
et al. (2008) provide a slightly different perspective, viewing the levels of driving
automation by the extent to which the human or the system has vehicle control,
as opposed to task-specific elements. In a similar approach, the German Federal
Highway Research Institute (BASt) working group on automated vehicles developed a
categorisation of automated driving functions (Gasser and Westhoff, 2012) as part of
the work considering the Vienna Convention and German laws and regulations that
may be a barrier for introducing automated vehicles in Germany. The BASt expert
group identified five LoAs based on the degree of automation: full automation, high
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automation, partial automation, driver assistance, and driver only.
In parallel efforts, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA,
2013) and The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE, 2014) also developed classifi-
cations of driving automation. Similar to the BASt taxonomy in many respects, the
NHTSA and SAE definitions describe, at each level of automation, what aspects of the
primary driving task are performed by the human or the system (i.e. lateral control,
longitudinal control, and monitoring), such that as the LoA increases, so does the role
of the driver, shifting from a primary controller to a passive supervisor. However,
recently the SAE LoAs (Figure 1.3) went further to explicitly delegate responsibility
for monitoring the driving task and the road environment, with the driver being
responsible for the lower levels (L0, L1, L2) and the system being responsible for the
higher levels (L3, L4, L5). The SAE distinction rightly implies an automated driving
system should have the capability to monitor the driving environment before it should
be allowed to assume control of significant aspects of vehicle control.
This type of categorisation use by SAE has been criticised for implying a hierarchy
of the technology, while its natural evolution is not likely to follow this exact path,
which creates false expectations amongst policymakers, the press, and the public
(Templeton, 2014). Nevertheless, the SAE levels of automation have since become the
most widely cited vehicle automation taxonomy, and to standardise and aid clarity
and consistency, the U.S. Department of Transportation (2016) adopted the updated
2016 SAE LoA definitions (SAE, 2016) in their Federal policy for automated vehicles.
For these reasons, this thesis will adopt the SAE (2016) nomenclature.
At SAE Level 2 (L2, Partial Automation) and Level 3 (L3, Conditional Automation),
the primary controllers of the driving task, longitudinal and lateral control, are
automated via Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Lane-Keeping Systems (LKS),
respectively. This minimises the psychomotor aspect of control and modifies the
cognitive element (Kircher et al., 2014), which fundamentally changes the role of
the human in the driving task. In L2 systems, the emphasis on drivers’ attention is
shifted towards monitoring the driving task. In L3, drivers are not expected to monitor
driving task but are expected to be available to make decisions and solve problems
related to the driving task. In both systems, drivers are expected to be available to
resume manual control should the system reach some limit. In the following section,
we consider how this interaction most commonly manifests in HAD: the transitions of
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control.
Figure 1.3: Description of Levels of Driving Automation for On-Road Vehicles
Emphasising (A) Execution of steering and acceleration/ deceleration, (B) Moni-
toring of driving environment, (C) Fallback performance of dynamic driving task,
and (D) System capability (SAE International, 2016).
1.4.3 Transitions of control
Regarding vehicle automation, the term "transition" has been used in the literature to
refer to either the activation or deactivation of an automated driving function (Gold
et al., 2013), a change in the level of automation (Merat et al., 2014), a transfer of
responsibility (Saffarian et al., 2012), or the period between the changing from one
vehicle control state to another (Flemisch et al., 2012). The term transition has also
been used interchangeably in the literature with handover, handoff, and take-over.
In this thesis, the transition is defined as, the process and period of transferring
responsibility of, and control over, some or all aspects of a driving task, between a human
driver and an automated driving system.
While the SAE LoAs show the transitions that could occur between different levels
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of control (Figure 1.3), it is equally important to consider a framework delineating the
principles of the transfer of control, which has been the subject of a number recent
publications (cf. McCall et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2016). Here, we will focus on an ontology
developed by Flemisch et al. (2008), outlining three basic principles of transitions.
Figure 1.4: All possible transitions occurring between operator and automation at
different levels of automation, with green arrows showing the transitions between
manual control and highly automated driving, and the blue arrows indicating the
transitions between manual control and fully automated driving (Flemisch et al.,
2008).
The first principle relates to the direction in which a transition can occur, with
Figure 1.4 showing control can be transferred from the driver towards the automated
system, e.g. driver activating Adaptive Cruise Control, or transferred from the
automated system towards the driver, e.g. system deactivation of a Lane Keeping
System due to missing lane markings.
The second principle refers to who initiates the transition, the driver or the
automated system. A driver-initiated transition, also referred to by Goodrich and Boer
(1999) as a discretionary transition, might occur when the driver wants to take control
because they feel their ability is rated as more expedient and safer. A system-initiated
transition, otherwise referred to as a mandatory transition, is where the system has
reached its limits either due, for example, to automation failure, road blockage, severe
weather conditions, or sudden manoeuvres by another vehicle (Saffarian et al., 2012).
However, there are also instances where system-initiated transition may be triggered
in non-failure situations, for example, at the end of a programmed route.
The third principle considers who has control at the start of the transition and who
is the recipient of the transition request.
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Table 1.3: Transition of control from human to automation (redrawn from Martens
et al., 2007).
Hi→ A H→ Ai Hi← A H← Ai
Who has "it"? Human Human Automation Automation
Who should get "it"? Automation Automation Human Human
Who initiates transition? Human Automation Human Automation
As part of the CityMobil project, Martens et al. (2007) proposed an ontology
outlining the four different classes of transitions. The ontology is summarised in
Table 1.3, with "H" referring to the Human and "A" to the Automation system. The
underlined letters in the table specify who is in control, with the arrows representing
the direction in which the transition is occurring, and the "i" defining which agent is
initiating the transition.
Under baseline driving circumstances, drivers who are in safe manual control of a
vehicle are assumed to have adequate levels of SA. In such a scenario, a driver-initiated
transition from manual driving to HAD (Hi→ A and H→ Ai) would be less complex
from a human factors perspective, as the driver can choose whether to initiate, accept,
or reject the transition request. Therefore, driver-initiated transitions are less likely to
present a significant threat to safety than a transition HAD to manual control. The
exception to this is if drivers assume that an attempted HAD activation is successful
when it is not, and they mistakenly relinquish physical control.
In transitions from HAD to manual (Hi ← A and H ← Ai), however, Endsley
and Kiris (1995) argue that a system should have to consider driver state before
relinquishing control, as drivers cannot be relied upon to guarantee they are sufficiently
aware of the situation to ensure safe return-to-manual driving. Should the system be
equipped with a driver monitoring system, the decision to relinquish driving control
would have to be based on some empirical data of drivers’ capacity and behaviour, in
such conditions. For example, if the pattern of drivers’ visual attention in the lead up
to a transition shows that they were completely disengaged from the driving task, then
a take-over-request could be delayed until drivers’ attention is back on the driving
task. Otherwise, the vehicle may initiate a minimum risk manoeuvre, bringing the
vehicle to a safe position on the road. At present, this data does not exist. Therefore,
it is further motivation to investigate drivers’ capabilities and limitations in a research
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setting.
1.4.4 Human-automation interaction
Automation creates a trade-off between performance benefits and performance costs
(Bainbridge, 1983; Sheridan, 2002). As seen in the aviation domain, as the degree of
automation increases, there is an increased risk that performance following return
to manual control will be degraded (Endsley and Kiris, 1995). A meta-analysis
investigating the impact of degrees of automation (DoA) on human performance
concluded that humans are much more vulnerable to automation "failures" when the
DoA moves across the critical boundary from information acquisition and analysis to
selecting and executing a particular action (Onnasch et al., 2013). However, these are
conclusions drawn from observations of automation in control process tasks, such as
traffic control tasks and unmanned aerial vehicle routeing tasks, and it remains to be
seen if this relationship exists for vehicle automation.
Nevertheless, this apparent trade-off puts forward the paradoxical recommenda-
tion that, with increasing DoA, it is increasingly important that drivers are to some
extent kept "in-the-loop", via decision and action selection as well as action implemen-
tation (Merat and Jamson, 2008). However, this argument is at odds with the espoused
benefits of full automation, which would see drivers relieved of not only the driving
task but also of managing or supervising vehicle automation. Also, classical vigilance
studies (Mackworth, 1950) have shown that it is virtually impossible for an individual
to maintain constant attention towards a source of information that does not often
change, to monitor for any system changes, requests, or errors (Bainbridge, 1983).
This limitation manifests as interaction errors and accidents, which have motivated
much of the research on human-automation interaction (Wiener and Curry, 1980).
Mental workload and performance in the transition
One way to conceptualise performance in the transition is to consider it within the
framework of mental workload (MWL) theory (Figure 1.5; De Waard, 1996), which
follows the inverted-U function of the Yerkes-Dodson (1908) principle of optimal
arousal. Mental workload is defined as "the reaction to demand", and "the proportion of
capacity that is allocated for task performance" (De Waard, 1996). The model holds that
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Figure 1.5: Workload and performance in six regions (De Waard, 1996).
conditions of extremely low task demand and under-stimulation (region D) will lead
to decreased attention and diminished cortical arousal (Grandjean, 1979), which will
result in low-performance efficiency. Performance is optimal in region A2, where the
operator can easily cope with the task demand without changes to task performance.
In regions A1 and A3, performance is not affected, but the operator has to increase
effort to match task-demands. However, when task demands become too great, and
task-related effort cannot be maintained, performance will decline (region B) until
the high task-demand causes operator overload or fatigue, shown in region C, which
results in low-performance efficiency (Hancock and Verwey, 1997).
Though the MWL model has been discredited on many fronts in terms of its
ability to predict performance impairments (Matthews et al., 2000), task demand is
a critical factor in the development of active and passive fatigue states, the latter of
which would most likely be induced should significant aspects of the driving task be
automated (De Winter et al., 2014). To illustrate the role of MWL on performance in
the transition, let us consider an example from aviation.
The challenges presented by automation in aviation are in some ways analogous
to those emerging in vehicle automation. For many years, aircraft have contained
components that support the pilot by automating entire sub-tasks, including auto-
throttle, anti-skid braking systems and flight management systems. Compared to
ground vehicles, these can be likened to traction control, anti-lock braking system
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(ABS) and forward collision warning systems (FCW). These systems are mainly
aimed at supporting the safety intentions of the operator. However, it is the automated
systems that assume some level of control over the aircraft that have created challenges
regarding human-automation interaction, and not only concerning mode confusion
and incorrect mental models of the automated system. Automating these aspects of
the flying task does not necessarily reduce pilot workload, it simply transfers it to
other tasks such as monitoring the system for errors (Parasuraman et al., 1996). During
periods where workload demands are quite low, such as routine in-flight operations,
pilots’ monitoring behaviour has been shown to degrade (Sumwalt et al., 2002). This
becomes most critical when a pilot is expected to rapidly direct 100% attentional effort
to a task, due to a time-critical situation, such as during descent and final approach
or if an automated system malfunctions or reaches a system limit. Here, the sudden
increase in workload (moving from region A3 to B to C, in Figure 1.5), results in a
concomitant decrease in performance, which manifests as poor decision-making or
taking unsafe actions.
Similarly, should an driver who is disengaged from the driving task, be required to
resume manual control from HAD, the mental demand for redirecting attention to both
the cognitive and physical aspects of the driving task may also to lead to overload,
especially for inexperienced or untrained drivers (Merat et al., 2012). Moreover,
expecting a driver to monitor the automated system for long periods of time, while
not being in control of the vehicle, can also lead to mental overload should the driver
be unexpectedly required to attend to the driving task. Research in the aviation
domain has also shown that the longer and more frequent a pilot uses automation,
the more impaired their manual flight skills become (Wiener, 1988). The United States
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledged this in a recent Safety Alert
For Operators (SAFO), discussing the findings of analysis done on flight operations,
that there was an increase in manual handling errors (FAA, 2013). The report states,
"continuous use of auto flight systems could lead to a degradation of a pilot’s ability to quickly
recover the aircraft from an undesired state". The SAFO recommended that operators
incorporate "emphasis of manual flight operations into both line operations and training". It
should not be taken lightly that the aviation industry is expressing such grave concern
over the effects of automation, especially as pilots are typically more highly skilled,
with more experience and operate in less complex environments than average drivers
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of ground vehicles.
However, a strict interpretation of performance from an MWL perspective assumes
a set workload requirement during a transition, where in practice it is more dynamic.
For example, traffic situations tend to change quite quickly. Therefore, there may be
instances where drivers are asked to resume manual control, but as soon as doing
so, any subsequent change in the road and traffic scenario may be associated with an
increase or decrease in MWL for the driver. Therefore, it is also important to consider
the effect of MWL in the transition in concert with the characteristics of both the
transition and what drivers are doing before period of the transition.
While tasks requiring moderate MWL have traditionally been encouraged, to
ward off the deleterious effects of underload and overload on attention (Hancock
and Verwey, 1987; Schömig et al., 2015), in the context of transitions it is not clear
whether this is sufficient to ensure a safe transition to manual driving, especially as
task characteristics vary in terms of their stimulus attributes, conceptual criteria, goal
states (what to do), and action rules (how to do it). It is clearly important, therefore, to
understand the effect of different driver activities during automation on their ability
to safely resume manual control. The following sections consider some factors known
and hypothesised to influence drivers’ performance in the transition.
1.5 Driver-based factors influencing performance in
the transition
There is a range of factors contributing to the aetiology of automation-related inter-
action errors and accidents, including insufficient or inappropriate system feedback,
misunderstanding of automation, and over-reliance on automation (Billings, 1997;
Parasuraman and Byrne, 2003; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). In addition, a number
of inter-related psychological factors have been linked to drivers’ capacity to interact
safely with automated driving systems, including trust, mental models, situation
awareness, and the out-of-the-loop problem (Young and Stanton, 2002; Merat and
Jamson, 2009; Kircher et al., 2014; De Winter et al., 2015; Seppelt and Victor, 2016).
These will be discussed below.
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1.5.1 Trust
Automation trust can be described as "the attitude that an agent will help achieve an
individual’s goals in a situation characterised by uncertainty and vulnerability" (Lee and
See, 2004, p. 51). Trust is an important factor determining the success of human-
automation interaction, as it shapes users’ willingness to rely on automation (Lee and
See, 2004). However, it is equally important that users’ develop appropriate reliance,
as levels of trust that do not match the capabilities of the system, i.e. over trust or
distrust, may lead to misuse or disuse, which are detrimental to safety (Parasuraman
and Riley, 1997).
In their dynamic model of automation trust and reliance, Lee and See (2004)
propose that trust is formed through a dynamic interaction between the automation,
interface, operator and context, which is guided by three important elements: First,
that trust and reliance are part of a closed-loop feedback process, where a user’s
trust in automation is guided by their reliance on it, and the user’s reliance on the
automation is in turn guided by their trust in it. The second element proposes that
whether or not this trust translates into actual reliance depends on contextual factors
such as user workload and effort to engage. Third, developing appropriate trust is
highly dependent on how users’ interpret information about the automation, and,
therefore, the content and format of information displays are crucial to calibrating
trust.
1.5.2 Mental models
For an operator to have effective control over any process, they must possess a mental
model of that system (Johnson-Laird, 1980; Norman, 1983, Moray, 1990). A mental
model is an operator’s memory of a system, which is used to predict how or whether
that system will respond to different control inputs and environmental changes (Klein
and Crandall, 1995). The highest levels of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995a; see
Section 1.5.3) are achieved when the controller can anticipate the future state of the
system (Endsley and Kiris, 1995), and the accuracy of a mental model is related to
their experience and training with that system, while its weakness may be caused by
inconsistent system behaviours.
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With the introduction of semi-automated driving systems, vehicle control and
responsibility are shared between two agents, a driver and vehicle. A driver’s mental
model of that system’s functionality will inform their decision about whether or not to
intervene in particular situations. Should a driver’s mental model be inconsistent with
the actual system model, he/she may either intervene unnecessarily or worse, he/she
may fail to intervene when it is necessary (Stanton and Young, 2000; Pauwelussen and
Feenstra, 2011).
Therefore, mental models will play a crucial role in drivers’ problem solving,
judgement, decision making and abilities to plan and act, during their interactions
with an automated driving system (Beggiato and Krems, 2013). It is of utmost
importance, therefore, that drivers can develop appropriate models of the system’s
functionalities because both inappropriate intervention and active failure to intervene
present a risk to safety (Sarter and Woods, 1995).
1.5.3 Situation awareness
Situation awareness (SA) is considered one of the most important of human factors
constructs that are predictive of performance and safety (Parasuraman et a., 2008).
Humans are highly adaptable, able to solve complex problems, and have a superior
sensory system, making them highly capable drivers that can navigate effectively
(Fletcher, 2008). However, for a human to fulfil these competencies in a driving context
depends first and foremost on their awareness and understanding of the situation and
environment.
What is situation awareness?
Several attempts have been made to develop a concise definition of SA, with Endlsey’s
(1988) being the most commonly cited:
"Situation awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status
in the near future."
Endsley (1995a) elaborated on this statement to define SA on three levels: Level 1 SA
(perception) involves being aware of various elements of information in the environment
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Figure 1.6: Endlsey’s model of SA. This is a synthesis of versions she has given
in several sources, notably Endsley (1995a) and Endsley et al. (2000), in Jin, 2008.
relevant to successful task performance, such as the size, colour, location and speed
of objects. Level 2 SA (comprehension) refers to the ability to interpret the meaning,
context and significance of that information, and is integrally linked to Level 1 SA.
The third stage, Level 3 SA (prediction), refers to an ability to predict the future state
or configuration of the environmental conditions, interpreted through Level 1 and
Level 2 SA (Endsley, 1995a; Figure 1.6). SA does not only imply a driver knows what
is going on, but that they know what is going on with elements in the environment
specific to the driving task.
The levels of SA are hierarchically dependent, which means, for example, that a lack
of visual cues and proprioceptive information at (Level 1 SA) will result in inaccurate
meaning/sense making and prediction (Level 3 SA) (Ward, 2000). Conversely, an
inaccurate prediction of future situations (Level 3 SA) can lead to a misinterpretation
of the environmental context (Level 2 SA), which can lead to a false interpretation of
specific elements in the environment (Level 1 SA). Therefore, in the same way, that the
driving task requires both sufficient feed-forward and feedback elements to support
task performance, and goal attainment, so sufficient SA on all three levels is necessary
(Ward, 2000).
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Assessing situation awareness
SA has been investigated in numerous domains, to investigate human performance,
including military aviation (Endsley, 1995b), air traffic control (Endsley and Kiris, 1995),
military operations (Matthews et al., 2000), driving (Walker et al., 2004) and the process
industry (Hogg et al., 1995). Most researchers (e.g. Fracker, 1991; Sarter and Woods,
1995; Wickens, 1992) divide the measures for SA into three broad categories: (a) explicit,
(b) implicit, (c) and subjective measures. Explicit measures require individuals to report
material in memory, either retrospectively or concurrently, including freeze techniques,
such as the well-known Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT;
Endsley, 1995b), which has been shown to have predictive validity. For example, in the
aviation domain, Endsley (1990) showed that SAGAT scores were indicative of pilot
performance in a simulation. Implicit measures utilise task performance to infer SA,
which makes them objective and unobtrusive, but are limited in that poor performance
may be as a result of factors other than low SA. Using subjective measures, such as
the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART; Taylor, 1989), SA is assessed by
self-assessment or by an observer. For example, Endsley et al. (2000) measured SA via
real-time probes in an air traffic control task and found some relationship between
SART and other SA measures but not SAGAT. While subjective measures are practical
and easy to implement, they cannot be compared across raters, and scores may be
skewed based on how good or bad operators perceived their task performance.
Despite the popularity of SA in the academic literature, there are some questions
regarding its utility and scientific validity (Flach, 1995), with some accusing SA
models of being limited by linear, information-processing theory, and providing a
false distinction between cause and effect (Chiappe et al., 2011). Dekker and Hollnagel
(2004), for example, described SA as a "folk model", lacking substance and offering
no useful explanation of how failures arise, while Sarter and Woods (1995) note that
precise definitions of SA are context-dependent, which limits its usefulness as a general
theoretical concept. Endsley (2015) recently argued that many of these criticisms have
arisen out of misconceptions or misunderstandings of the original Endsley (1995a)
model. For example, Endsley (2015) argues that many researchers (e.g. Sorensen et al.,
2010; Salmon et al., 2012; Dekker and Lutzhoft, 2004) incorrectly state that the levels
of SA in Endsley model, are linear, where they, in fact, represent ascending levels of
SA. She went on to rebut these and other ’fallacies’ by referring to a strong body of
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 23
empirical work supporting SA as a diagnostic tool for different humans states, and as
a useful prescriptive model. Next, we consider research focused on the assessment of
SA in HAD.
Situation awareness in HAD
In a critical review of the literature, De Winter et al. (2014) argued there is a close link
between HAD and SA, based on studies of drivers’ eye movements, tests of object
detection, engaging in tasks unrelated to driving, and responses to critical incidents.
With regards to eye movements and tests of object detection and comprehension,
there is an assumption that if a driver is scanning the road environment, they will
have better SA. For engaging in tasks unrelated to driving, there is an assumption
that increased engagement in these tasks will mean lower SA, while for responses to
critical incidences, there is an assumption that the better the responses, the better the
SA.
Eye movements In terms of drivers’ eye movements, a few studies (e.g. Carsten et
al., 2012; Damböck et al., 2013) have found that, compared to manual driving, drivers
in HAD were overwhelmingly less likely to monitor the road, especially the centre
of the visual field, where accidents are more likely to occur. Carsten et al. (2012), for
example, found that, for the 24 drivers who did not focus on the DVD player during
HAD, their visual attention was concentrated on the central region of the road only
53% of the time, compared to 72% in manual driving. While these results do not
necessarily allow us to conclude specifically on maintenance or loss of SA, they do
give some indication that drivers under automation are more inclined to lose SA for
the driving task/environment during HAD, only because they are not monitoring the
driving task. Moreover, it is well established that the more visual attention is paid to
the road scene so the potential for higher SA increases (Green, 1999; Chaparro et al.,
1999), therefore, it follows that the reverse would also be true. However, few studies
have examined eye gaze behaviour for drivers with varying levels of engagement
with the driving task during HAD, which is pertinent given the range of different
tasks/activities that drivers could engage with during automation.
One example is that of Merat et al. (2014), who analysed drivers’ reaction times
after automation disengaged automatically if they were not looking at the road centre
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for longer than 10 s. The authors found that there was a 10-15 s lag time between
when automation disengaged and drivers’ resuming of control. In another driving
simulator study, Gold et al. (2013) showed that, in-between a take-over request and
resumption of control, drivers tended to fixate on side mirrors, which suggests that
this time is used regain SA before resuming control. Lorenz et al. (2014) reporting that
drivers are quick to direct visual attention to the road scene but struggle to instantly
understand the situation. However, the precise eye movement patterns underlying the
process of SA recovery in the transition for drivers with varying levels of SA is not
clear, and deserve further investigation.
Tests of object detection There are conflicting conclusions regarding the impact
of vehicle automation on driver SA when based on tests of object detection. For
the most part, these discrepancies can be attributed to differences in methodological
approaches and interpretation of SA results. For instance, in their meta-analysis of SA
and HAD, with tests of object detection and comprehension, De Winter et al. (2014)
analysed studies by Davis et al. (2008) and McDowell et al. (2008) and concluded
that HAD can result in improved SA compared to manual driving, as drivers in HAD
were able to detect more targets in the road scene. It is curious, though, that the
authors drew this conclusion for SA in HAD, as the studies were on military convoy
drivers that had to detect targets in the road scene, and not anything pertaining to the
environment related to the driving task. It is incorrect to conclude on SA if the task
used to measure it does not in any way form part of what is being investigated in the
first place. The object detection task was not related to performance in the driving
task and, therefore, it is tenuous to assume that maintaining SA in one task implies a
maintained SA in another. Other studies have come to different conclusions on SA.
Biondi et al. (2014) used a surprise recognition memory task developed by Strayer
et al. (2003), to assess the impact of automation on SA during a drive, which is an
explicit retrospective measure of SA. Using a between-subjects design, the authors found
that drivers in HAD were able to recall fewer detailed features in the environment
than those in the manual driving group. This is an interesting means to probe SA
without imposing additional workload during the task. Its utility is limited, however,
as participants may intentionally memorise features in the road scene if they suspect
they might be asked about these at a point in the future. Moreover, it is difficult to
draw conclusions on task-specific SA with a metric designed to assess general SA.
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Non-driving related activities There is a consensus in the literature that HAD
encourages higher uptake of non-driving related activities, compared to manual
driving. Carsten et al. (2012) report that, during HAD, drivers were more likely to use
a DVD player than during manual driving (32.5% vs 2.6% of the time) and also more
likely to use the radio (54.1% vs. 41.4% of the time) and even read a magazine (9%
of the time). This is confirmed by other studies, with Llaneras et al. (2013) finding
that, during HAD, half of the participants texted or emailed during a 1.5h-2h drive.
The authors found that participants engaged in a number of other tasks during HAD
including eating, reaching for an item in the rear compartment, dialling and talking on
the cell phone. The fact that drivers chose to partake in tasks unrelated to driving does
not necessarily reflect the extent to which SA has been lost, or indeed that they have
impaired SA at all. As with measures of eye movements, it simply gives an indication
of the extent to which SA could possibly be lost. A further limitation of this method is
that the authors do not link the type of reaction to any safety or performance-related
outcomes, which would be useful to form a holistic view of the importance of SA to
performance in the transition.
Reactions to critical events Measuring drivers’ reactions to critical events while
in HAD has become a standard methodology for the assessment of the impact of HAD
on performance. As part of the CityMobil project, Merat and Jamson (2008) examined
driver reactions to a number of ’critical’ incidents, including merger from the left,
an oncoming car turning across the vehicle path, the presence of traffic lights, and
the presence of a parked car. Drivers’ responses in manual driving were compared
to those in HAD, where a critical incident triggered automation disengagement and
the driver was expected to respond. The authors used a measure of ’anticipation’,
defined as drivers’ ability to predict and understand the behaviour of traffic during
these critical events, to conclude on drivers’ SA. Anticipation was measured as the
difference in time between the lead car’s brake lights coming into sight and when
drivers depressed their brake pedal. Results showed that, for the three longitudinal
critical events, drivers in the automated driving condition braked on average 1.5 s
later than in the manual driving condition. In the lateral critical event (parked car),
28 of the 38 drivers in the automated driving condition braked after the collision
warning alarm was emitted. One possible explanation is that drivers were less aware
of the unfolding events. However, the authors suggest it may also be because drivers
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over-relied on the automated system, concluding that the use of an automated driving
system may reduce drivers’ situational awareness and may also cause drivers to
become complacent behind the wheel.
While it is possible to make inferences about the state of drivers’ SA, there are
a number of factors in the design of these critical events which can influence how
drivers react. These include the time budget within which a driver is required to
resume control, the road and traffic scenario and the way in which automation status
and take-over request is communicated, and are discussed in Section 1.6.
1.5.4 The out-of-the-loop problem
A key underlying factor contributing to the issues outlined above is the out-of-the-
loop (OoTL) performance problem (Kaber and Endsley, 2003). According to Kienle
et al. (2009), a driver is considered OoTL when they are "not immediately aware of
the vehicle and the road traffic situation because they are not actively monitoring, making
decisions or providing input to the driving task". Therefore, OoTL refers to a state
where an operator loses awareness of the system state and external situation due
to limited human-system interaction (Endsley and Kiris, 1996). This is typified by
a reduced ability for an operator to re-enter the system control loop and resume
manual control. In this sense, OoTL pertains more to the state of the system than the
state of other elements in the environment, which is the focus of SA. However, these
are not mutually exclusive. In the first instance, humans are poor supervisors and
therefore not efficient at detecting system errors (Parasuraman and Riley, 2007). Also,
in the event of an automation failure, the time it would take to re-orient an OoTL
operator to both the system state and the task at hand would most likely result in
either a diminished effectiveness of the task or even a total failure to complete the task
(Kaber and Endsley, 2003). The concept of an OoTL state offers an insight into the
performance consequences of automation. However, it does not incorporate aspects
related to automation-induced complacency and automation bias, which plays a key
role in the development of the OoTL state (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010).
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1.5.5 Complacency and automation bias
Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) describe complacency as an attention allocation
strategy, where automated tasks are neglected in favour of manual tasks, and which is
comprised of trust, confidence, reliance, and safety-related complacency (Parasuraman
et al., 1992). Automation bias, however, refers to omission or commission errors made
by operators, essentially a tendency towards over-reliance on automation (Parasura-
man and Manzey, 2010). These phenomena highlight issues with imperfect automation
and help explain why drivers might experience difficulties when automation does not
function as it should. To better understand these regarding performance consequences,
Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) developed an integrated model of complacency and
automation bias (Figure 1.7).404 June 2010 - Human Factors
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Figure 6. An integrated model of complacency and automation bias.
Figure 1.7: An integrated model of complacency and automation bias (Parasura-
man and Manzey, 2010).
The model consists of three critical featur s: 1) it distinguish s betwe n two
aspects of compla ency and ut mation bi s, re erred to s "complacency potential"
and "attentional bias" in inf rmation processing (Singh et al. 1993a, 1993b), 2) the
differentiatio between automation-induced attentional p enomena and its ossible
performance consequences, and 3) two feedback loops reflecting the dynamic and
adaptive nature of complacency and automati n bias (Manzey and B h er, 2005).
The author conceive complacency potential as a tendency to react in less attentive
manner hen intera ting with a particular automated system, which is influenced
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by system properties (e.g. perceived reliability and consistency) and also individual
characteristics of the operator (e.g. attitudes and personality). These factors are
thought to have a much stronger influence over complacency when task load is
high and, therefore, related to attentional bias (task prioritisation and allocation of
attentional resources). These two phenomena lead to the loss of SA, which manifests
as a performance consequence should automation fail, but has no direct performance
consequence if automation functions normally (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010).
The presence of positive and negative feedback loops in the model implies that
performance consequences are not due to a lack of appropriate system competency or
knowledge. While the model does account for the influence of an individuals’ state
on attentional bias, the authors provide no explanation for how different operator
and motivational states might affect performance consequences. So while the model
provides a coherent account of the role of complacency and attention bias in the loss
of SA, and, therefore ,performance consequences, it is limited in its ability to account
for the exact role of drivers’ engagement with the driving task, nor does the original
description of the OoTL phenomenon, described in the previous section. A possible
solution to this shortfall is to combine these concepts to form a view of interaction
regarding different levels of engagement with the driving task.
For instance, Banks and Stanton (2014) used previous work on human-automation
interaction to theorise four states of engagement with a driving task, across a combi-
nation of in/out-of-the-loop and active/passive states (Table 1.4). While plausible, the
authors provide no empirical results to validate these different states concerning HAD.
They also only refer to driver state regarding the driving task and make no mention of
the impact of arousal on these states. For instance, the Out-of-the-loop & Passive state
does not distinguish between a driver who is cognitively engaged in a non-driving
related task and one who is mind-wandering. Moreover, tasks vary widely regarding
their cognitive, visual, and auditory loads. Therefore, if interacting with automated
driving systems could give rise to these different states of engagement, then it is vital
to establish exactly what these are and what their implications are for a drivers’ ability
to resume control. This is key to developing appropriate strategies for ensuring drivers
safely and efficiently re-engage in manual driving. For example, human-machine
systems that emphasise either situation-relevant information or haptic vehicle control
support during the transition, or both.
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Table 1.4: States of engagement with a driving task (Banks and Stanton, 2014).
In-the-loop Out-of-the-loop
Active The driver is in full control of the vehicle and
actively engaged in the driving task.
The driver is in full control of the vehicle but
showing characteristics of being out-of-the-loop
e.g. driving without attention.
Passive The driver is no longer in control of the vehicle
but remains vigilant to the driving task.
The driver is no longer in control of the vehicle
and becomes desensitised to the driving task.
1.6 Vehicle/Environment-based factors influencing
performance in the transition
There are a number of vehicle/environment-based factors shown to influence driver
performance in the transition, including the transition time budget, the design of the
HMI, and the road and traffic situation.
1.6.1 Time budget
A primary area of interest in the study of transitions in HAD in recent years is the
time it takes for drivers to resume manual control given a particular time budget or
lead time (e.g. Damböck et al., 2012; Gold et al., 2013; Naujoks et al., 2014; Zeeb et
al., 2015; Payre et al., 2016). Damböck et al. (2012) was the first to systematically vary
the time budget available to drivers following a take-over request. Comparing time
budgets of 4 s, 5 s, 6 s, and 8 s, the authors found that, compared to when in manual
control, drivers crashed significantly more frequently in all time budget conditions
except for the 8 s condition. Gold et al. (2013) examined driver behaviour following
an auditory take-over request at either 5 s or 7 s time-to-collisions, with a stationary
vehicle in the lane ahead. Results were compared to a baseline group that performed
the same task but in manual driving. The Gold et al. study provides a detailed account
of behavioural responses to different take-over times (see Figure 1.8). Drivers with a
shorter time budget (5 s) were able to react faster in all considered variables compared
to drivers given a longer time budget (7 s), but they tended to have fewer glances
at the rear and side mirrors before a lane change and were also less likely to use an
indicator. Therefore, drivers who were given a 5 s time budget showed more erratic
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Figure 1.8: Reaction sequences in the Gold et al. (2014) study.
behaviour following a take-over.
Using a similar rear-end near-crash situation, van den Beukel and van der Voort
(2013) found that, when given time budgets of 1.5 s and 2.8 s, drivers in in 47.5% and
12.5% of cases, respectively, were unable to avoid colliding with a braking lead vehicle.
Zeeb et al. (2015) found similar crash rates, where 45% of drivers who were given a
time budget of 4.9 s crashed with a lead vehicle, and where 15% of drivers given a
6.6 s time budget, crashed. These studies clearly demonstrate that, in time-pressured
take-over scenarios, drivers struggle to resume vehicle control and resolve the critically
of the situation.
However, the motivation of focusing on driver responses given different time
budgets arises from a need to define operational and technical parameters for the
design of automated driving systems, which, as pointed out by Larsson (2013),
provides only a narrow view of how drivers interact with their automated driving
system. This is especially true considering that some other external factors in the
transition scenario vary between studies. This limits our understanding of deeper
behavioural adaptations brought about by such system interactions, and, therefore,
how they should be designed to ensure safe and efficient interactions.
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1.6.2 Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) is used to provide system feedback to users,
which is argued to be important for appropriate human-automation interactions
(Norman, 1990). Incorrect or insufficient system feedback could result in drivers
developing inaccurate mental models, which could lead to errors in decision or action
(Sarter and Woods, 1995). To ensure that feedback is both correct and sufficient,
Norman (1990) proposed a set of four design criteria for automation HMIs, as follows:
"Appropriate design should (1) assume the existence of error, (2) it should continually provide
feedback, (3) it should continually interact with operators in an effective manner, and (4) it
should allow for the worst of situations" (Norman, 1990).
The design of feedback and warning systems for automated vehicles typically
communicate information in range of modalities (for a review, see Manca et al., 2015),
sequences (Radlmayr et al., 2014), and with various meanings (Lorenz et al., 2014;
Beller et al., 2013).
The nature of the HMI has been shown to have some mediating effect on per-
formance in the transition. For example, concerning modality, Naujoks et al. (2014)
assessed driver performance following ’visual’ and ’visual + auditory’ take-over re-
quests in three different traffic scenarios. Reaction time, measured as hands on the
steering wheel, was significantly higher for the ’visual’ group compared to the ’visual +
auditory’ group (6.19 s vs. 2.29 s). Similarly, both maximum lateral position and SDLP
were significantly higher for the ’visual’ group compared to the ’visual + auditory’
(0.84 m vs. 0.43 m and 0.30 m vs. 0.15 m, respectively). Differences between modality
conditions were more pronounced the more difficult the traffic scenario. Lee et al.
(2002) found that an auditory warning elicited significantly shorter braking times,
irrespective of whether participants were distracted or not.
Petermeijer et al. (2015) investigated the usefulness of vibrotactile stimuli embed-
ded in drivers’ seats to elicit faster take-over time. The authors found that, when the
vibrations were presented in a static pattern, steering wheel touch and steering input
reaction times were approximately 200 ms faster than when presented in a dynamic
pattern, which indicated a directional cue for a lane change manoeuvre However,
the study did not include a non-vibrotactile condition against which to evaluate the
usefulness of vibrotactile warnings.
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1.6 VEHICLE/ENVIRONMENT-BASED FACTORS INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE
IN THE TRANSITION
Lorenz et al. (2014) investigated two augmented reality (AR) concepts for warnings
and information during the transition. An "AR red" concept projected a restricted
corridor directly onto the road scene, showing the driver where they must not steer
through, while an "AR green" concept displayed a safe corridor showing the driver
where they can steer through, and a control condition provided no AR information.
There was no difference between the two concepts regarding take-over time. However,
drivers in the "AR green" concept had better vehicle control, as measured by steering
trajectories, and longitudinal and lateral accelerations.
In a driving simulator study, Beller et al. (2013) used symbols of automation
uncertainty in an attempt to improve driver-automation interaction. The authors
compared the use of automation uncertainty versus no uncertainty information in
high and low automation reliability conditions and found that displaying automation
uncertainty increased time-to-collision in the case of automation failure. These studies
confirmed the importance of system feedback during the transition in improving not
only performance but also acceptance of and trust in the automated system.
1.6.3 Road and traffic scenario
There are some road and traffic situations that have been investigated in studies of
the transition and typically reflect actual or predicted limitations or boundaries, of
an automated driving system. These include situations where the vehicle is reaching
a target destination, surrounding vehicles or road works obstruct intended journey
path, technical/sensor failure, and a system limitation in dealing with unaccounted
for road and traffic scenarios, such as an accident or absence of road infrastructure
supporting the automation.
Radlmayr et al. (2014) investigated the effect of varying traffic situations and
non-driving related tasks on the process and quality of a system-initiated take-over.
The experiment was conducted in a high-fidelity simulator and used the standardised
visual Surrogate Reference Task (SuRT) and the cognitive n-back task to simulate
the non-driving related tasks. The study included four traffic situations each with
a time budget of 7 s: In situation No. 1, an obstacle appeared in the middle lane,
while the right and left lane were blocked by vehicles at the time of the take-over
request (TOR). In situation No. 2, an obstacle appeared in the right lane while no other
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vehicles were present during the situation. In situation No. 3, the obstacle appeared
on the left lane. Situation No. 4 closely resembled No. 1, except that the two adjacent
lanes were not blocked. The authors used a range of dependent variables to infer
quality of the transition. These included take-over time, longitudinal acceleration,
time to collision (TTC), the total number of collisions during take-over, results from
a Detection Response Task (DRT) and the subjective rating. The authors concluded
that traffic scenario and traffic density had a substantial effect on take-over quality
in a highway setting. Similarly, Kircher et al. (2014) found that drivers’ response
times were moderated by whether the driver was pre-warned and by the type of
scenario. Traffic density has been shown to influence how long drivers need to regain
situation awareness and resume control (Jamson et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2016). These
suggest that performance in the transition is dependent on the complexity of the
traffic scenario. However, Naujoks et al. (2014) found no effect of traffic scenarios in a
take-over event.
1.7 Summary and key research gaps
Impaired performance during in human-automation interaction is typically attributed
to the out-of-the-loop (OoTL) phenomenon (Endsley and Kiris, 1995). However, depending
on the context, the term "loop" has been used to refer to one of a range of factors,
including varying degrees of physical control, cognitive control, awareness, and feed-
back. Moreover, it may be concluded that some of the key gaps in our knowledge on
how drivers interact with automated driving systems can be defined in the following
broad terms:
• With the appeal of automation to free drivers’ attention in the vehicle, the
research community has focused on understanding the impact of engagement
in one or two non-driving related secondary tasks at a time, on behaviour and
performance. However, given the importance of SA to safe human-automation
interaction, it is notable that little research has compared the effects of a range of
conditions that systematically vary the impact of drivers’ SA during automation
to investigate drivers’ performance during the resumption of manual control.
• A common approach in assessing driver behaviour during automation is to
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employ metrics traditionally used in the study of manual driving, which, as
discussed in the following chapters, often fall short of what is necessary to
quantify not only how drivers interact with automation, but also the quality
of that interaction. It may be concluded that there has been no consistently
applied objective measure of the quality of performance after the transition.
SAE International (2014, p. 7) states that performance is taken to be "the timely,
safe, and correct performance of the dynamic driving task for the prevailing circum-
stances", yet quite how studies define this is either scarcely reported, and varies
widely. Some studies have focused on take-over time as a measure (Gold et al.,
2014), while others have considered minimum time to collision (TTC; Gold et
al., 2013), minimum time headway (Merat and Jamson, 2009), and maximum
accelerations (Zeeb et al., 2016; Hergeth et al., 2016). However, take-over time
and other response-time based measures do not detail the quality of vehicle
control following the transition, and while this can be described in part by TTC
and vehicle-based measures, their interpretation is somewhat constrained by
the kinematics of the scenario. Therefore, a deeper understanding of how these
performance measures should be interpreted in the context of the transition is
required.
Clearly, these issues have contributed to the research community’s inability to
concur on a definition of an out-of-the-loop driver, how this state is assessed and
classified, and what behavioural response profiles reflect an efficient and safe tran-
sition to manual control. If we can understand the nature of the OoTL performance
problem, and how this interacts with SA, we will be better able to predict performance
breakdowns in different situations, which will inform the design of more human-
centered automated driving systems that augment drivers’ capabilities and mitigate
their limitations.
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1.8 Research questions and thesis overview
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the nature of the out-of-the-loop phenomenon
in highly automated driving, and its effect on driver behaviour during automated
driving and the transition from automated to manual control. In particular, the thesis
seeks to address the following questions:
1. How does automation affect drivers’ performance in transition situations re-
quiring control- and tactical-level responses?
2. How does automation affect drivers’ behaviour in automation compared to
manual driving?
3. What is the pattern of drivers’ visual attention distribution during automa-
tion?
4. How does automation affect drivers’ visual attention distribution in the tran-
sition?
5. How does automation affect drivers’ perceptual-motor performance during
and immediately after the transition?
To induce a range of OoTL states during HAD, drivers were exposed to various
OoTL manipulations. These manipulations varied regarding drivers’ secondary task
engagement as well as the amount of visual information available to drivers from the
system and road environment.
As outlined in Figure 1.9, the overall structure of the study takes the form of seven
chapters.
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Figure 1.9: Thesis structure.
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resumption of control
Assess drivers’ perceptual motor attunement during the 
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• Chapter two reports on a study that sought to establish a realistic highway use-
case for studying human-automation interaction, as well as a methodology to
probe drivers’ ability to respond to critical road events following the resumption
of control from automation. To vary driver workload during the transition while
maintaining the same use-case, drivers were given directional cues for a lane
change manoeuvre, based on the colour of the lead vehicle.
• Chapter three details the refinement of the use-case, and reports on the develop-
ment of a series of experimental conditions designed to induce varying degrees
of driver engagement and interaction with the driving task (OoTL manipula-
tions). Using analysis of eye gaze dispersion, it goes on to discuss how each
condition affects driver information needs during automation and the transition
of control.
• Chapter four presents the analysis of driver eye-gaze dispersion during automa-
tion and in the transition, to assess the effect of the OoTL manipulations on
visual attention allocation, comparing results to manual driving.
• Chapter five presents the analysis of driver eye-fixations to assess driver visual
attention allocation before and during the transition and finds a different pattern
of visual attention distribution for drivers who crash compared to those who do
not.
• Chapter six reports on an analysis of drivers’ perceptual-motor performance
during critical events in automated driving and finds that drivers respond to the
kinematic urgency of the scenario.
• Chapter seven summarises and discusses the work presented in this thesis, and
provides some questions and directions for further work.
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CHAPTER 2
ENGAGING WITH HIGHLY AUTOMATED
DRIVING: TO BE OR NOT TO BE IN THE LOOP?
ABSTRACT This desktop driving simulator study investigated the effect of
engagement in a reading task during vehicle automation on drivers’ ability to
resume manual control and successfully avoid an impending collision. To avoid
collision with the stationary vehicle, drivers were required to regain control of
the automated vehicle and change lane. The decision-making element of this
lane change was manipulated by asking drivers to move into the lane they saw
fit (left or right) or to use the colour of the stationary vehicle as a rule (blue -
left, red - right). Drivers’ reaction to the stationary vehicle in manual control
was compared to two automation conditions: (i) when drivers were engaged
and observing the road during automation, and (ii) when they were reading a
piece of text on an iPad during automation. Overall, findings suggest that drivers
experiencing automation were slower to identify the potential collision scenario,
but once identified the collision was evaded more erratically and at a faster pace
than when drivers were in manual control of the vehicle. Short (1-minute) periods
of automation used in this study did not appear to impede drivers’ ability to
complete simple operational and tactical-level driving tasks, following a system
initiated take-over request. Results suggest that until there is an effective strategy
to help drivers regain SA during resumption of control from Highly Automated
Driving, they should be encouraged to remain in the driving loop.
2.1 Introduction
The promise of ’driverless vehicles’ is slowly being realised, with testing under way by
a number of major manufactures who have committed to bringing the first generation
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of such systems to market by 2020 (Merat et al., 2014). Current Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS), such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), still require the
driver to be in the control loop. These Level 1, function-specific automation systems
(see SAE, 2014), are evolving into Level 2, combined-function automation and on to
more intelligent Level 3, limited self-driving automation, or Highly Automated Driving
(HAD), which will see necessary driver intervention only in certain situations that
cannot be managed by the system. The concern from a human factors perspective is
that this limited driver-state interaction may take drivers out-of-the-loop (OoTL), which
Endsley and Kiris (1996) argue is a state induced by limited human-system interaction,
causing an operator to lose awareness of the system state. The deleterious performance
effects of the OoTL state have led some from cognate disciplines (Parasuraman and
Riley, 2007) to suggest that HAD should be designed such that drivers are kept engaged
and in the-loop for best performance and able to resume control of automation when
system limitations are reached (Merat and Lee, 2012; de Waard et al., 1999), while
others have argued that drivers should not be expected to continuously monitor the
road (Jacoby and Schuster, 1997).
These opposing views may be due in part to the lack of a clear definition of what
constitutes an OoTL state. Also, it is not currently clear what the ’loop’ refers to, an
information processing control loop (attentive to the driving task) or a sensory-motor
control loop (vehicle control), or both. Previous investigations into drivers’ ability
to respond to Level 2 automation failures have explored the effects of workload and
situation awareness (Jamson et al., 2013; Merat et al., 2012) and time budgets for
resuming control (Gold and Bengler, 2014; Damböck et al., 2012), but none have
compared the above distinction, or considered possible effects of different degrees
of driver engagement with the driving task during HAD. It is important to have a
sound theoretical basis for the OoTL concept, as it is frequently referred to in studies
on HAD to explain drivers’ ability to safely resume control from automation.
Another concern is the impact of scenario difficulty on drivers’ return-to-manual
performance, following system disengagement. With a few exceptions (e.g. Kircher,
Larsson and Hultgren, 2013), studies have tended to examine take-overs for scenar-
ios requiring operational-level responses, which are driving tasks that only require
immediate longitudinal and lateral control by the driver (see Michon’s levels of
driving tasks, Michon, 1985). Given that the system limits which enforce a manual
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take-over are likely to be derived from more difficult scenarios than just those at
an operational-level (e.g. road works, exiting a busy motor way), it is relevant to
examine how drivers respond to higher, more tactical-level scenarios, which involve
an element of rule-based decision making processing. However, there is only a very
limited understanding of drivers’ behavioural response to these levels in the context
of HAD. The objective of this study was therefore to investigate the effect of varying
degrees of engagement with the driving task, on behavioural responses to a potential
collision scenario, introducing rule-based scenarios of varying workload to assess
whether there were any behavioural differences between operational and tactical-level
driving tasks. As a result, two hypotheses are evaluated: (a) the further drivers are
disengaged from the driving task the worse their ability to respond appropriately to a
potential collision scenario; (b) the greater the workload imposed on the driver during
automation disengagement the worse their ability to resume control.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Participants
Following approval from the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee, 16
participants (8 male) between the ages of 19 and 26 (M = 21, SD = 1.54) were recruited
via the driving simulator database and were paid £10 for taking part. No other
particular criteria were used for recruiting participants, but they were required to have
had a driving licence for at least one year and drive at least 500 miles per year.
2.2.2 Apparatus
This study was performed using the University of Leeds portable simulator (Figure
2.1, which was operated on a HP Z400 workstation running Windows 7, using custom
made software. The visual simulation imagery was displayed on a Samsung 40"
wide-screen 1920x1080 monitor, rendered at 60 Hz. Vehicle control inputs were via a
Logitech G27 dual-motor force feedback steering wheel and pedals.
During manual driving, participants were entirely responsible for the manipulation
of standard longitudinal (accelerator and brake pedals) and lateral (steering wheel)
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Figure 2.1: Driving simulator set-up. Central display unit (inset) indicated
automation status. A ’beep’ tone alerted drivers when automation was turned
on/off.
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the driving scenario.
controls. During HAD, the longitudinal controller was effectively an ACC with a
default target speed of 67mph (108 km/h) with target headway fixed at 1.5 seconds,
which could not be adjusted by the driver. The lateral controller resembled a Lane
Keeping System (LKS) and, on activation, attempted to maintain the vehicle in the
centre of the current lane occupied. HAD was activated and deactivated automatically
by the simulation. Drivers were notified of changes to automation state with a
non-intrusive ’beep’ tone.
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2.2.3 Design and Procedure
A within-subjects 3x3 repeated-measures design was used, with all participants
completing all conditions. The independent variables were Drive (manual, engaged
automated, distracted automated) and Load (no rule, congruent rule, incongruent
rule).
Upon arrival, participants were briefed on the requirements of the study and
their ethical rights. After completion of informed consent, participants were given
the opportunity to practice manual driving and HAD within a free-flowing 3-lane
motorway. Drivers were asked to ensure safe operation of the vehicle, including timely
take-over from HAD, if necessary.
In the experimental session, drivers initiated a trial by depressing the accelerator
pedal. All trials began in manual driving behind a lead vehicle travelling in the middle
lane at 67mph (108km/h). As shown in Figure 2.2, after 30 seconds of manual driving,
one of three 60 second conditions was presented in a counter-balanced order: In the
manual condition, drivers had full manual control of the vehicle. This corresponded
to an Active & In-the-loop state. In the engaged automation condition, participants
observed the driving scene but took their hands away from the steering wheel and
foot off the accelerator pedal while the automation was active. This aligned with a
Passive & In-the-loop state. In the distracted automation condition, drivers were asked
to read aloud a selection of text that was displayed on an iPad located to the bottom
left of the steering wheel (Figure 2.1). This trial was designed to induce a Passive &
Out-of-the-loop state.
After this 60 second period, the lead vehicle changed lane (to the right or left) to
reveal a stationary vehicle obstructing the middle lane. Participants were instructed
to change lane to avoid colliding with this stranded vehicle. When automation was
activated, this manoeuvre of the lead vehicle coincided with the deactivation of
automation. Four ’ghost’ trials were also randomly assigned during the experiment,
where a stranded vehicle did not exist in the middle lane.
To induce different loads after the lead vehicle changed lanes, drivers’ lane
changing manoeuvre was governed by one of three rules. In the no rule condi-
tion, participants were free to choose the direction of travel to avoid collision with the
stranded vehicle. This only entailed a control element and was therefore considered
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Figure 2.3: Representation of the congruous and incongruous rule conditions.
an operational-level driving task. In the congruous and incongruous rule conditions,
participants were required to change lane in a particular direction, depending on
the colour of the stationary vehicle (green = left, red = right). These were therefore
considered to be tactical-level driving tasks. In the congruous rule condition, the direc-
tion in which the lead vehicle changed lane was the same as the direction instructed
by the rule, while in the incongruous rule condition the opposite was true (Figure
2.3). After passing the stranded vehicle, manual driving continued for a further 30
seconds, after which the driving scene faded out and the trial was over. The next
trial then began as soon as drivers depressed the accelerator pedal. All participants
completed the trials involving the no rule condition first, followed by those involving
the two rule conditions. This was to ensure that the rules for the congruous and
incongruous rule conditions did not confuse participants during the no rule condition.
Based on estimations of future sensor ranges, and results from previous studies (Gold
and Bengler, 2014; Damböck et al., 2012) the Time To Collision (TTC) between the
stationary vehicle and the simulator vehicle was 6.5 seconds. In order to control for
TTC in manual driving, drivers were required to maintain a set headway of 42m,
using chevron markings on the roadway as a guide. Participants completed 18 trials
in total and the time taken to complete the experiment was around 1.5 hours.
A number of dependent variables were used to study performance; maximum
lateral and longitudinal acceleration, time to first steer and time to lane change. A
distribution of how drivers reacted to avoid the collision: steering, braking, steering
and braking, was also noted. Measures of maximum lateral and longitudinal accelera-
tion were taken from when the stationary vehicle was revealed, until the end of the
trial, and were used as indicators of stability of control. Time to first steer considered
the time from when the stationary vehicle was revealed, until the first steering input
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greater than 2◦ was applied. Time to lane change refers to the time from when the
stationary vehicle was revealed until all four corners of a driver’s vehicle were in an
adjacent lane.
2.3 Results and Discussion
A 3x3 repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on maximum
lateral and longitudinal acceleration comparing the values in the three Drives (manual,
engaged automation, and distracted automation) and at the three Load levels (no
rule, congruous rule and incongruous rule). Results showed a significant main effect
of Drive on maximum lateral acceleration [F(2,14) =15.71, P<.001, η2p= .51; Figure
2.4] and post-hoc Bonferroni tests showed higher maximum lateral accelerations
for both engaged automation and distracted automation drives, compared to the
manual drive (p=.008 and p<.001, respectively). Vehicle control, as revealed by lateral
acceleration, was, therefore, more erratic the further drivers were out-of-the-loop.
Comparison between automation drives was not significant. There were no main
effects of maximum longitudinal acceleration and also no interaction effects.
Figure 2.4: Maximum lateral acceleration for Drive (Error bars = SE, * = significant
difference between conditions).
To observe how drivers responded to a potential collision, time to first steer and
time to lane change were subjected to a 3x3 ANOVA, with the same factors as above.
There was a significant effect of Drive on time to first steer [F(2,14) =9.98, p=.001, η2p=
.39; Figure 2.5] with post-hoc Bonferroni tests showing that, compared to manual
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Table 2.1: Brake and Steer combinations for Drive.
Manual Engaged Automation Distracted Automation
Steer Only 72.9 % 81.25 % 70.8 %
Steer and Brake 27.1 % 18.75 % 29.2 %
driving, drivers took significantly longer to generate their first steering manoeuvre
during both engaged automation (p=.002) and distracted automation (p=.037). There
was no significant effect of Load and there was also no interaction effect present
between Drive and Load on time to first steer.
Figure 2.5: Time to first steer for Drive (Error bars = SE, * = significant difference
between conditions).
The effect of Drive on time to lane change approached significance [F(2,14) =3.60,
p=.058, η2p= .19; Figure 2.6]. There was no significant effect of Load on time to lane
change was no interaction between Drive and Load. Taken together, these results
suggest that, regardless of whether they were distracted or not, automation delayed
drivers’ first steering input. However, when observing the scene during automation,
drivers’ response to the collision seems to have been more calculated and more under
their control, taking time to steer to the adjacent lane, with less lateral acceleration.
When engaged in the reading task, drivers seem to have simply responded to the
beep denoting the disengagement of automation, changing lane quickly and more
erratically, as indicated by their maximum lateral deviation.
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Figure 2.6: Time to lane change for Drive (Error bars = SE, * = significant difference
between conditions).
This difference in tactic between engaged and distracted automation is also shown
in the steering and braking behaviour (Table 2.1), where similar results were seen
between engaged automation and manual driving, different to that of distracted
automation. Whilst in 70.8% and 72.9% of cases in the manual and distracted automa-
tion drives participants avoided the obstacle by only steering into the next lane, for
engaged automation the proportion of cases where participants steered increased to
81.28%. Chi square tests revealed that these differences were not significant, however.
There were no collisions with the stationary vehicle across all trials. In terms of
decision-making behaviour based on the condition rules, for the no rule condition,
in 95.83% of cases drivers chose to follow the lead vehicle to avoid a collision, in line
with similar findings by Malaterre et al. (1988). Drivers managed to adhere to the
rule in 100% and 98% of cases for the congruent and incongruent rule conditions,
respectively.
2.4 Conclusions
There has been a great deal of interest regarding how to safely re-engage drivers in
manual driving following a period of HAD (Merat et al., 2014), with the out-of-the-
loop phenomenon cited as a primary contributor to impaired performance. The main
objective of the current study was to investigate the behavioural differences that might
exist between different levels of engagement with a driving task, and whether and to
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what extent these interact with operational and tactical-level driving tasks (Michon,
1985).
Apart from drivers braking less often in the engaged automation than in distracted
automation and manual conditions, which showed similar response profiles, our
results showed that there was no difference between the manual and engaged automa-
tion conditions, across all variables. Though, since the trials were rather stereotypical,
it is likely that, with repeated exposure, drivers increasingly learned how to deal
with the critical events. However, as found in previous studies (Merat et al., 2012),
compared to manual driving, drivers’ response was significantly slower following
brief 1-minute periods of automated driving, even during engaged automation, where
drivers were focused on the road scene immediately prior to the critical event. In
addition, automation seems also to have impacted on the speed and quality of lane
changes, with lane changes completed at a faster rate once initiated, and also with
significantly higher maximal lateral accelerations for both automation conditions,
compared to manual. This demonstrates that the key factor affecting the response
is whether the driver is actively engaged in vehicle control (i.e., an active part of the
sensory-motor control loop).
The OoTL concept seems, therefore, to encompass a strong element of physical
control, with the effects of cognitive control possibly a more subtle addition. Certainly,
the possible priming of the repeated-measures design suggests that any observed
effects of being out of the cognitive control loop are conservative and, therefore,
deserve more focused investigation. To assist in this, future studies on HAD making
reference to the OoTL phenomenon should attempt to distinguish which loop is being
addressed. Our results show that what is most important is whether the driver is
in vehicle control and that this aspect should form the basis for any strategies to
re-engage the driver in manual control. Nevertheless, humans are poor supervisors
(Parasuraman and Riley, 2007) and therefore aspects of information processing control
in HAD needs to be scrutinised by further studies to establish whether the observed
behaviour is valid for more difficult scenarios, under shorter TTCs and after longer
periods of HAD. Finally, in the same way that steering entropy has benefited our
understanding of driver distraction, there is a pressing need to develop an objective
measure of the quality and safety of a take-over, rather than relying on a series of
reaction times, which would fall short of capturing the difficulty inherent in more
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strategic-level driving tasks.
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CHAPTER 3
DRIVER INATTENTION AND VEHICLE
AUTOMATION: HOW DOES ENGAGEMENT
AFFECT RESUMPTION OF CONTROL?
ABSTRACT This driving simulator study, conducted as part of the EC-funded
AdaptIVe project, investigated the effect of level of distraction during automation
(Level 2 SAE) on drivers’ ability to assess automation uncertainty and react to
a potential collision scenario. Drivers’ attention to the road was varied during
automation in one of two driving screen manipulation conditions: occlusion
by light fog and occlusion by heavy fog. Vehicle-based measures, drivers’ eye
movements and response profiles to events after an automation uncertainty
period were measured during a highly automated drive containing one of these
manipulations, and compared to manual driving. In two of seven uncertainty
events, a lead vehicle braked, causing a critical situation. Drivers’ reactions to these
critical events were compared in a between-subjects design, where the driving
scene was manipulated for 1.5 minutes. Results showed that, during automation,
drivers’ response profile to a potential collision scenario was less controlled and
more aggressive immediately after the transition, compared to when they were
in manual control. With respect to screen manipulation in particular, drivers in
the heavy fog condition collided with the lead vehicle more often and also had a
lower minimum headway compared to those in the light fog condition.
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3.1 Introduction
The emergence of vehicle automation presents a radical shift in the way that drivers
interact with their vehicles and the driving task itself. Extensive research has been
carried out on the human factors issues relating to lower levels (SAE Level 1 and 2)
of vehicle automation (such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC); for a review see De
Winter et al. 2014). However, investigating the human factors implications of higher
levels of automation up to SAE Level 5 have been somewhat constrained by the fact
that the development and implementation of this technology are still some way off.
It is argued that as automation advances, it will increasingly relieve drivers of the
moment-to-moment demands of driving (Lee, 2013). However, as these systems will
likely be fallible for some time to come the driver will, on occasions, be required to
intervene and resume control from automation.
Understanding the factors that influence driver distraction is underpinned by a
strong theoretical orientation with multiple definitions. Amongst these, Lee et al.’s
(2008, p. 38) is widely used: "Driver distraction is a diversion of attention away from
activities critical for safe driving towards a competing activity." A key assumption here
is the competition for attentional resources between the driving task and another -
secondary - activity. For the early generations of automation (Level 1-3; SAE, 2014),
however, the "activities critical for safe driving" will be some combination of the driver
monitoring the environment and being the fall-back operator. However, increasing
automation is likely to encourage driver engagement in secondary tasks, because
drivers are no longer required to participate in the driving task at all times (Merat
and Lee, 2012). Indeed, previous work conducted in our laboratories has found
that during Highly Automated Driving (HAD), drivers are more likely to engage in
tasks unrelated to driving (Carsten et al., 2012). The nature of this distraction during
automation can be both driver-initiated and stimulus-oriented, whilst drivers are
also susceptible to stimulus-independent thought or mind-wandering. Such shifts
in attention can interfere with processing of or reaction to safety-critical events and
stimuli, such as roadway hazards (Li et al., 2012). As the level of vehicle automation
increases, drivers are likely to further disengage from driving and may, for example,
fail to recognise and act upon a hazard when faced with a take-over-request (TOR,
Gold et al., 2013).
CHAPTER 3. DRIVER INATTENTION AND VEHICLE AUTOMATION 69
Therefore, less effective driving performance during the transition is likely unless
drivers are given the correct information for resumption of control in an appropriate
and timely manner. For example, drivers’ reaction time to critical events can be
markedly reduced during distraction with a secondary task (Merat et al., 2012).
Driver distraction research has traditionally employed a dual-task paradigm to explain
performance via competition for attentional resources where driving is the primary
task (Strayer and Johnston, 2001). During automation, however, the driver is not
in control of the vehicle, which means that a dual-task paradigm is not possible
in the study of transitions. Therefore, to study the effects of stimulus-independent
thought that may occur before, during and/or after a transition, there is need for the
development of a suitable methodology to establish what mechanisms contribute to
how a driver might go from being engaged with the driving task during automation
to being disengaged, or prone to mind-wandering, a process also referred to as passive
fatigue (see Neubauer, Langheim, Matthews and Saxby, 2011). It is also important to
establish whether and how the effect of such states can be easily measured.
Many of the studies on transitions have rather loosely attributed less effective
driving after return-to-manual control to phenomena such as out-of-the-loop (OoTL)
or having lost situation awareness (SA). Unhelpfully, however, there is some confusion
around the distinction between the OoTL state and SA in terms of what the two
concepts encompass; for example, whether they engage specific attentional domains
or whether they are somewhat analogous. From a purely theoretical perspective,
Endsley (1995) suggests a loss of SA is related to elements within the environment
while being OoTL is specifically linked to elements of the automation status itself. To
further complicate the matter, there is some debate around the usefulness or validity
of each concept (Carsten and Vanderhaegen, 2015). One could draw a distinction
between attentional aspects and physical aspects of control. For example, in a recent
driving simulator study, we attempted to isolate the effects of the attentional and
physical aspects of driving on a driver’s ability to resume manual control and respond
to an impending collision scenario after 60 s of automation (Louw, Merat, and Jamson,
2015). In the first automation condition, participants were asked to keep their eyes on
the road, while in the second they were distracted by a secondary task (reading on a
PDA, which forced their visual attention away from the driving scene).
To assess the physical aspect of resuming control, we compared driver responses
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in both automation conditions to a manual condition. Our results showed that simply
having to regain physical control is an important factor in these contexts, but the
extent to which cognitive disengagement alone influences performance is yet to be
established. It seems, therefore, that the difference between a driver who has lost SA
and a driver who is OoTL is that the latter state also accounts for the effect of not being
in physical control of performance. In addition, the definition of the OoTL concept
is more descriptive about how the loss of SA arises. Endsley (1995) argues that the
passive monitoring of automation, as a result of not being in physical control, leads
to decreased vigilance and a lower understanding, which leads to a loss of SA. Our
proposed schematic representation of the OoTL phenomenon, shown in Figure 3.1,
suggests that the loss of physical control and the loss of SA can arise independently
as a result of vehicle automation and can lead to less effective return-to-manual
performance. Importantly, the loss of physical control can also act on SA, which can
result in less effective performance.
Vehicle 
Automation
Loss of 
Situation 
Awareness
Loss of 
Physical 
control
Impaired 
Performance
Driver
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of the out-of-the-loop (OoTL) phenomenon
Based on studies of OoTL problems in human-automation-interaction in cognate
domains, such as aviation (Molloy and Parasuraman, 1996), it can be argued that the
further drivers are removed from the driving loop, the worse their return-to-manual
performance. This stresses the need to investigate the effect of automation as a
distraction, and in particular how stimulus-independent thought brought about by
automation affects drivers resumption of manual control. However, while investigating
the effects of stimulus-oriented thought simply requires engagement in a secondary
task, inducing stimulus-independent thought is more challenging. Therefore, the
main aim of this study was to develop a means of simulating various degrees of
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the driver OoTL states during HAD. To do this, we worked back from Endsley’s
(1995) definition of SA and OoTL state. We argued that simply adding lateral and
longitudinal assistance (Level2/3 automation) induced the physical aspect of being
OoTL. To induce loss of SA, we progressively limited the driver’s ability to perceive
information about the status of the automated system and the driving environment
itself, by overlaying a fog-like occlusion screen onto the driving scene. We reasoned
that, by partially blocking the road scene (light fog, see below), drivers would be
somewhat aware of their surroundings, whilst blocking the road scene completely
(heavy fog) would completely remove drivers’ awareness of their surroundings.
With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Beller et al., 2014), most previous studies
on transitions (e.g. Gold and Bengler, 2014; Hergeth et al., 2015) have investigated
responses to take-over-requests (TOR) brought on by an automation system’s failure or
limitation. These studies have mostly incorporated mandatory transitions (Goodrich
and Boer, 1999) or TORs, which effectively instruct the driver to resume control. It is
likely, therefore, that such methods simply assess drivers’ ability to react to an alarm or
take over message. Although investigating how drivers perform when they take back
control is an important consideration, the ability to process information and make
decisions in the face of an automated system with limited capabilities is also valuable.
Therefore, in this study, we used the concept of automation uncertainty (or system
limitation) not only to improve understanding of the driver-automation-interaction,
but also as a means of assessing whether drivers could recognise the unfolding of a
potentially critical event (which is an important element of SA). We argue that the
more drivers were taken OoTL, the worse their ability to recognise and respond to
road-related hazards.
While the driver’s role in monitoring the system varies according to the level
of automation, the driver is largely removed from vehicle control when automation
increases beyond SAE level 2 (SAE, 2014). Jamson et al. (2013) suggest that this
then limits the usefulness of many of the metrics traditionally used to assess driver
behaviour, such as Standard Deviation of Lateral Position (SDLP). There is, therefore,
a need to develop a set of objective, formative measures of the quality and safety
implications of the transition (Louw et al., 2015), rather than relying on system-
dependant evaluative measures. Therefore, another aim of this study was to consider
alternative measures to assess the transition to manual control from automation.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
Following approval from the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee, 30
participants (20 male) between the ages of 22 and 69 (M=39.2, SD=14.45) were recruited
via the driving simulator database and were paid £20 for taking part. Participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were required to have had a driving licence for
at least five years (M=20.17 SD=15.26) and drive at least twice a week (mean annual
mileage was 8,616 miles).
3.2.2 Design and Procedure
Materials
The experiment was conducted in the University of Leeds Driving Simulator, which
consists of a Jaguar S-type cab with all driver controls operational. The vehicle is
housed within a 4m spherical projection dome and has a 300◦ field-of-view projec-
tion system. A v4.5 Seeing Machines faceLAB eye-tracker was used to record eye
movements at 60Hz.
Design
A repeated measures mixed design was used for this study, with a between-participant
factor of Condition (no fog, light fog, heavy fog, heavy fog + task) and within-
participant factors of Drive (manual, automated) and Event (critical event 1, critical
event 2).
The experimental session consisted of two drives (manual and automated) lasting
about 20 minutes each, and to alleviate symptoms of fatigue, participants were given
a short break between drives. Participants drove exactly the same road in both drives,
but a screen manipulation was applied to the automated drive only. The order of drives
was counterbalanced across participants, with half of the participants performing the
manual drive first and the automated drive second, or vice versa. As shown in Figure
3.2, within each drive there were seven discrete events, each lasting approximately
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150s. Events 1,3,4,5 and 7 were non-critical while events 2 and 6 were critical. During
the non-critical events, the lead vehicle would either speed up or change lane while in
the critical events the lead vehicle would brake, resulting in an impending collision
scenario (2,6). The time-to-collision (TTC) at the point of the lead vehicle braking was
5s.
To induce the OoTL state during the automated drives we employed two screen
manipulation techniques. In the light fog condition, a translucent grey filter was
overlaid onto the road scene. Here, drivers were able to distinguish elements of
the road environment and movements of the surrounding vehicles, the aim of the
manipulation was to simulate a process whereby limited visual attention was directed
towards the screen, for example when drivers are engaged in reading an email but
partly aware of the driving scene in their peripheral vision. In the heavy fog condition,
an opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene. This manipulation effectively blocked
all visual information from the road environment. For both manipulations, drivers
were also unable to see the HMI which portrayed the status of the automated system.
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Lead vehicle action
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Lead vehicleEgo vehicle
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Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of each discrete event, with events two and
six shown as critical.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were briefed on the description of the study and were asked
to sign a consent form, with an opportunity to ask any questions, if required. They
were then given the opportunity to practice manual driving and Highly Automated
Driving (HAD) within a free-flowing 3-lane motorway. During the practice session,
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participants were talked through the various aspects of the vehicle HMI (Figure 3.3)
were shown how to engage and disengage the automation, and were also shown the
screen manipulation they would encounter during the experimental automated drive.
The road contained ambient traffic, but participants did not experience the critical
events during the practice drives.
Figure 3.3: Example of the in-vehicle HMI with the FCW symbol on the left and
the Automation Status Symbol on the right.
In terms of automation uncertainty, participants were told that, should the automa-
tion become uncertain during the drive (see below for how this was portrayed), they
should monitor the driving environment and determine for themselves whether or
not to intervene. Participants were instructed to drive in lane 2 of the motorway for
the duration of the drive but were permitted to change lane in critical situations, and
were told to move back into lane 2 as soon as possible. Drivers were asked to obey the
normal rules of the road and to ensure safe operation of the vehicle.
To engage the highly automated driving system, participants pressed a button
on the steering wheel. To disengage automation, participants would either press the
same button, turn the steering wheel more than 2◦ or press the brake pedal. During
the automated drive, participants were asked to move to the centre of the middle lane
as soon as convenient and then activate automated driving as soon as it was available
(see Figure 3.2) which typically occurred 30 s after the drive began. If drivers did not
engage automation, after 60 s the system engaged automatically. The activation of
automation constituted the start of an event. After 30 s of automated driving, one of
two 90 s screen manipulations began. It is important to note that the vehicle dynamics,
as well as all auditory cues, remained active during the screen manipulations. To
ensure drivers were able to disengage from the driving task during automation
without experiencing a high level of fatigue, we chose a screen manipulation duration
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of 90 s. After each screen manipulation, the presence of a lead vehicle triggered an
uncertainty scenario. At this point, the screen manipulation concluded, the driving
scene was again visible, and simultaneously the automation status changed from
"Engaged" to "Uncertain". Drivers were notified of this change by an auditory ’beep’
and the automation status symbol, which was now visible, changed from green to
flashing yellow. The driver was then expected to monitor the situation and intervene
if necessary. After 3 s, the lead vehicle would make one of three manoeuvres: In
the non-critical event (1,3,4,6) the lead vehicle either moved out of lane 2 or sped up,
while in the critical events (2,6) the lead vehicle braked sharply with a maximum
deceleration of 5.0 m/s2.
Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
The status of the vehicle’s automated system was indicated by the colour of a steering
wheel symbol that was located on the left panel of the central display unit (See Figure
3.3). There were four possible combinations of this status, as outlined in Table 3.1. Any
change to the automation state, whether driver- or system-initiated, was accompanied
by a non-intrusive ’beep’ tone.
In addition to the automation status, a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) symbol
was included in the left panel of the central display unit Figure (3.3). Active only
when automation was engaged, this system provided a visual approximation of the
headway of the lead vehicle in seconds. A continuous alarm alerted drivers of an
imminent collision whenever TTC with the lead vehicle was below a threshold of 2 s.
To further deprive drivers of system information during automation, the automation
status (steering wheel) and the FCW status were also hidden. However, participants
were able to reveal the HMI at any point by pulling the left indicator stick towards
them. This action illuminated the HMI for 2 s. Participants were able to do this as
often as they wanted.
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Table 3.1: Description of the automation status HMI.
Steering Wheel
Colour
Automation status Description
Grey Unavailable Indicates that automation is not available to be engaged by the driver.
Appears during the first 30 s of the automated drive and when the vehi-
cle is not in the middle of the middle lane.
Flashing green Available Indicates that the driver is able to engage automation. Appears when
the vehicle is in the middle of the middle lane.
Green Engaged Indicates that the vehicle is being controlled by the automated system,
which manages gentle manoeuvres and is not designed to respond to
critical and unexpected incidents.
Flashing yellow Uncertain Indicates that the automated system, while currently functioning nor-
mally, thinks that in the near future there may be a situation on the road
that it cannot deal with and, therefore, requires the driver to monitor the
road and intervene where necessary.
Red Disengaged Indicates that the automation is temporarily unavailable. Appears im-
mediately after automation is disengaged.
3.3 Results and Discussion
In this experiment, we attempted to simulate the feeling of being OoTL during HAD
by limiting system and environmental information, and examined drivers’ assessment
of the criticality of automation uncertainty warnings and their ability to respond to
critical situations. We hypothesised that as drivers are further removed from the
loop their ability to assess and respond to critical situations would be degraded.
Additionally, we expected that drivers’ ability to recognise and respond to these
critical situations would be worse in automation, compared to manual driving and
that response in heavy fog conditions would be worse than light fog, which has some
visibility of the driving environment.
3.3.1 Validating the OoTL state
To assess the validity of the screen manipulation technique for inducing a state of
being OOTL, we considered drivers’ visual attention to the road scene and driving
task by observing its distribution across five spatial regions as illustrated in Figure 3.4,
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similar to a technique used by Hughes and Cole (1988) and Carsten et al. (2012). We
used Percentage Road Centre (PRC; Victor, 2005) all seven events, and during both
manual and automated driving. PRC was defined as the mode of gaze fixations that
fell within the road centre area, a 6◦ circular region within a 60 s moving window.
As described in Carsten et al. (2012), the left region covered fixations to the centre
console (e.g., radio controls) as well as the left side mirror, door window, and passing
traffic in the adjacent lane. The right region covered the right side mirror, door
window, and passing traffic in the adjacent lane. The bottom region covered mainly
the dashboard, where the speedometer, automation HMI, and a variety of gauges
were located. The top region covered mainly the sky. We reasoned that automation
would reduce drivers’ attention to the road and, therefore, reduce PRC values in the
central region, in particular.
Figure 3.4: Visual attention regions (Carsten et al., 2012).
To understand what information may be useful to drivers when they are required
to re-engage in the driving task, we also calculated the point of first gaze fixation
after each screen manipulation ended in the two automation conditions. Finally, we
counted the frequency of occasions drivers used the indicator stick to glimpse at the
HMI, in order to understand whether and to what extent drivers were engaging with
the driving task during the periods of screen manipulation when automation was on.
3.3.2 Distribution of visual attention
The drivers’ gaze behaviour was analysed across Screen Manipulation conditions.
PRC during periods of Screen Manipulation for all seven periods of automation was
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compared using a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with Drive (automation,
manual) as a within-subjects factor. Figure 3.5 shows that when compared to those in
the heavy fog condition, participants in the light fog condition, fixated on the road
ahead (depicted by the Centre bar) significantly more often than any other visible
sections of the driving environment (F(1,26) = 31.984, p<.001, η2p = .417). These can be
compared to the central PRC values in the manual drive, which were 73.77% for the
light fog group and 73.50% for the heavy fog group. By the same token, for the same
period, less fixations were observed towards the bottom of the screen (including the
dashboard area) (F(1,26) = 4.792, p=.001, η2p= .363) and the left and right of the screen
(including the side mirrors) (F(1,26) = 4.480, p=.044, η2p= .147).
Figure 3.5: Percentage Road Centre during Light Fog and Heavy Fog automation
drives. Error bars = SEM. * indicates significant difference.
3.3.3 Engagement with the system
Data were analysed using a mixed-design ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of
Events (7) and a between-subject factor of Condition (light f og, heavy f og). Mauchly’s
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(20) = 151.86, p <
.001), and therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser
estimates of sphericity (e =0.26). There was a main effect of Events [F(1.557, 42.027) =
5.185, p=.015, η2p.161], where drivers glimpsed at the automation status less often as
the drive progressed over the seven events (Figure 3.6). This suggests that, over time,
participants were more disengaged from the driving task, possibly either because they
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trusted the system more or because the system status was always the same when they
checked. There was no main effect of Condition, however, which indicates that drivers’
engagement was not influenced by whether or not they could see what was happening
in the road environment during light fog versus heavy fog conditions. There were
also no significant interactions between Condition and Event.
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Figure 3.6: Average number of ’peeks’ at the hidden automation status throughout
the light fog and heavy fog automated drives.
3.3.4 First gaze fixation
When the screen manipulation was turned off, more of the participants driving in the
light fog condition looked at the road centre first (M=76.53% vs. M=66.67%) compared
to the central display area, which contained the dashboard (M=8.16% vs. M=15.24%).
However, a chi-squared test indicated that these differences were not statistically
significant.
3.3.5 Driver response to critical events
Driver response measures during the critical events included automation disengage-
ment time, a count of the process by which participants disengaged automation, as
well as how many lane changes and collisions were experienced.
Automation disengagement time was analysed with a mixed-design ANOVA, with
Event (critical event 1, critical event 2) as a within-subjects factor and Condition (light
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Table 3.2: Disengagement methods for all cases in the critical and non-critical
events.
Critical Events (2,6) Non-Critical Events (1,3,4,5)
Light Fog Heavy Fog Light Fog Heavy Fog
Brake 18/30 23/30 2/60 8/60
Steer 9/30 7/30 9/60 6/60
Button 3/30 0/30 4/60 0/60
Automation Remained Engaged 0/30 0/30 45/60 46/60
fog, heavy fog) as a between-subjects factor. Chi-squared tests were conducted on lane
change and collision counts.
There was no effect of Condition on automation disengagement time [F(1,27) =
.991, p=.328, η2p= .034], suggesting that being OoTL prior to the critical event did not
impede drivers’ ability to react to the lead vehicle braking. There was also no effect of
Event and no interactions between Event and Condition. However, as argued earlier,
drivers’ disengagement times might be considered less informative than whether and
how they reacted. Results from Table 3.2 show that, for the non-critical events, in
both the light fog and heavy fog conditions, automation was only disengaged in a
quarter of cases, while for the critical events automation was disengaged in all 60 cases.
Importantly, only 8 of these critical event disengagements occurred before the lead
vehicle braked, suggesting that, during the automation uncertainty even drivers were
able to regain sufficient SA to recognise the criticality of the situation (lead vehicle
braking, reduced TTC and the likelihood of a collision). Drivers were not explicitly
told how the system would behave in a critical situation, which suggests that when
drivers do not know the limitations of their automated systems, they trust their own
abilities over those of the system or they could be suspicious until they trust it.
To assess associations for lane changes, a chi-squared analysis was conducted.
Table 3.3 shows that, drivers made fewer lane changes in the automation condition
compared to manual. However, even though drivers were able to recognise the
criticality of the event following automation, they were still unable to avoid a collision,
with a chi-squared test revealing that significantly more collisions with the lead vehicle
occurred in the automation than manual drives (p=.01). During automation, however,
there was a marked increase in collisions when the heavy fog manipulation was on,
CHAPTER 3. DRIVER INATTENTION AND VEHICLE AUTOMATION 81
Table 3.3: Lane Changes and collision counts (in brackets).
Automation Manual
Critical Event 1 Critical Event 2 Critical Event 1 Critical Event 2
Light Fog 7 (2) 10 (1) 11 (1) 12 (0)
Heavy Fog 9 (7) 9 (3) 11 (2) 11 (1)
compared to the light fog condition, with the trend more prominent in the first critical
event. These results suggest that, compared to manual driving, automation reduced
drivers’ ability to avoid a collision, and particularly so when drivers were further out
of the loop in the heavy fog condition.
3.3.6 Vehicle measures
To examine driver’s overall vehicle control during the transition in critical events (2,6),
longitudinal driving performance was measured using maximum deceleration from
the point of resumption of manual control to the end of the critical event, which was
10 seconds after the lead vehicle’s brake light illuminated. Taken in the same time
frame, lateral driving performance was measured using maximum lateral acceleration,
which has also been used previously as a measure of vehicle control (Gold et al.,
2014; Louw et al., 2015). Minimum distance headway was also calculated and was a
measure of how close a driver came to the rear of the lead vehicle.
A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on Drive (automation, manual) and Event
(critical event 1, critical event 2) as within-subjects factors and Condition (light fog,
heavy fog) as a between-subjects factor, for maximum lateral acceleration, maximum
deceleration and minimum headway.
Maximum lateral acceleration
Maximum lateral acceleration was significantly higher in the automated drives, com-
pared to the manual drives (M=1.99m/s2; SE=0.19 m/s2, vs. M=1.13 m/s2; SE=0.12
m/s2) [F(1,28) = 9.382, p=.005, η2p= .251), suggesting that following re-entry into
manual control drivers displayed less stable vehicle control in response to a potential
collision scenario, compared to manual driving. However, there was no effect of
Condition or Event and also no interactions.
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Maximum deceleration
There was also a significant effect of Drive on maximum deceleration [F(1,25)=13.774,
p=.001, η2p=.355], with participants reducing their speed at a higher rate in the au-
tomated drive (M=-5.94 m/s2; SE=0.45 m/s2, vs. M=-4.25 m/s2; SE=0.46 m/s2). As
shown in Figure 3.7, this effect was qualified by the interaction between Drive and
Condition, [F(1,28)=9.382, p=.005, η2p=.251], where the difference in maximum deceler-
ation between the automation and manual drives was significantly greater in the light
fog condition. There was no effect of Condition or Event and no other interactions.
Figure 3.7: Maximum deceleration for the two Drives and for the two Conditions.
Error bars = SEM.
Headway
There was a main effect of Drive on minimum headway [F(1,28)=7.343, p=.011, η2p=
.208], being significantly shorter in the automated drive (M=15.31m, SE=2.72) than
in the manual drive (M=22.75m, SE=3.47m). The result of this lower headway is
also demonstrated by the higher collision count in the automated drives (Table 3).
There was an effect of Condition for headway [F(1,28) = 5.679, p=.024, η2p= .169], with
drivers in the heavy fog condition having a significantly shorter headway (M=12.96,
SE=2.63m) compared to the light fog condition (M=17.66m, SE=2.81m), but this result
needs to be interpreted cautiously because of the inter-group variance in headway in
this between-subjects design. This is further supported by the differences in collision
counts between the light fog and heavy fog conditions. There was a significant
effect of Event for headway [F(1,28)=10.513, p=.003, η2p=.273] with shorter headway
CHAPTER 3. DRIVER INATTENTION AND VEHICLE AUTOMATION 83
in the second critical event (M=15.27m, SE=2.98m), compared to the first (M=22.75m,
SE=3.20m).
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
Previous studies on the human factors of the transition from HAD to manual driving
have attributed less effective return-to-manual performance to the rather poorly
understood human OoTL problem. To investigate the relative contribution of the
driver OoTL state to driving performance during this transition, the current study
attempted to simulate the driver OoTL state, and to examine whether it affected
drivers’ ability to recognise and respond to a critical situation.
We hypothesised that, by limiting system and environmental information during
automation and prior to an automation uncertainty event, drivers would have a
reduced ability to recognise and respond to a critical scenario. Eye glance data showed
that during automation, when the screen was manipulated by a heavy fog condition,
drivers were less engaged with the driving task and reduced their attention to the
road centre. However, drivers were able to determine the criticality of the impending
collision (critical events), disengaging automation after the lead vehicle braked in
all but 8 of 60 cases. Yet, simply recognising the hazard did not seem sufficient, as
drivers collided with the lead vehicle in 13 of 60 critical event cases. Drivers seemed
to be more out of the loop in the heavy fog condition, with more collisions after this
manipulation than the light fog condition (although differences were not significantly
different).
In the study reported by Beller et al. (2013), communicating automation uncertainty
was found to improve driver-automation interaction, such as an improved time to
collision in the case of automation failure. They also report higher trust ratings and
increased acceptance of the system. This study extends the work of Beller et al. (2013)
by investigating the effect of such uncertainty on a higher range of vehicle control
measures.
We found that when drivers were not in physical control of the vehicle and had an
artificially reduced situation awareness during automated driving, their response to
an impending collision after an uncertainty message in critical events involved greater
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maximum deceleration and higher maximum lateral accelerations, whilst they also
maintained a shorter headway with the lead vehicle, when results were compared to
manual driving performance. The response profile of drivers to a potential collision
scenario was, therefore, less controlled and more aggressive immediately after the
transition. Given that the uncertainty alarm was not a take-over-request but rather a
request to monitor the system and intervene if they deemed necessary, it is difficult
to accurately assess response time to an event. Nevertheless, taken together these
differences suggest that following automation, drivers have a diminished capacity to
respond as they would under normal manual control. Apart from the higher collision
count in the heavy fog automation drive, driver response after the transition was
found to be similar between the two screen manipulation conditions. However, it is
not currently clear whether this lack of difference between the two levels of screen
manipulation, aimed at taking drivers further OoTL, was an inappropriate application
of the methodology, or whether the vehicle-based measures used to test this hypothesis
were not robust enough to highlight any possible differences.
One of the challenges of using the screen manipulation technique to induce the
OoTL state is that drivers are likely aware that they are losing information. In reality,
when drivers are OoTL as a result of a distracting non-driving task or, indeed, vehicle
automation, they may not know the extent to which they are OoTL. Therefore, the
technique used in this study, may well be underestimating the effects of being OoTL in
automation, on a driver’s ability to respond in critical situations. In addition, as Dekker
(2004) points out, the loss of situation awareness or deficient situation awareness is
explained by reference to an "ideal", potential state of situation awareness, where
one notices things that turn out to be critical. In the context of vehicle automation,
this "ideal" is likely closely linked to drivers’ understanding of the functionality
and behaviour of the automated system. Before higher levels of vehicle automation
become ubiquitous it is important for us to understand how drivers interact with their
vehicle’s automation system in dynamic environments, such that the design of these
systems augment the limitations of the driver in this new context. Future studies on
driver-automation interaction should, therefore, strive to integrate deeper context and
meaning into the design of experiments and scenarios.
It is also pertinent to acknowledge that the measures used may be more meaningful
when analysed according to the nature of the driver’s response to a critical event.
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For example, measures of lateral acceleration will be different for those who steer
compared to those who only brake. Further studies are currently in progress in our
laboratories to investigate these ideas in more detail by comparing the results from
this study with other types of screen manipulation including the use of distracting
tasks.
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CHAPTER 4
ARE YOU IN THE LOOP? USING GAZE
DISPERSION TO UNDERSTAND DRIVER
VISUAL ATTENTION DURING VEHICLE
AUTOMATION
ABSTRACT This driving simulator study, conducted as part of the EC-
funded AdaptIVe project, assessed drivers’ visual attention distribution during
automation and on approach to a critical event, and whether such attention
changes following repeated exposure to an impending collision. Measures of
drivers’ horizontal and vertical gaze dispersion during both conventional and
automated (SAE Level 2) driving were compared on approach to such critical
events. Using a between-participant design, 60 drivers (15 in each group) expe-
rienced automation with one of four screen manipulations: 1) no manipulation,
2) manipulation by light fog, 3) manipulation by heavy fog, and 4) manipulation
by heavy fog with a secondary task, which were used to induce varying levels
of engagement with the driving task. Results showed that, during automation,
drivers’ horizontal gaze was generally more dispersed than that observed during
manual driving. Drivers clearly looked around more when their view of the
driving scene was completely blocked by an opaque screen in the heavy fog
condition. By contrast, horizontal gaze dispersion was (unsurprisingly) more con-
centrated when drivers performed a visual secondary task, which was overlaid on
the opaque screen. However, once they ceased and an uncertainty alert captures
drivers’ attention towards an impending incident, a similar gaze pattern is seen
for all drivers, with no carry-over effects observed after the screen manipulations.
This pattern was also seen for this period of manual driving. Results showed that
drivers’ understanding of the automated system increased as time progressed
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and that scenarios that encourage driver gaze towards the road centre are more
likely to increase situation awareness during high levels of automation.
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4.1 Introduction
The past decade has seen a rapid development of vehicles equipped with Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), culminating in multiple vehicle manufacturers
releasing first-generation automated driving functionalities such as Lane Keeping
Assist (LKA) and Adaptive Cruise Control (Level 2, partial automation; SAE, 2014).
These include the Volvo XC90 (Volvo Cars, 2015), Tesla Model S (Tesla Motors, 2015),
and Infinity Q50 (Infinity, 2015). While vehicle automation promises a number of
social and individual benefits, including increased mobility (Rosenbloom, 2012), safety
and efficiency (Anderson et al., 2014), it also shifts the driver’s role, from that of
an active operator to that of a passive supervisor (Merat et al., 2012). Some authors
have suggested that this supervisory role takes drivers "out-of-the-loop" (OoTL) and
impairs their ability to manage critical situations when performance after automation
failure/limitations is compared to manual driving (Rudwin-Brown and Parker, 2004;
Gold et al., 2013; Strand et al., 2014; Merat et al., 2014). While the origin of this OoTL
concept is based on the effect of automation on performance within other domains
(Weiner and Curry, 1980; Bainbridge, 1987; Norman and Orlady, 1989; Endsley and
Kiris, 1995; Rasmussen and Rouse, 2013), the term is not yet currently well-defined
when addressing the impact of vehicle automation on driving performance. Yet, from
a human factors and road safety perspective, it is important to investigate the nature
and consequences of this OoTL state and understand, for example, how it influences
drivers’ distribution of attention during high levels of automation, or how it affects
their ability to resume control from automation in an appropriate and timely manner,
should a system limit be reached. This paper, therefore, describes a driving simulator
study that attempted to simulate the OoTL concept in vehicle automation and reports
on the distribution of drivers’ visual attention during SAE level 2 automation as a
means of assessing this methodology.
According to Kienle et al. (2009), a driver is considered OoTL when they are
"not immediately aware of the vehicle and the road traffic situation because they are not
actively monitoring, making decisions or providing input to the driving task". Norman
(1990) attributes causality not to automation per se but rather to a lack of continual
feedback. The concept seems, therefore, to include two elements; one, which relates
to the awareness of elements in the environment, and another, which relates to the
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awareness of elements regarding vehicle status and its automated system(s).
Seeking to expand on the mechanisms underlying the OoTL problem, Louw et al.
(2015) presented a schematic representation of this concept, which proposes that, as a
result of vehicle automation, drivers are removed from a physical control loop, because
they are no longer physically interacting with the vehicle’s mechanisms such as the
steering wheel and pedals (see also Stanton and Young, 1998). Drivers can also be
removed from a ’cognitive control loop’ and lose situation awareness, either because
they are looking away from the driving scene during automation and interacting with
a distracting task, or due to boredom/mind-wandering (Lerner et al., 2015). Clearly,
both loops are important for contributing to safe driving performance, since, for
instance, physical neuromuscular control gives drivers feedback of steering torque and
helps contribute to corrections of heading errors (Pick and Cole, 2006), whilst good
situation awareness contributes to effective attentional control and decision-making
and improves hazard perception, for instance, in response to critical events (Endsley,
2006; Horswill and McKenna, 2004). Accordingly, Louw et al. (2015) hypothesise
that reductions in either or both aspects of control, brought about by automation,
can contribute to less effective return-to-manual performance, but that not being in
physical control can also act to impair situation awareness, which consequently can
reduce driving performance.
To further investigate this concept, the current study sought to induce a range
of OoTL states by removing driving-relevant information during automation and
explored whether these affected drivers’ ability to regain situation awareness in
response to a potentially critical event. Based on the Kienle et al. (2009) definition,
being in the loop involves three distinct elements: drivers must (i) be aware of
the vehicle (ii) be aware of the road traffic situation and (iii) make decisions or
provide input to the driving task (when resuming control). We, therefore, designed
a study where we examined how drivers’ ability to respond to potentially critical
situations which followed a system-initiated automation disengagement, was affected
by the systematic removal of the three elements mentioned above, thereby inducing
an artificial OoTL state. This was achieved by developing a screen manipulation
technique, introduced in Louw et al. (2015) and Louw et al. (2016), which uses a
fog-like display to vary the degree of visual information available to drivers during
automation, both in terms of the dashboard displays in the vehicle and also the road
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environment itself (see Figure 2, and Methods section for a more detailed outline).
This approach broadly resembles a visual occlusion technique, first used by Senders
et al. (1967) to model driver behaviour based on information theory, and then others
to quantify the visual demand of in-vehicle information systems (Foley, 2008).
Extended durations of automated driving have been shown to take drivers further
OoTL (Körber et al., 2015). However, here, we were simply interested in assessing
whether removing driving-relevant information, with short periods of such screen
manipulations, would take drivers OoTL, and what the effects of such manipulations
would be on drivers’ visual attention. Of course, one simple method for taking drivers
OoTL (both physical and cognitive) is to allow interaction with a secondary task during
automation. However, our rationale for using screen manipulations was to reduce
the complications associated with the physical demand of engaging in a secondary
task (Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf, 2015), which can take drivers’ head, hands and eyes
away from the driving scene (Carsten, Lai, Barnard, Jamson, and Merat, 2012; Louw,
Merat, and Jamson, 2015) and adds considerable individual variability during the
return to manual control.
Traditionally, analysis of drivers’ performance in the transition period from au-
tomation to manual control has relied on the use of vehicle-based metrics and reaction
time measures, following a mandatory resumption of control from a failing or limited
automation system (Gold, Damböck, Lorenz, and Bengler, 2013; Louw et al., 2015;
Merat and Jamson, 2008). However, while it is relevant to establish the minimum time
required for drivers to resume control of the vehicle after automation disengagement
(termed a take-over-response or TOR; see Beller et al., 2014; and Helldin et al., 2013),
we argue that such instructions to resume control may simply be in response to alarms
and experimenter commands, and not a reflection of drivers’ recognition of, and ability
to manage, an emerging critical situation. This argument is supported by Gold and
colleagues’ finding that while a relatively rapid resumption of control from automation
is possible, where the first braking input can be as fast as 2.06 s, and steering input
is around 2.27 s, it is at the cost of safe vehicle control (Gold et al., 2013). Therefore,
our aim was to investigate drivers’ assessment of the environment following a period
of screen manipulation using an uncertainty alert, which declared the automation
might not be able to handle the unfolding situation, and investigated how each screen
manipulation condition affected drivers’ ability to evaluate the criticality of events
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and decide whether resumption of control was necessary. We also assessed whether
repeated exposure to such events influenced drivers’ visual attention.
To assess drivers’ attention to the driving scene and vehicle controls during, before
and after each screen manipulation, we considered their visual attention to different
areas of interest, using eye gaze dispersion. Psychophysiological research using eye
gaze data has been a popular method for measuring drivers’ attention allocation
(Posner, 1980), situation awareness (Gugerty, 2011; Gartenberg et al., 2013) and hazard
perception (Endsley and Jones, 2004; Horswill and McKenna, 2004). However, while
gaze concentration has been used successfully in manual driving to distinguish
between the effects of visual and cognitive load (Engström et al., 2005), it has been
scarcely applied in automated driving (see for example Damböck et al., 2013, who
report greater horizontal gaze dispersion for highly automated driving as compared
to manual driving). A review of the literature by de Winter, Happee, Martens, and
Stanton (2014), found that drivers in highly automated driving gaze on the road less
often than when in manual control, which therefore could result in lower workload,
but also poor situation awareness. However, most of the studies reviewed by de
Winter et al. (2014) have used fixation-based Percentage Road Centre (PRC) measures
(e.g. Carsten et al., 2012), rather than raw gaze data. According to Wang et al. (2014),
fixation-based PRC is less sensitive to demand-induced changes in visual behaviour
than measures of gaze-based PRC and gaze dispersion. Therefore, in this study,
we chose to explore the use of horizontal and vertical gaze dispersion as a means
of evaluating drivers’ OoTL state during automated driving, as well as during the
resumption of control from automation. The screen manipulation technique was used
to induce varying levels of the OoTL state, by systematically removing information
from drivers during automation. The study then considered the following questions:
1. What gaze pattern do drivers exhibit during each of the different screen manip-
ulation conditions?
2. When resumption of manual control is required, is drivers’ visual attention
to the scene and vehicle controls affected differently by the different screen
manipulations?
3. Can we infer drivers are taken out of the loop by the screen manipulations, and
does this depend on the particular manipulations applied?
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4. Does drivers’ visual attention change after repeated exposure to the same events?
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Following approval from the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee (Refer-
ence Number: LTTRAN-054), four groups of 15 drivers were recruited via the driving
simulator database and were paid £20 for taking part in the experiment. The average
age of the participants was 36.16 ±12.38 years, and out of 60 participants, 32 were
male. Average mean annual mileage was 8290.46 ±6723.08 miles. Participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were required to have had a driving licence for
at least one year (M = 16.22, SD = 12.92) and drive at least twice a week. Data from
one participant was excluded from the analysis due to abnormal values from their
eye-tracking data (±3 SD from the mean).
4.2.2 Design and Procedure
Materials
The experiment was conducted in the University of Leeds Driving Simulator, which
consists of a Jaguar S-type cab with all driver controls operational. The vehicle is
housed within a 4m spherical projection dome and has a 300◦ field-of-view projec-
tion system. A v4.5 Seeing Machines faceLAB eye-tracker was used to record eye
movements at 60Hz.
Design
A repeated measures mixed design was used for this study, with a between-participant
factor of Screen Manipulation (no fog, light fog, heavy fog, heavy fog + task) and
within-participant factors of Drive Type (manual, automated) and Event Number (1-6).
The experimental session consisted of two drives for each group (manual, auto-
mated) which lasted about 20 minutes each, and participants experienced a short
break between drives, to alleviate the symptoms of fatigue. Participants drove the
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No Fog Heavy FogLight Fog Heavy Fog + Task
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Non-critical
Critical a f g
Manual Driving
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≈150 s
d
Automated Drive ≈20 min Manual Drive ≈20 min
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of each discrete event in the automated (left)
and manual (right) drives. (a) to (g) represent various phases of the drive, as
follows: (a) Event start, (b) Automation on, (c) Screen Manipulation on, (d) Drone
moves into lane, (e) Screen Manipulations off + uncertainty alert, (f) Drone action,
(g) Event end.
same road in both drives, but the screen manipulation was only used during the
automated drives. For each Screen Manipulation group, the order of drives was coun-
terbalanced across participants, with half of the participants performing the manual
drive first and the automated drive second, and vice versa. As shown in Figure 1,
within each automation and manual drive, there were six discrete car-following events,
each lasting approximately 150 s. Our main aim here was to study drivers’ response
to critical events after they were taken OoTL with a screen manipulation. However,
to assess situation awareness after the uncertainty events (see below), and to reduce
priming, each drive contained only two critical events (events 2 and 6), interspersed
with four non-critical events (events 1, 3, 4 and 5). During the non-critical events, the
lead vehicle would either speed up or change lane, while during the critical events
the lead vehicle decelerated at a rate of 5 m/s2, resulting in an impending collision
scenario. The time-to-collision (TTC) at the start of this deceleration was 3 s.
As outlined in the Introduction, to induce varying levels of the OoTL state during
the automated drives, we employed four screen manipulation techniques (Figure
4.2). In the no fog condition, there was no manipulation of the road scene, and
drivers could observed all aspects of the road and traffic environment. In the light
fog condition, a translucent grey filter superimposed the road scene. The aim of this
manipulation was to simulate a process whereby drivers were able to distinguish
only basic elements of the road environment and the movement of vehicles in the
immediate vicinity. In the heavy fog condition, an opaque grey filter overlaid the road
scene. This manipulation sought to effectively blocked all visual information from the
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(a) No Fog (b) Light Fog
(c) Heavy Fog (d) Heavy Fog + Task
Figure 4.2: Example of a drivers’ view in the a) no fog, b) light fog, c) heavy fog,
and d) heavy fog + task conditions.
road environment such that drivers were unaware of the traffic conditions. During
the heavy fog + task condition the road was blocked with the same opaque grey
filter used in the heavy fog condition but overlaid with a series of visually presented
secondary tasks. Here, participants were required to complete a number of multiple-
choice questions involving visuo-spatial shape-matching, general knowledge, and
moderately challenging mathematics, which were sourced from various web-based IQ
tests and were presented in a random order. All responses to this task were verbal. The
aim of this manipulation was to assess how engagement in a secondary task affected
performance, but since we were keen not to remove drivers’ eyes and head away from
the screen (keeping physical position as similar as possible to the other experiments)
the secondary task was displayed on the driving scene, akin to a Head-Up Display.
Participants were told that they would not be penalised for incorrect answers, but that
their response would be recorded. We hypothesised that less visual information about
the scene would take drivers further OoTL and that drivers, therefore, would be most
OoTL during the heavy fog condition, followed by light fog and no fog conditions.
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Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were briefed on the description of the study and were asked
to sign a consent form, with an opportunity to ask any questions, if required. They
were then given the opportunity to practice manual driving and Highly Automated
Driving (HAD) within a free-flowing 3-lane motorway. During the practice session,
participants were talked through the various aspects of the vehicle HMI Figure 4.3
were shown how to engage and disengage the automation and were also shown the
screen manipulation they would encounter during the experimental automated drive.
The road contained ambient traffic, but participants did not experience the critical
events during the practice drives.
Regarding automation uncertainty, participants were told that should the automa-
tion become uncertain during the drive (see below for how this was portrayed) they
should monitor the driving environment and determine for themselves whether or not
to intervene. Participants were instructed to drive in the middle lane of the three-lane
motorway for the duration of the drive (automation was only possible in this lane) but
were permitted to change lane in critical situations, and were told to move back into
the middle lane as soon as possible. Drivers were asked to obey the standard rules of
the road and to ensure safe operation of the vehicle.
To engage the highly automated driving system, participants pressed a button
on the steering wheel. To disengage automation, participants would either press the
same button, turn the steering wheel more than 2◦ or press the brake pedal. During
the automated drive, participants were asked to move to the centre of the middle
lane as soon as convenient and then activate automated driving as soon as it was
available. If drivers did not engage automation, the system engaged automatically
after 5 s. The activation of automation constituted the start of an event. After 30 s of
automated driving, one of four 90 s screen manipulations began. It is important to
note that the vehicle dynamics, as well as all auditory cues, remained active during
the screen manipulations. After each screen manipulation, the presence of a lead
vehicle triggered an uncertainty scenario (for both critical and non-critical events). At
this point, the screen manipulation concluded, the driving scene was again visible,
and the automation status changed from "Engaged" to "Uncertain". Drivers were
notified of this change by a short duration auditory tone (1000Hz, lasting 0.2 s), and
CHAPTER 4. ARE YOU IN THE LOOP? 99
the automation status symbol, which was now visible, changed from green to flashing
yellow. The driver was expected to monitor the driving situation and intervene, if
necessary. After 3 s, the lead vehicle completed one of three manoeuvres: In the
non-critical event (1, 3, 4, 5) the lead vehicle either moved out of lane 2 or sped up,
while in the critical events (2, 6) the lead vehicle braked sharply with a maximum
deceleration of 5.0 m/s2.
Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
The status of the vehicle’s automated system was indicated by the colour of a steering
wheel symbol that was located on the left panel of the central display unit (Figure
4.3). During the automated drives, the steering wheel symbol was solid green when
automation was engaged, flashing yellow when it was uncertain and solid grey
when it was unavailable. Any change to the automation state, whether driver- or
system-initiated, was accompanied by the same non-intrusive auditory tone described
above.
Figure 4.3: An example of the in-vehicle HMI with the Forward Collision Warning
symbol on the left and the Automation Status Symbol on the right (flashing green
in this example).
In addition to the automation status, a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) symbol
was included in the left panel of the central display unit. Active only when automation
was engaged, this system provided a visual approximation of the headway of the lead
vehicle in seconds. In the automated drives, a continuous alarm alerted drivers of an
imminent collision whenever TTC with the lead vehicle was below a 2 s threshold.
However, this only occurred during the critical events. To further deprive drivers of
system information during automation, the automation status (steering wheel) and
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the FCW were also hidden during the screen manipulation conditions. However,
participants were able to reveal the HMI at any point by pulling the left indicator stick
towards them. This action illuminated the HMI for 2 s. Participants were able to move
this stick as often as they wished.
Research aim
Gaze dispersion was used to assess how drivers’ visual attention was distributed in
each of the four screen manipulation conditions and to study how visual attention
to the vehicle and driving scene was affected by vehicle automation in each screen
manipulation condition. We hypothesised that less visual information about the scene
would take drivers further OoTL and that therefore drivers were most OoTL during
the heavy fog condition, followed by light fog and no fog. To take drivers one stage
further OoTL from the heavy fog condition, we distracted drivers by introducing a
secondary task on the heavy fog screen. This was done in preference to using an
in-vehicle display as we were keen not to dramatically change the position of the
drivers’ eyes, head and hand compared to the other conditions.
4.2.3 Statistical analyses
All data were analysed with IBM SPSS v21 (IBM Corp., 2012). Shapiro Wilk’s test
showed that not all estimates were normally distributed. As the data were moderately
positively skewed, square root transformations were used for analyses (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 2007). ANOVA results reported below are on the transformed responses, while
the graphs represent estimates in the original units, to facilitate interpretation (Neter
et al., 1990). An α-value of .05 was used as the criterion for statistical significance and
partial eta-squared was computed as effect size statistics. Degrees of freedom were
Greenhouse-Geiser corrected when Mauchly’s test showed a violation of sphericity.
Unless otherwise stated, variances of the data were homogenous, as assessed by
Levene’s test of equality of error variances (Field, 2009). Similarly, covariances of the
data were homogenous, as assessed by Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices,
unless otherwise stated. LSD pairwise comparisons (α = .05) were used to determine
the difference between levels of Screen Manipulation and Event Number.
As highlighted in the Introduction, we used drivers’ gaze dispersion to establish
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Table 4.1: Time windows used for statistical analyses.
Time 
Window Start End Rationale Comparisons
1 Automation On (b)
Screen 
Manipulation On 
(c)
Assess visual 
attention during 
uninterrupted 
driving
2 X 6 X 4 ANOVA: Drive Type (automated, manual ) and Event Number 
(1-6) as within-participant factors and Screen Manipulation (No Fog, 
Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog + Task ) as a between-participant 
factor
2
Screen 
Manipulation 
On (c)
Drone Moves 
Into Lane (d)
Assess the effect of 
the screen 
manipulations on 
visual attention
6 X 4 ANOVA: Event Number (1-6) as within-participant factors and 
Screen Manipulation (No Fog, Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog + 
Task ) as a between-participant factor
3 Drone Moves Into Lane (d)
Screen 
Manipulation Off 
(e)
Not used for 
analysis -
2 X 6 X 4 ANOVA: Drive Type (automated, manual ) and Event Number 
(1-6) as within-participant factors and Screen Manipulation (No Fog, 
Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog + Task ) as a between-participant 
factor
6 X 4 ANOVA: Event Number (1-6) as within-participant factors and 
Screen Manipulation (No Fog, Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog + 
Task ) as a between-participant factor
5 Lead Vehicle Action (f)
Lead Vehicle 
Action (f) + 3 s
Assess the effect of a 
lead vehicle braking 
on visual attention
2 X 4 ANOVA: Critical Event (2, 6)  as within-participant factors and 
Screen Manipulation (No Fog, Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog + 
Task ) as a between-participant factor
4
Screen 
Manipulation 
Off (e)
Lead Vehicle 
Action (f)
Assess the carry-
over effect of the 
screen 
manipulations on 
visual attention 
how visual attention was distributed before and during each of the different screen
manipulations. In addition, to understand how each manipulation affected this
dispersion on approach to the six events, we considered how gaze dispersion varied
just after the screen manipulations. To compare across the groups, we, therefore,
divided each event into five Time Windows (TW), as in Figure 4.4. The rationale for
these divisions and analyses are summarised in Table 4.1. Full statistical results are
included in Table 4.2.
No Fog Heavy FogLight Fog Heavy Fog + Task
Lead vehicle
21 3 4 6 7
1     Event Start
2     Automatio  On   
3     Occlusions On
4     Drone Moves Into Lane
5     Occlusions Off/Uncertainty Alert
6     Lead Vehicle Action
5
7 Event End
Ego 
vehicle
Non-critical Critical
1 2 3 4 5 6
≈150s
~30s
1
~100s
2
~8s
3
~3s
4
~3s
5
Time 
Windows:
ba c d f ge
~30s
1
~100s
2
~8s
3
~3s
4
~3s
5
Time 
Windows:
Lead vehicleEgo vehicle
Figure 4.4: Schematic representation of the Time Windows used for the analyses.
(a) to (g) represent various phases of the drive, as follows: (a) Event start, (b)
Automation on, (c) Screen Manipulation on, (d) Drone moves into lane, (e) Screen
Manipulations off + uncertainty alert, (f) Drone action, (g) Event end.
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4.3 Results and Discussion
4.3.1 Gaze patterns during uninterrupted driving
Time Window 1 (TW1) was the only period in the automated drive where all drivers
were able to see the road environment, which therefore allowed a comparison of
performance with manual driving, and provided a reference point for the four screen
manipulation conditions. For SD of Gaze Yaw, a three-way ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant effect of Drive Type, where horizontal scanning was higher during automated
driving compared to manual driving (M = 8.35◦, SEM = .39◦ vs. M = 6.92◦, SEM
= .29◦, respectively; Table 4.2). Our results are in line with findings from Damböck
et al. (2013) and multiple other studies, which have used gaze PRC (de Winter et
al., 2014) and find higher horizontal scanning by drivers during automation. This
pattern of increased horizontal scanning can be seen in Figure 4.5(a)-4.5(b), which
shows an example of density contour plots of gaze dispersion for the automated and
manual drives during TW1, on approach to a non-critical event (Event 5). Analyses
of variance did not find a significant effect of Screen Manipulation or Event Number
for SD of Gaze Yaw, or any significant interactions. The primary plots illustrate a 40◦
vertical and horizontal field of view, where darker areas represent more concentrated
gaze areas, while the histograms depict two-dimensional views of horizontal gaze
concentration and the histograms to the right depict two-dimensional views of vertical
gaze concentrations.
For SD of Gaze Pitch, a three-way ANOVA revealed no effect of Screen Manipula-
tion or Drive Type (Table 4.2). There was a significant effect of Event Number for SD
of Gaze Pitch, with Figure 4.6 showing that there was a gradual decrease across the
experiment for both drives. However, the significant interaction of Drive Type and
Event Number, also shown in Figure 4.6, suggests that the effect of Event Number is
mainly due to the automated drives, as post-hoc tests showed that vertical gaze was
significantly more dispersed in Event 1 compared to Events 2-5 (p<.001). This higher
SD of Gaze Pitch for the first Event in automation was likely due to a familiarisation
period, as drivers tried to assess their environment, looking ahead at the driving
scene and back at the vehicle dashboard, which is then significantly reduced after
the first Event. Also, whereas in the automated drive SD of Gaze Pitch continues to
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(a) Automated drives
(b) Manual drives
Figure 4.5: Example density contour plots of gaze dispersion in Time Window 1
(from "Automation On" to "Screen Manipulation On") for Event 5.
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fluctuate over the course of the six events, in the manual drive the decrease is relatively
consistent, which is likely due to the fact that, across all time windows, the manual
drive was far less interrupted. Therefore, drivers seem to be looking between the
lead vehicle and dashboard less during automation, perhaps attempting to assess the
environment they do not control. In manual driving, drivers divided their attention
between the lead vehicle and dashboard more, which could be because they were
asked to maintain a speed of 70mph.
The slight increase in SD of Gaze Pitch in Event 3 for both the automated and
manual drives is likely due to drivers’ propensity to engage further in the driving task
and glance more regularly between the road and vehicle console after experiencing
the first critical event (Event 2).
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Figure 4.6: Mean SD of Gaze Pitch in Time Window 1 (from "Automation On" to
"Screen Manipulation On") for each Event Number for the automated and manual
drives.
4.3.2 Gaze patterns during the screen manipulations
Time Window 2 (TW2) represents the period where the various screen manipulations
were applied during the automated drives. Here, we expected changes to visual
attention distribution as a result of these manipulations, and as a direct consequence
of the degree of visual information available to drivers. To provide an overview of gaze
distribution for the four Screen Manipulation conditions, Figure 4.7(a) to Figure 4.8(b)
displays density contour plots for all participants during TW2 for each Manipulation.
Whereas these figures show raw gaze distribution, analysis was conducted on the
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mean standard deviation of gaze (e.g., Figure 4.9). Therefore, while the patterns in
Figure 4.9 loosely correspond to the patterns in Figure 4.7(a) to Figure 4.8(b), the latter
are intended only as a visual guide.
A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the SD of Gaze Yaw to assess the effect of
each screen manipulation during automation (Table 4.2). Results showed a significant
main effect of Screen Manipulation, as shown in Figure 4.9. Post-hoc analyses revealed
this was due to the different horizontal scanning pattern of drivers during the No
Fog and Heavy Fog + Task conditions (p < .05). This reduction of horizontal gaze
because of the secondary task engagement is not surprising and cannot in itself be
used as a direct indication of how much drivers were OoTL. Figure 4.9 also shows
similar horizontal scanning when drivers were able to see the driving scene in the
No Fog condition and when the scene was fully occluded during the Heavy Fog
condition. There was no effect of Event Number (p = .664) for SD of Gaze Yaw and
no interaction between Event Number and Screen Manipulation, suggesting that the
screen manipulations had a consistent effect on horizontal scanning throughout the
six Events for all screen manipulations (p = .92).
A two-way ANOVA for SD of Gaze Pitch also showed a main effect of Screen
Manipulation, with the greatest vertical gaze dispersion seen for drivers in the Heavy
Fog condition. Post-hoc analyses found significant differences between this condition
and all other screen manipulation conditions (Figure 4.10), suggesting that when
drivers were taken OoTL by not being able to see the the road, their primary vertical
gaze activity focused on looking between the road ahead and the vehicle dashboard,
presumably awaiting the end of the screen manipulation. There was also a main
effect of Event Number for SD of Gaze Pitch. As can be seen in Figure 4.11, pairwise
comparisons revealed that this effect was due to an increased concentration of vertical
scanning after Event 1, which is significantly higher than all but the last Event (p<.05).
As with TW1, the higher SD of Gaze Pitch for Event 1 is likely due to a familiarisation
period by drivers, at the start of the drive. There was no interaction between Event
Number and Screen Manipulation for SD of Gaze Pitch.
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(a) No Fog
(b) Light Fog
Figure 4.7: Density contour plots of gaze for the No Fog and Light Fog groups in
Time Window 2 (from "Screen Manipulation On" to "Drone Moves into Lane") for
all events in the automated drive.
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(a) Heavy Fog
(b) Heavy Fog + Task
Figure 4.8: Density contour plots of gaze for the Heavy Fog and Heavy Fog +
Task groups in Time Window 2 (from "Screen Manipulation On" to "Drone Moves
into Lane") for all events in the automated drive.
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Figure 4.9: Mean SD of Yaw during Time Window 2 (from "Screen Manipulation
On" to "Drone Moves into Lane") for each of the four automated drives (*p<.05).
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Figure 4.10: Mean SD of Pitch during Time Window 2 (from "Screen Manipulation
On" to "Drone Moves into Lane") for each of the four automated drives (*p<.05,
**p<.001).
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Figure 4.11: SD of Gaze Pitch across all events in the automated drive for Time
Window 2 (from "Screen Manipulation On" to "Drone Moves into Lane"). Asterisks
indicate that, for SD of Gaze Pitch in the automated drive, Event 1 is significantly
different to Events 2-5 (*p<.05).
4.3.3 Gaze patterns pre-screen manipulations
Time Window 3 (TW3) constituted an 8 s period where the manipulations in TW2
continued in the automated drives, but where surrounding vehicles began to move
into place to trigger an uncertainty event. TW3 was excluded from the analyses, since
drivers’ eye movements were likely to be affected by the movement of surrounding
vehicles when the road scene was visible.
4.3.4 Gaze patterns post-screen manipulations
Time Window 4 (TW4) constituted a 3 s period from the end of the screen manipula-
tions (which coincided with the start of the uncertainty alert in automation) up to the
moment before the lead vehicle either braked, changed lane, or sped up. This period
allowed for the assessment of drivers’ gaze patterns during a Situation Awareness
Recovery period (SAR; Gartenburg et al., 2013), defined as the process of restoring
SA after SA has been reduced. A 3-way ANOVA revealed no differences between the
automated and manual drives for either SD of Gaze Yaw (p = .130) or SD of Gaze Pitch
(p = .160), suggesting that regardless of the screen manipulation, drivers recovered
quite quickly, at least as indicated by their visual attention to the road ahead.
To investigate any carry-over effects of the four screen manipulations on gaze
110 4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
patterns, a 2-way ANOVA was conducted on SD of Gaze Yaw and Pitch for the
automated drives only. Results showed that horizontal and vertical gaze dispersion
was the same for all Screen Manipulations, in the three seconds immediately after
screen manipulation was removed. These results suggest that when drivers’ attention
was captured by the uncertainty alert, their visual attention to the road ahead was
not affected by the previous screen manipulation. Therefore, regardless of the degree
of visual information available to drivers during each screen manipulation the same
pattern of horizontal and vertical gaze scanning was observed in preparation for
response to the lead vehicle.
Analyses of variance also showed that while there was no effect of Event Number
for SD of Gaze Yaw in the automated drives (p = .450), there was a significant effect of
Event Number for SD of Gaze Pitch (p < .05). Patterns were similar to that seen during
Time Windows 1 and 2 and likely due to drivers’ familiarisation with the driving
scenarios, after Event 1.
4.3.5 Gaze patterns post-Brake light
Time Window 5 (TW5) constituted a 3 s period after first onset of the lead vehicle’s
brake light. Only gaze patterns for the two Critical Events were considered for
this analyses, as these events required direct intervention by drivers, which would
otherwise result in a collision.
A 3-way ANOVA showed that, there was no effect of Drive Type (p = .225) or
Screen Manipulation (p = .067) on SD of Gaze Yaw (Table 4.2). There was, however, a
significant difference in horizontal scanning between the two critical events, with lower
SD of Gaze Yaw in the first (M = 5.26◦, SEM = .403◦) compared to the second (M = 6.30◦,
SEM = .51◦) critical event. The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between
Drive Type and Event Number for SD of Gaze Yaw. Although horizontal scanning
was relatively high for both events in the manual conditions, in the automated drive it
increased from 4.03◦ (SEM = .47◦) in Critical Event 1 to 6.83◦ (SEM = .51◦) in Critical
Event 2 (Figure 4.12). This suggests a learning effect in the automated drives, where
drivers understood the significance of a potential collision in the first critical event
and scanned the environment and particularly the adjacent lane more extensively
on approach to the second critical event to prepare for a suitable response, such as
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changing lane. Clearly, the same degree of horizontal scanning occurred for both
Events in manual driver, when drivers were in control of the vehicle and responsible
for lane changing.
For SD of Gaze Pitch, there was no effect of Drive Type (p = .064) or Screen
Manipulation (p = .095), suggesting that drivers’ vertical gaze distributions just before
response to the braking lead vehicle were the same in the manual and automated
drives and across the four conditions. There was also no effect of Event Number for
SD of Gaze Pitch, suggesting that the screen manipulations did not have a carry-over
effect on vertical gaze patterns, once the lead vehicle braked in the Critical Incidents.
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Figure 4.12: Mean SD of Gaze Yaw for Critical Event 1 and Critical Event 2 in
the Automated and Manual drives, for Time Window 5 (from "Drone Action" to
"Event End".)
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Table 4.2: Results for ANOVAs conducted for each Time Window for SD of Gaze
Yaw and SD of Gaze Pitch.
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4.4 Conclusions
Previous studies have suggested that drivers’ inability to respond effectively to critical
scenarios following limitations or failures of highly automated driving (SAE Level 2)
is because they are ’out-of-the-loop’ (OoTL). In these studies, when performance in
automated driving is compared to manual driving, reaction time to critical incidents
is slower, sometimes leading to crashes, and drivers are generally less aware of their
surroundings, presumably taking some time to reorient their attention to the driving
scene after automation is disengaged. However, there is currently no consensus as to
what constitutes an OoTL driver, how this state is measured, and what information
drivers use to remain engaged with the driving task. To address these issues, we
manipulated the simulated driving scene in a series of conditions, by removing driving-
relevant visual information for short periods, and investigating driver behaviour and
gaze patterns before, during and after such manipulations. Drivers’ visual attention to
unfolding critical and non-critical events after such manipulations were also studied
and findings were compared to driving with manual control.
Results showed that, during automation, drivers’ vertical gaze was most dispersed
when the road scene and dashboard were completely occluded during automation
(heavy fog condition). Here, drivers systematically moved their gaze between the road
ahead and the vehicle dashboard, presumably in preparation for the resumption of
control. Horizontal gaze dispersion was also highest in this drive. In contrast, and
against our expectations, when the road scene was partially occluded during the light
fog condition, drivers’ gaze was almost entirely on the road centre, and they seemed
to ignore the vehicle HMI. Therefore, by withholding only some information, drivers
were seen to remain more engaged in the driving task, compared to if all information
was removed. Focus of gaze towards the road scene and infrequent gaze towards the
HMI was also high when a secondary task was present on the driving scene during
automation.
These gaze dispersion patterns provide some understanding of what information
drivers use to keep themselves engaged in the driving task during automation, and
what information they use to keep in the loop when they have access to only some
driving-relevant information. In other words, when they can see the scene for them-
selves, drivers distribute their gaze towards a larger area of the driving scene and
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surrounding environment, presumably, because they can easily see any unfolding
events and believe they can rapidly resume control from automation, if required.
Perhaps they can afford to trust the automation more in this condition as resumption
of control is easier, in the event of a failure. When this information is completely
removed, attention is also spread horizontally across the driving scene but also heavily
between the vehicle HMI and the road. This increase in vertical gaze, especially, is
likely to allow drivers access to maximum information from all relevant sources, for
resumption of control. Taken together, these results may suggest that, if relevant
vehicle information is presented in the dashboard area, then vertical dispersion of
gaze is likely to be higher when drivers are OoTL.
When the road scene was only partially visible, drivers clearly believed visual
attention was best placed towards the area of the likely incident, the road centre,
and that less valuable information was available from the HMI. Here, drivers prob-
ably trusted the automated system least and wished to rely on their own skills for
resumption of control. Finally, when required to engage in a secondary task, drivers
prioritised this task, perhaps to the detriment of driving, also taking their attention
away from the HMI - when the road scene was not visible.
Perhaps fortunately, this study revealed that regardless of these screen manipu-
lations, when an uncertainty alert captures drivers’ attention towards an impending
incident, a similar gaze pattern is seen for all drivers, with no carry-over effects
observed after the screen manipulations, and similar gaze patterns also seen for this
period of manual driving. Therefore, while these short periods of screen manipulation
may well disperse drivers’ visual attention away from the road centre, they do not
have a long lasting effect on visual attention to the point of danger, when response is
required before a potentially critical event.
While the focus of this paper was to induce varying degrees of being OoTL and
assess their concomitant effect on drivers’ gaze dispersion, the effect of such gaze
patterns on ensuing performance is perhaps worth considering. Although not reported
here, an analysis of driving performance suggests that those screen manipulations
which caused the most gaze dispersion (no fog and heavy fog) were followed by the
highest number of collisions (Louw et al., 2016). These results illustrate, therefore, that
scenarios that encourage driver gaze towards the road centre are likely to bring drivers
back into the loop more efficiently by facilitating better situation awareness/hazard
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perception during the transfer of control from highly automated driving. Although
further work is required to validate this proposal, these findings suggest that any
information presented to drivers during automation should be placed near the centre
of the road, akin to a Head Up Display. Clearly, the interaction between presenting
such information towards the road centre during automation, and the consequent
effect on driver distraction, needs further investigation.
An encouraging finding from these studies was that, regardless of screen ma-
nipulation, drivers’ understanding of the automated system and uncertainty events
increased as time progressed. This was illustrated by observations in vertical gaze
dispersion, which was significantly reduced after the first event. There was also an
increase in horizontal dispersion of gaze upon approach to the second critical event in
automation; suggesting drivers prepared themselves, for instance by looking towards
the adjacent lane before a lane change, to avoid collision with the lead vehicle.
It is important to note that the manipulations used in this study do not provide
a complete assessment of the OoTL state. As disengagement from the driving task
was involuntary and experimenter-induced, the effects are likely underestimated.
Under normal automated driving conditions, drivers’ withdrawal of attention, and
therefore disengagement from feedback of driving relevant information, is generally
self-induced and voluntary. Maintaining consistent and voluntary disengagement
from all aspects of the driving task in a controlled setting highlights a key challenge
in attempting to investigate the OoTL state. Moreover, gaze dispersion is only one of
several measures that should be examined to investigate whether automation unduly
impedes drivers’ abilities to regain full cognitive and physical control. Therefore,
natural progressions of this work are to analyse how drivers’ visually process road
hazards in critical takeover scenarios, and to establish how well calibrated drivers’
vehicle control is to the criticality of an unfolding scenario, following a takeover.
Future studies should also consider the effect of longer periods of placing drivers
OoTL on such measures, as well as HMI solutions that provide informative, yet
non-intrusive system feedback.
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CHAPTER 5
WERE THEY IN THE LOOP DURING
AUTOMATED DRIVING? LINKS BETWEEN
VISUAL ATTENTION AND CRASH POTENTIAL
ABSTRACT A proposed advantage of vehicle automation is that it relieves drivers
from the moment-to-moment demands of driving, to engage in other, non-driving
related, tasks. However, it is important to gain an understanding of drivers’
capacity to resume manual control, should such a need arise. As automation
removes vehicle control-based measures as a performance indicator, other metrics
must be explored. This driving simulator study, conducted under the EC-funded
AdaptIVe project, assessed drivers’ gaze fixations during partially-automated
(SAE Level 2) driving, on approach to critical and non-critical events. Using
a between-participant design, 75 drivers experienced automation with one of
five out-of-the-loop (OoTL) manipulations, which used different levels of screen
visibility and secondary tasks to induce varying levels of engagement with the
driving task: 1) no manipulation, 2) manipulation by light fog, 3) manipulation
by heavy fog, 4) manipulation by heavy fog plus a visual task, 5) no manipulation
plus an n-back task. The OoTL manipulations influenced drivers’ first point of
gaze fixation after they were asked to attend to an evolving event. Differences
resolved within one second and visual attention allocation adapted with repeated
events, yet crash outcome was not different between OoTL manipulation groups.
Drivers who crashed in the first critical event showed an inconsistent pattern of
eye fixations towards the road centre on approach to the event, while those who
did not demonstrated a more stable pattern. Automated driving systems should
be able to direct drivers’ attention to hazards no less than 6 seconds in advance of
an adverse outcome.
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5.1 Introduction
The first generation of partially-automated vehicles (SAE Level 2; SAE, 2014) is already
on our roads. The Volvo XC90, for example, combines Lane Keeping Assist (LKA)
and Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) in ’IntelliSafe Autopilot’ mode (Volvo Cars, 2016).
However, drivers are still required to supervise the system and resume control, for
instance due to system limitations. Studies suggest that prolonged monitoring of
an automated system can take drivers out of the loop (Merat et al., 2014), inducing
passive fatigue (Desmond and Hancock, 2001), thereby reducing drivers’ attentional
capacity (Desmond and Matthews, 1997) and ability to detect, evaluate and respond
to critical events thus increasing the likelihood of crashes (Endsley, 1995; Hollnagel
and Woods, 2005; de Winter et al., 2015). Concomitantly, drivers may choose to
engage in non-driving related activities (Carsten et al., 2012), which distract from
the supposed primary task of monitoring the vehicle. Therefore, passive fatigue and
task disengagement are two factors that may hamper drivers’ ability to safely resume
control from an automated system in driving (Neubauer et al., 2014; Merat et al.,
2012).
Previously, in a series of studies designed to investigate this concept, we used
various OoTL manipulation techniques, including altering drivers’ visibility of the road
scene during automation while they completed visual and non-visual tasks, thereby
varying drivers’ level of awareness and engagement in the driving task (Louw et al.,
2015; Louw and Merat, 2017). We found a differential effect of OoTL manipulation on
the standard deviation of horizontal gaze position, where drivers looked around more
when their view of the driving scene was completely blocked, and horizontal gaze was
more concentrated when drivers performed a visual secondary task presented on the
road scene, but these differences actually resolved within three seconds after removal
of the OoTL manipulation. However, while gaze dispersion provides an overview of
drivers’ visual attention, it is not as informative as point and duration of eye fixations
for identifying the focus of drivers’ visual attention. That is, where and for how long
drivers are fixating in the driving scene or car cabin.
Previous studies have shown that sudden changes to the road environment capture
drivers’ attention, resulting in reduced visual scanning of the scene and increased
fixations towards changes therein (Chapman and Underwood, 1998; Velichkovsky
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et al., 2002) which link directly to an increase in crashes (Crundall, Shenton, and
Underwood, 2004). Therefore, this study considered drivers’ eye fixations in the
seconds after removal of the OoTL manipulations, to assess how each manipulation
affected the pattern of visual attention allocation, and whether this was predictive of
drivers’ ability to avoid crashes in critical scenarios. Finally, although many studies
have considered driver behaviour after take-over from automation in response to a
take-over request (Gold et al., 2013; Louw, Merat, and Jamson, 2015) we introduced an
’uncertainty alert’ in this study to portray potential system limitation, which required
drivers to assess the need to resume manual control, allowing us to evaluate drivers’
trust in the system, assessing their visual attention on approach to each of the six
events.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Participants
75 drivers (41 male), aged 21-69 years (M=36.16, SD=12.38) were recruited via the
participant database of the fully motion-based University of Leeds Driving Simulator
(UoLDS) and were reimbursed £20 for partaking. Participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, an average annual mileage of 8290.46 (SD=6723.08), a full driving
licence for at least three years (M=16.22, SD=12.92), and drove at least twice a week.
5.2.2 Design and Procedure
Materials
The experiment was conducted in the UoLDS, which consists of a Jaguar S-type cab
housed in a 4m spherical projection dome with a 300◦ field-of-view projection system.
A v4.5 Seeing Machines faceLAB eye-tracker was used to record eye movements at
60Hz.
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Design
A 5 X 2 repeated measures mixed design was used, with OoTL Manipulation (No
Fog, Light Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog+Quiz, No Fog+n-back) as between-participant
factor and Event Number (1-6) as within-participant factor. The automated drive
lasted about 20 minutes and encompassed six discrete car-following events, within a
free-flowing three-lane motorway with ambient traffic. As shown in Figure 6.3, the
drive contained two critical events (2,6), where the lead vehicle decelerated at a rate
of 5.0 m/s2 with a 3 s time-to-collision (TTC), and four non-critical events (1,3,4,5),
where the lead vehicle either sped up or changed lane. Crash with the lead vehicle
was inevitable in the critical events, if drivers failed to resume control. Participants
completed two experimental drives, a manual drive and an automated drive, which
were counterbalanced across participants. As this paper is focused on comparing the
effect of different types of OoTL manipulation on performance in automation, results
from the manual drive are not included.
Lead vehicle
a Automation On   
b OOTL  Manipulations On
OOTL Manipulations Off/
Uncertainty Alert On
d Lead Vehicle Action
Non-critical Critical
1 2 3 4 5 6
≈150s
a b dc
Ego vehicle No Fog
Heavy Fog
Light Fog
Heavy Fog + Quiz
No Fog + n-back100 s 3 s 3 s
c
Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of each discrete event in the experimental
drive. (a) to (d) represent various phases of the drive.
Automated Driving System
The partially-automated driving (PAD) system was only available when the vehicle
was travelling between 65 and 75 mph in the middle lane. The system was engaged
via a button on the steering wheel and disengaged by either pressing the same button,
turning the steering wheel more than 2◦, or depressing the brake pedal. If participants
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did not engage automation, the system engaged automatically after 5 s. Once engaged,
the system assumed lateral and longitudinal control and adjusted the vehicle’s speed
to maintain 70mph.
Automation status was indicated by the colour of a steering wheel symbol located in
the vehicle’s central display unit. It was solid grey when automation was unavailable,
flashed green when available, and appeared solid green when active. A flashing yellow
symbol indicated automation was ’uncertain’, and drivers were expected to monitor
the roadway and intervene if they deemed necessary (see Louw and Merat (2017)
for further details of the HMI). If the driver deactivated the automation, the symbol
appeared solid red for 2 s. Automation activation and deactivation was accompanied
by an auditory tone (1000Hz, 0.2 s). A forward crash warning symbol included to the
left of the automation status symbol gave drivers a visual estimate of the lead vehicle
headway and a continuous alarm sounded if drivers reached a 2 s TTC.
OoTL Manipulations
To vary the level by which drivers were aware of, and engaged with, the driving
task during automation, we applied one of five OoTL manipulation techniques to
briefly alter their vision of the road scene. In the No Fog condition, the road scene
was not manipulated in any way. In the Light Fog condition, a translucent grey
filter superimposed the road scene, allowing drivers to perceive elements in the road
environment in the immediate vicinity, but not further afield. This manipulation aimed
to simulate situations where drivers’ primary focus towards the OoTL is partially
hindered due to interaction with other non-driving related tasks. In the Heavy Fog
condition, an opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene, blocking all visual information
from the road environment, with the aim of simulating situations where the driver is
completely looking away from the road scene and is unaware of the traffic conditions.
In the Heavy Fog+Quiz condition, a visually presented secondary task was overlaid
on the opaque grey OoTL, and participants were required to provide verbal answers to
a series of multiple-choice questions relating to visuospatial shape-matching, general
knowledge questions, and moderately challenging mathematics. These questions
were sourced from various web-based IQ tests and were used to assess how a visual
secondary task affected performance. In the No Fog+n-back task condition, there was
no OoTL manipulation, and participants completed the verbal response delayed digit
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recall task (n-back; Mehler et al., 2011; Kirchner, 1958) during automation. Participants
were presented with a sequence of single digit numbers and were expected to repeat
out loud the last number presented. This was used to assess how engagement in
a non-visual task during automation would affect eye-movements, resumption of
control and crash avoidance.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants read a handout with details of the experiment. After
signing consent, participants completed a 15-minute familiarisation drive, consisting
of non-critical events only. This began with a short manual drive. Once familiar with
the simulator controls, participants practised activating/deactivating the automation,
were shown how the HMI communicated automation states, and experienced the
OoTL manipulations. Participants then completed the two experimental drives.
Data Analysis
Data were analysed with SPSS V.21 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA). A α-value of .05
was used as the criterion for statistical significance and partial eta-squared (η2p) was
computed as an effect size statistic. Least Significance Difference (LSD) pairwise
comparisons (α= .05) were used to determine the difference between levels of OoTL
Manipulation and Event Number.
5.3 Results and Discussion
Our aim was to explore drivers’ visual attention during the resumption of control
from PAD, after experiencing different OoTL manipulations designed to vary drivers’
awareness of, and engagement with, the road scene. The following research questions
were addressed: (i) how does each OoTL Manipulation affect the location of drivers’
first fixation after the uncertainty event, (ii) how are drivers’ fixations distributed
over time, and (iii) what is the relationship between fixations during the uncertainty
alerts and crash frequency. Fixations were calculated based on a 200 ms threshold
with a standard deviation of gaze position below 1◦. Fixation location was based on
five spatial areas of interest (AOIs) anchored by the road centre region, which was
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defined as the mode of gaze fixations that fell within a 6◦ circular region of the road
centre area (See Percent Road Centre (PRC; Harbluk, Noy, and Eizenman, 2002; Victor,
Harbluk, and Engström, 2005). The Top, Left, Bottom and Right regions of this AOI
account for an equal division of the remainder of the road scene (for details see Louw
et al., 2014).
5.3.1 Where do drivers look first?
Our results show that the OoTL manipulations influenced the AOI region first fixated
by participants after the manipulations ceased (Figure 5.2). To assess how dispersed
the groups’ fixations were between the AOIs for each group and across all events, we
calculated a dispersion index (D; Hammond, Householder, Castellan, 1970), defined
as, "the ratio of the number of pairs in the data which are found to be different to
the maximum number of such pairs, given the total number of observations" (Schafer,
1980). This produces a value from zero to one, where zero indicates the observations
are concentrated in one category and one indicates the observations are distributed
evenly among the categories:
D =
(k(N2 −∑ki=1 N2i )
(N2(k− 1)) (5.1)
Where k = the number of categories,
N = number of observations,
Ni = number of observations in the ith category.
Since some fixations coincided with the start of the uncertainty event, only those
starting 200 ms after the cessation of the OoTL manipulations were analysed. In the
Heavy Fog + Quiz and No Fog + n-back group fewer drivers fixated on the central
region immediately after the screen was removed, and the dispersion index shows
there was more variance in these groups compared to others. The high number of
fixations on the top region for the No Fog + Quiz group is likely due to the location
of the Quiz on the screen enveloping both the central and top regions. The high
number of fixations on the top region for the No Fog + n-back was also expected, as
drivers who are engaged in a non-visual cognitive task have been shown to have a
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higher vertical gaze angle compared to a baseline drive (Kountouriotis and Merat,
2016). Fixations between participants were least dispersed in the Light Fog and Heavy
Fog condition, with the majority of first fixations located in the central region. These
results suggest that, irrespective of screen visibility, performing a secondary task
during automation caused more variation in drivers’ first fixation, when they were
required to re-engage in the driving task.
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Figure 5.2: Location of participants’ first fixation after the OoTL manipulations
ceased, for all events.
5.3.2 Effect of OoTL Manipulations on fixations
To understand how drivers distribute their visual attention while the automated
system was in an ’uncertain’ state, an index of PRC was calculated for three 1 s time
windows, immediately after the OoTL manipulations ended. These were compared
using a three-way ANOVA, with Event Number (1-6) and Time (1s-3s) as within-
participant factors and OoTL Manipulation (5 Conditions) as between-participant
factor.
Results showed an effect of Event Number (F(5,350)=3.179, p<.01, η2p=.043), where,
as shown in Figure 5.3(a), drivers’ visual attention distribution changed with successive
events. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that PRC scores for Events 1 and 3 were
significantly different. There was also an effect of Time (F(2,140)=10.329, p<.001,
η2p=.129), and Figure 5.3(b) shows that PRC scores rose significantly from the first
to the second and third second after the OoTL manipulations ended. There was an
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interaction of Event Number and Time (F(10,700)=19.162, p<.01, η2p=.215). However,
post-hoc comparisons failed to show any meaningful patterns. Consistent with our
previous results (Louw et al., 2015), there was no effect of OoTL Manipulation on
fixations to the road centre in the first three seconds, however there was an interaction
of Time and OoTL Manipulation (F(8,140)=2.772, p<.05, η2p=.137). To investigate
this interaction, two-way ANOVAs were conducted for each of the three seconds,
with OoTL Manipulation as between-participant factor and Event Number as within-
participant factor. A main effect of OoTL Manipulation was observed only for the
first second (F(4,70)=2.997, p<.05, η2p=.146). Post-hoc comparisons showed that during
the first second, PRC scores were significantly lower in the Heavy Fog and Heavy
Fog+Quiz group compared to the others. This indicates that drivers were scanning
the environment more after not having seen the road beforehand, but at the expense
of focusing on the lead vehicle.
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Figure 5.3: Average Percent Road Centre frequency after the uncertainty alert, for
(a) each of the six events, and (b) for the first three seconds after the uncertainty
alert (right) * p<.05, ** p<.001.
5.3.3 Fixations in the Critical Events
The number of crashes in Critical Event 1 (CE1) and Critical Event 2 (CE2), did not
differ significantly between the Conditions (CE1, p=.073; CE2, p=.064), as calculated by
2 chi-squared tests (Table 5.1). This suggests that crash propensity may not necessarily
be linked to drivers’ first point of fixation. To test for a relationship between fixations
during the uncertainty alerts and crash frequency, PRC scores were calculated for six
1 s periods after the OoTL manipulations ceased. We compared PRC scores in CE1
using a two-way ANOVA, with Time Window (1s-6s) as within-participant factor and
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Table 5.1: Crash counts out of 15 cases for Critical Event 1 (CE1) and Critical
Event 2 (CE2) for each group in the automated drive.
Critical Event 1 Critical Event 2
No Crash Crash No Crash Crash
No Fog (N=15) 10 5 15 0
No Fog + n-back (N=15) 11 4 15 0
Light Fog (N=15) 14 1 14 1
Heavy Fog + Quiz (N=15) 13 2 15 0
Heavy Fog (N=15) 8 7 12 3
Total 56 19 71 4
Event Outcome (crash/no crash) as between-participant factor. We focused on CE1
as there were only four crashes in CE2. Not included in the analysis but important
to note is that in the second before the OoTL manipulations ceased there was no
difference in PRC scores between participants (Figure 5.4), therefore any changes in
PRC can be attributed to drivers’ strategies for coming back into the loop.
There was a significant effect of Time Window (F(5,325)=5.287, p<.01, η2p=.075),
where post-hoc comparisons revealed significantly higher PRC scores in the third
to sixth second, and immediately after the brake light, compared to that of the
first second. There was no effect of Event Outcome (p=.526), however there was a
significant interaction between Time Window and Event Outcome (F(5,325)=5.125,
p<.01, η2p=.073), where PRC scores over time were clearly different for the event
outcome groups (Figure 5.4). This is highlighted by results from independent sample
t-tests comparing PRC scores between the Event Outcome groups for each of the six
1 s Time Windows. For the crash group, only 51% of total fixations in the first two
seconds were on the road centre region, which compares to 70.5% and 84% in the same
periods for those who did not crash, the latter being significantly different (t(73)=3.14,
p<.01). However, in the third second, the crash group’s PRC score rose to 97%, which
was significantly higher compared to the no crash group at 71.3% (t(73)=2.238, p <.05).
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Figure 5.4: Percent Road Centre scores in Critical Event 1 for the crash (N=19)
and no crash group (N=54) for seven 1 s time windows from the second before the
OoTL manipulations ceased. Those who did not crash in Critical Event 2 (N=71)
are also shown. *p<.05, **p<.01 (applies to comparisons for Critical Event 1).
In terms of preparation to respond to the hazard, it seems that drivers who crashed,
left it too late. They maintained a high PRC score during the fourth and fifth second
before dropping in the sixth possibly reflecting a late attempt at avoiding a crash.
This was in contrast to the no crash group, whose PRC score rose gradually over the
same period. Therefore, drivers with a more consistent frequency of eye fixations
towards the point of the potential hazard (the road centre) and were more likely to
avoid a crash than those who were late to fixate on the potential hazard. The PRC
pattern for the crash group could be a result of these drivers either succumbing to
an ’automation surprise’ (Hollnagel and Woods, 2005) leading to increased cognitive
demand (Engström, Johansson, and Ostlund, 2005), or over-trusting the system to
handle the hazard (Lee and See, 2004), which led to them not feeling the need to
distribute their attention in preparation for a response until it was too late. As a
comparison, Figure 5.4 shows that the PRC trend for non-colliders in CE1 is remarkably
similar to that of the 71 non-colliders in CE2.
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5.4 Conclusions
The aim of this study was to investigate drivers’ visual attention patterns during the
resumption of manual control from PAD and whether these link to crash potential.
Following Louw and Merat (2017), we hypothesised that drivers who crashed would
have different patterns of visual attention towards the road centre, compared with
those who did not. OoTL manipulations influenced drivers’ first point of gaze fixation
after they ceased, yet these differences resolved within 2 s, and there was also no
association between OoTL manipulation and crash outcome. Key to bringing a driver
back into the loop who then responds appropriately is directing their attention as early
as possible towards the hazard that may lead to an automation disengagement. This
avoids indecisive eye scanning and improves information acquisition and processing,
which supports better decision-making and action execution (Parasuraman, Sheridan,
and Wickens, 2000).
As vehicle automation evolves from SAE Level 2 to SAE Level 3, so the decisions
that drivers will have to take regarding their involvement in the driving task will shift
from being about when to intervene to whether to intervene. Considering that we
do not have a well-defined understanding of drivers’ competence to resume control
safely, previous studies argued that drivers should remain engaged with the driving
task during automation to intervene quickly if necessary. This justifiably conservative
recommendation results in drivers not being relieved of the workload that automated
driving promises, highlighting a familiar irony of automation (Bainbridge, 1983). This
paper provides two recommendations that might help realise the potential for PAD to
reduce workload: (1) automated driving systems needs to be able to direct drivers’
attention towards the cause of a system limitation at least 6 s in advance of an adverse
outcome and (2) drivers need to possess an accurate and confident understanding of
their role and the capabilities of their PAD systems (Vlasic and Boudette, 2016). These
are especially relevant for time-critical situations and where drivers are ultimately
responsible for safety. A possible limitation of this study is that the automated drive
duration used may not have been long enough to induce the out-of-the-loop states.
Therefore, and with a view to developing a more complete understanding of drivers’
capacity to resume control, a natural progression of this work is to investigate links
between longer durations out of the loop, visual attention, takeover times, vehicle
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control and crash outcome.
What is already known on this subject
1. In the coming decades, the driving task will become increasingly automated.
Irrespective of the level of automation, drivers will likely engage in non-driving-
related tasks, which may impede their ability to avoid crashes if they are expected
to resume manual control, should the vehicle reach a limitation.
2. Little is known about drivers’ visual attention during such instances, yet this is es-
pecially important as automation renders traditional metrics of driver behaviour
inadequate.
3. The design of safe automated driving systems can and should be informed
by a clear understanding of how drivers’ visual attention is distributed in the
moments after they are expected to resume control.
What this study adds
1. This research improves and expands upon previous research by comparing
how varying levels of drivers’ awareness of, and engagement with, a partially
automated driving system influences their visual attention distribution during
critical and non-critical road events.
2. A detailed insight into drivers’ eye fixation behaviour in these events is presented,
and differences in visual attention patterns between those who crashed and
those who did not is shown.
3. Our results suggest it is imperative that automated driving systems are able to
direct drivers’ attention no less than 6 s in advance to the cause of a manual
take-over request, especially if this is a traffic threat that may lead to a crash.
This is a conservative estimate, however, with the threshold likely to rise with
increasing road and traffic complexity.
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CHAPTER 6
COMING BACK INTO THE LOOP: DRIVERS’
PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR PERFORMANCE IN
CRITICAL EVENTS AFTER AUTOMATED
DRIVING
ABSTRACT This driving simulator study, conducted as part of the EU
AdaptIVe project, investigated drivers’ performance in critical traffic events, dur-
ing the resumption of control from an automated driving system. Prior to the
critical events, using a between-participant design, 75 drivers were exposed to
various screen manipulations that varied the amount of available visual infor-
mation from the road environment and automation state, which aimed to take
them progressively further ’out-of-the-loop’ (OoTL). The current paper presents
analysis of the timing, type, and rate of drivers’ collision avoidance response, also
investigating how these were influenced by the criticality of the unfolding situa-
tion. Results showed that the amount of visual information available to drivers
during automation impacted on how quickly they resumed manual control, with
less information associated with slower take-over times, however, this did not
influence the timing of when drivers began a collision avoidance manoeuvre.
Instead, the observed behaviour is in line with recent accounts emphasising the
role of scenario kinematics in the timing of driver avoidance response. When
considering collision incidents in particular, avoidance manoeuvres were initiated
when the situation criticality exceeded an Inverse Time To Collision value of ≈ 0.3
s−1. Our results suggest that take-over time and timing and quality of avoidance
response appear to be largely independent, and while long take-over time did not
predict collision outcome, kinematically late initiation of avoidance did. Hence,
system design should focus on achieving kinematically early avoidance initiation,
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rather than short take-over times.
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6.1 Introduction
The advent of automated vehicles promises a number of benefits, including an increase
in the flow and capacity of the road network (Kesting et al., 2008, Ntousakis et
al., 2015), a wide range of economic benefits (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), an
increase in shared mobility (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), and a reduction in energy
consumption (Anderson et al., 2014). Many of these forecasts have received a great
deal of attention in recent years, including those predicting that vehicle automation
will result in a reduction in road traffic accidents (Bertoncello and Wee, 2015).
The aim of partial (SAE, 2016; Level 2; L2) automated driving systems is to relieve
drivers of the moment-to-moment demands of the control (lateral and longitudinal),
yet not supervision, of the driving task. In conditional (SAE Level 3; L3) automated
driving systems, drivers are able to relinquish both control and supervision of the
driving task. However, drivers are still expected to be responsible for the safety of
the vehicle when operating these systems, and should be available to resume manual
control, should the system reach some limit, for example, due to poorly marked lane
boundaries. During automated driving, drivers may shift their attention away from
information relevant to the driving task, for example, the traffic environment or the
status of the automated driving system, to one of a range of non-driving related
activities (Carsten et al., 2012). This shift in attention potentially impairs drivers’
ability to perceive, comprehend, and predict events in the road scene, diminishing
their situation awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995, De Winter et al., 2014). A key human
factors concern regarding L2 and L3 systems is that drivers with deteriorated SA may
be ill-prepared to regain the attention and motor-control necessary to safely navigate
the vehicle, if a system limit is reached and manual intervention (or ’take-over’) is
required; an issue often referred to as the out-of-the-loop (OoTL) performance problem
(Endsley and Kiris, 1995).
There is evidence to suggest that the non-driving related task drivers engage in
during automation may affect how quickly and safely they can resume control (Gold
et al., 2013; Zeeb et al., 2015; Radlmayr et al., 2014; Merat et al., 2014; Louw et al., 2015),
though there is little consensus. For instance, Merat et al. (2012) compared drivers’
responses to critical incident scenarios, while engaging in a verbal "20 Questions
Task" (TQT). Compared to when drivers were not engaging in the TQT, the TQT had
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no effect on how long it took drivers to start the lane change, but it did affect their
ability to quickly reduce the vehicle’s speed to a safe level. In contrast, Neubauer et al.
(2012) found that drivers engaging in a mobile phone conversation during a take-over,
had shorter brake reaction times to a lead vehicle, compared to those who were not
engaging in a mobile phone conversation. This lack of consensus is not surprising as
studies have employed different experimental traffic scenarios (Naujoks et al., 2014,
Radlmayr et al., 2014), with varying time-budgets (Gold et al., 2013; Damböck et al.,
2012; van den Beukel and van der Voort, 2013), and human-machine interfaces (HMI),
and in simulators of varying degrees of fidelity. As non-driving related tasks demand
different levels of drivers’ visual attention, it is important to compare the effect of a
range of tasks.
In this study, conducted as part of the EU AdaptIVe project, we aimed to systemati-
cally take drives OoTL, by applying a number of screen manipulations that, to varying
degrees, limited the amount of system and environmental information available to
drivers during automation, before presenting critical and non-critical take-over events.
During these events, instead of a ’take-over request’, we used an ’uncertainty’ alert,
which required drivers to monitor the road scene and determine whether there was a
need to resume control from automation. These manipulations were introduced by
Louw et al. (2015, 2016) and Louw and Merat (2017), and are detailed further below.
Previously, we showed that, during automated driving, drivers’ eye-gaze concentration
was differentially affected by the OoTL manipulations (Louw and Merat, 2017), as was
the location of drivers’ first eye-fixations in the road scene, after the manipulations
ceased (Louw et al., 2016). However, these differences resolved within 2 s of the
manipulations ceasing. While these studies have illustrated how vehicle automation
affects drivers’ visual attention when ’coming back into the loop’, precisely whether
and how the degree of visual information available to drivers during automation
affects their perceptual-motor performance during the take-over is not clear, nor is
what constitutes ’good’ performance, in this context. This study aimed to investigate
these issues.
A number of measures and metrics have been used to study drivers’ performance
in the take-over, including take-over time from automation (Damboöck et al., 2014;
Gold et al., 2014), minimum Time To Collision (TTC; Gold et al., 2013, Louw et al.,
2015), reaction time to an obstacle (Neubauer et al., 2012), minimum time headway
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to an obstacle (Merat and Jamson, 2009; Merat et al., 2014; Louw et al., 2015), and
maximum accelerations during vehicle control in the transition (Zeeb et al., 2015;
Hergeth et al., 2016). In particular, take-over time has been used most widely to judge
driver performance during the resumption of control (for a review see Eriksson and
Stanton, 2017). However, we have previously argued that take-over time may not be
the most appropriate indicator of drivers’ preparedness for, or appreciation of the
unfolding situation (Louw et al., 2015), as drivers could simply be reacting to take-over
requests (TOR) from the system. Indeed, as reported in studies on braking behaviours
in manual driving, there exists a driver-related delay between initial brake application
and full emergency braking (Ising et al., 2012; Hirose et al., 2008; Perron et al., 2001;
Kiesewetter et al., 1999; Yoshida et al., 1998). Therefore, the current study analysed,
not only drivers’ take-over time, but also, the time it takes for them to react to a threat
in the road environment.
There is also a need to understand whether, and how, automation affects the quality
of drivers’ vehicle control following a take-over, as drivers do not mitigate all risk just
by resuming control or initiating a manoeuvre. While the quality of vehicle control
can be described, in part, by vehicle-based measures, such as lateral acceleration or
standard deviation of lane position (SDLP), their interpretation is often constrained to
the particular scenario under investigation. To provide scenario-independent measures
of vehicle control, and thus take-over quality, a possible solution is to analyse drivers’
responses in relation to the kinematics of an unfolding situation. Inverse Time To
Collision (invTTC), for example, is a measure that accounts for the visual looming
effect of a braking lead vehicle (Lee, 1976; Summala et al., 1998; Groeger, 2000; Kiefer
et al., 2003, 2005), and is an important crash risk indicator (Kondoh et al., 2008).
Victor et al. (2015) and Markkula et al. (2016) used this measure to show that
a majority of drivers involved in naturalistic crash and near-crash scenarios during
manual driving, reacted within 1 s of the kinematic urgency of the scenario, reaching
values of invTTC ≈ 0.2 s−1, which suggests that the timing and response rate of drivers’
initial response appears to be anchored to the criticality of the unfolding event. Based
on their findings, Markkula et al. (2016) proposed that how drivers make use of and
act on visual looming information from a lead vehicle in manual driving may also
explain drivers’ response processes when suddenly brought back into the control
loop in automated driving. If not being in physical vehicle control due to automation
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causes a mismatch between drivers’ internal model of a vehicle’s dynamics and the
actual vehicle dynamics (Macadam, 2003; Russell et al., 2016), then their ability to
respond in manner that is appropriate for the criticality of the situation in hand may
be impaired (cf. Fajen and Devaney, 2006; Fajen, 2008; Markkula et al., 2016).
The current study sought to evaluate this hypothesis, by analysing the timing and
rate of drivers’ responses (i.e. how fast they move brake pedal and steering wheel) in
relation to the kinematics of the unfolding situation, and how this interacts with the
degree of visual information available to drivers pre-take-over.
We hypothesised that drivers deprived of all visual information from the system
and road environment would be furthest OoTL and, therefore, take-over control later
and have the least consistent perceptual-motor control, than those who performed
visual and non-visual tasks pre-take-over. However, drivers who had access to all
visual information during automation were hypothesised to be the most in the loop
and would, therefore, take-over control the earliest and have the most consistent
perceptual-motor control during the transition.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Participants
Following ethical approval from the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee
(Reference Number: LTTRAN-054, seventy-five drivers (41 male), aged 21-69 years
(M=36, SD=12) were recruited via the participant database of the University of Leeds
Driving Simulator (UoLDS) and were reimbursed £20 for participation. Participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Their average annual mileage was 8290
miles (SD=6723), and all participants had held a full driving licence for at least three
years (M=16, SD=12) and drove at least twice a week.
6.2.2 Materials
The experiment was conducted in the fully motion-based UoLDS, which consists of a
Jaguar S-type cab housed in a 4m spherical projection dome with a 300◦ field-of-view
projection system. A v4.5 Seeing Machines faceLAB eye-tracker was used to record
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eye movements at 60Hz.
6.2.3 OoTL Manipulations
To vary the degree to which drivers had access to visual information from the system
and road environment during automation, we applied one of five OoTL manipulation
techniques, which have been described previously in Louw et al. (2015, 2016) and
Louw and Merat (2017), but are repeated in Table 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.1. As
outlined in Figure 6.1, it was anticipated that drivers in the No Fog conditions would
be the most in the loop and drivers in the Heavy Fog + Task condition would the most
out of the loop (See Table 6.1).
Figure 6.1: An example of drivers’ view in the (a) no fog, no fog + n-back, (b)
light fog, (c) heavy fog, and (d) heavy fog + task conditions..
6.2.4 Automated driving system
The automated driving system was only available when the vehicle was travelling
between 65 and 75 mph in the centre of the middle lane. Drivers could engage the
system by pressing a button on the steering wheel. When automation was engaged,
and drivers’ hands and feet were off the controls, automation could be disengaged by
either pressing a button on the steering wheel, turning the steering wheel more than
2◦, or depressing the brake pedal. If participants did not engage automation within
5 s of maintaining the vehicle position in the centre of the middle lane, the system
148 6.2 METHODS
Table 6.1: Description of the OoTL conditions.
Condition Description Motivation/Aim
No Fog The road scene was not manipulated in any way. This served as a baseline condition, where
drivers had access to all visual information
from the system and road environment dur-
ing automation.
No Fog + n-back The road scene was not manipulated in any way, but
participants completed the 1-back task (Mehler et
al., 2011) during automation, where they heard a se-
quence of single digit numbers and were expected
to repeat out loud the last number presented.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers had access to all visual information
from the system and road, but they were en-
gaged in a non-visual task.
Light Fog A translucent grey filter was superimposed on the
road scene.
The aim was to give drivers the opportunity
to perceive elements in the immediate vicin-
ity of the road environment but not further
afield, and to hinder their ability to accu-
rately predict how road events might unfold
in the future.
Heavy Fog An opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene block-
ing all visual information from the road environ-
ment.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers are completely looking away from
the road scene and are unaware of the traf-
fic conditions but not engaged in any other
activity.
Heavy Fog + Task An opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene block-
ing all visual information from the road environ-
ment. A visually presented secondary task was pro-
jected onto the front scene, which involved a series
of web-based multiple-choice IQ test questions re-
quiring verbal answers. Questions related to visuo-
spatial shape-matching, general knowledge ques-
tions, and moderately challenging mathematics.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers are not attending to visual informa-
tion from the system or road environment,
due to interaction with a visual secondary
task.
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Figure 6.2: An example of the in-vehicle HMI with the Forward Collision Warning
symbol on the left and the Automation Status Symbol on the right (flashing green
in this example).
engaged automatically. Once engaged, the system assumed lateral and longitudinal
control and adjusted the vehicle’s speed to maintain 70 mph.
6.2.5 Human-machine interface
The human-machine interface (HMI) used for automation status related to the colour
of a steering wheel symbol located in the vehicle’s central display unit (Figure 6.2).
This was solid grey when automation was unavailable, flashed green when available,
and appeared solid green when active. For each event (see below), at the end of the
OoTL manipulations, instead of a take-over request, drivers were presented with an
’uncertainty alert’. This was indicated by a flashing yellow symbol, which invited
drivers to monitor the roadway and intervene, if they deemed necessary. If the driver
deactivated the automation, the symbol appeared solid red for 2 s. Automation
activation and deactivation were accompanied by an auditory tone (1000Hz, 0.2 s). A
Forward Collision Warning (FCW) symbol included to the left of the automation status
symbol gave drivers a visual estimate of the lead vehicle headway and a continuous
alarm sounded if drivers reached an acceleration-based time-to-collision (TTC) of 2 s.
6.2.6 Experimental and Scenario Design
Five groups of 15 participants each were recruited for this study. All participants
conducted an automated and manual (without the OoTL manipulations) drive, which
were counterbalanced across participants. However, given the scope of this paper,
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only results of performance during the automated drive is included here. A 5 X 2
repeated measures mixed design was used, with OoTL Manipulation (No Fog, Light
Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog+Quiz, No Fog+n-back) as a between-participant factor
and Event Number (1-6) as a within-participant factor.
Each experimental drive lasted about 20 minutes and encompassed six discrete car-
following events, within a free-flowing three-lane motorway, with ambient traffic. As
shown in Figure 6.3, each drive contained two critical events (2,6) and four non-critical
events (1,3,4,5). For all events, 7 s before the uncertainty alert, a vehicle entered the
lane ahead, from the right. In the critical events, after 3 s of the OoTL manipulations
ending, the lead vehicle decelerated at a rate of 5.0 m/s2. This resulted in a collision
if, after 3 s from the lead vehicle brake onset, there was no driver action. In the
non-critical events, after 3 s of the OoTL manipulations ending, the lead vehicle either
sped up or changed lane to the left, nullifying the event criticality.
Lead  vehicle
Non-critical Critical
1 2 3 4 5 6
≈150s
a b dc
Ego vehicle
100 s 3 s 3 s30 s
Event:
Figure 6.3: Schematic representation of each discrete event in the experimental
drive. (a) to (d) represent various phases of the drive, where (a) denotes automation
being engaged, (b) denotes the start of the OoTL manipulations, (c) denotes the
end of the OoTL manipulations and the start of the uncertainty alert, and (d)
denotes the start of the lead vehicle braking in the critical event.
6.2.7 Procedure
Upon arrival, participants read a hand-out which contained details of the experiment,
but which did not include information on the critical situations. After signing the
consent form, participants completed a 15-minute familiarisation drive, consisting of
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non-critical events only. This began with a short manual drive. Once familiar with
the simulator controls, participants practised activating/deactivating the automation,
were shown how the HMI communicated automation states, and experienced the
OoTL manipulations. Participants then completed the experimental drive described
in the previous section.
6.2.8 Analysis of drivers’ perceptual-motor performance
Reaction time measures
Two metrics were adopted for quantifying timing measures during the take-over
process: The first was take-over time (ttake−over), which was defined as a measure of
the time between the end of the OoTL manipulations and a driver’s disengagement
of the automated driving system (by either pressing a button on a steering wheel,
turning the steering wheel more than 2◦, or depressing the brake pedal). We also
computed action time (taction), which was defined as the time from the end of the
OoTL manipulation, to when the driver started a significant deceleration or steering
action that was clearly intended to mitigate the impending crash.
During our studies, we have found that, in many cases, drivers touched the steering
wheel but did not initiate an evasive steering action, and similarly, they often pressed
the brake pedal but did not engage in an evasive braking action. Therefore, we looked
for a clear steering or braking action and then searched for the starting point of this
committed action. We developed a MATLAB (version R2015b, MathWorks) tool to
allow the experimenter to judge when the driver committed to their response action.
The following steps were taken to analyse taction for the braking and steering responses:
1. The brake pedal signal and steering wheel signal were each filtered with a 1st
order low-pass Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency of 0.05 Hz for braking,
and 0.1 Hz for steering.
2. (a) For braking, the first local maximum brake pedal sample greater than 4 was
identified (Red diamond marker in Figure 6.4). The brake pedal sample
represented a unit-less value of brake effort, on a scale of 0 to 450.
(b) For steering, the local maxima and minima values with an amplitude
threshold of ±2.5◦ were first identified, as per Schmidt et al. (2014). Then,
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Figure 6.4: Example plot from the analysis of a brake signal, to determine taction.
Longitudinal acceleration values are multiplied by 10 for illustration purposes.
the global maximum steering wheel angle amplitude prior to the lane
change manoeuvre was identified (Red diamond marker in Figure 6.5).
3. To identify the start point of the manoeuvre (taction), two criteria were used.
First, we identified the end of the plateau in brake or steering signal before
the point identified above, such that there was less than a 0.0005 difference in
values between consecutive samples (Red square markers in Figures 6.4 and
6.5). Second, to ensure accuracy, each start point was manually confirmed on
a case-by-case basis, based on changes to the vehicle’s speed and longitudinal
acceleration, for braking, and the vehicle’s offset and lateral acceleration, for
steering. Minor adjustments to the location of the start points were made where
necessary.
4. taction was calculated as the time from the end of the OoTL screen manipulations
(Figure 6.3) to the time corresponding to the start point identified in the previous
step.
Vehicle control
To determine the quality of drivers’ vehicle control after resuming control, we consid-
ered whether drivers were able to scale the rate of their collision avoidance response
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Figure 6.5: Example plot from the analysis of a steering signal, to determine taction.
Lateral acceleration and vehicle offset values are multiplied by 10 for illustration
purposes.
to the event criticality. For this, we calculated and correlated two different measures.
The first measure was Inverse Time To Collision (invTTC; Kiefer et al., 2003, 2005)
at taction, and was used to quantify the criticality of the unfolding event at the point
drivers began their collision avoidance manoeuvre. invTTC was calculated as relative
speed divided by distance gap between the ego and lead vehicle, which takes the lead
vehicle deceleration into account.
The second measure was the maximum derivative (Dmax) of the control input that
drivers used to avoid the collision, and was used to assess the rate and force of
drivers’ response to the critical event (Green circle marker in Figure 6.4 and Figure
6.5). Dmax was taken from the time period between the response onset (taction) and
the maximum value of the respective control input. If drivers changed lane, then
steering wheel angle was used, and if they braked, then brake pedal position was
used. If drivers braked then steered, then steering wheel angle was used. For both
steering avoidance (Markkula et al., 2014) and braking avoidance (Markkula et al.,
2016), drivers scale the rate of their avoidance manoeuvre (i.e. Dmax), to looming, as
measured by invTTC. By correlating invTTC at taction and Dmax, we aimed to assess
(i) whether similar situation-adaptive control behaviour would be present just after
a take-over from automated driving, and if so, (ii) whether it would be affected by
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the OoTL manipulations. Specifically, as suggested in the Introduction, that drivers
who had access to less visual information during automation, would generally have a
more scattered correlation between invTTC at taction and Dmax.
As braking and steering inputs are measured in different units, they could not be
analysed as a single data set, without first being transformed. To achieve this, separate
regression equations were calculated for the steering and braking responses between
invTTC and taction. Next, the Dmax values of the braking responses were transformed
such that the intercept and slope of the regression equation was the same as that of
the steering responses, allowing for the comparison of braking and steering responses.
Statistical analyses
The data were not normally distributed. Therefore, Kendall’s non-parametric rank
correlation test was used on the correlations throughout, which is preferred over
Spearman’s test, when using smaller sample sizes (Field, 2009). Kendall’s coefficient of
determination τ, was used here as a measure of goodness of fit. This was calculated
using the cor.test R function in the ’MASS’ package using the "kendall" method
(Venables and Ripley, 2002). For illustration purposes, the approximate slopes and
intercepts of the various factors were also calculated using robust linear regression,
using the rlm R function in the ’MASS’ package with default settings (Venables and
Ripley, 2002). To test for an effect of the OoTL manipulations on ttake−over and taction,
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were conducted using SPSS V.21 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA).
Included in this study, based on 15 participants in each of the five OoTL manipu-
lation groups and two critical events per participant, there were 150 transition cases
considered for the analysis. However, twenty-six cases were excluded for various
reasons. In 13 cases, drivers avoided a collision by changing lane but, at the point
of automation disengagement, the initial steering wheel angle exceed ±5◦ (which
was possible because the steering wheel was not self-correcting) and there were no
subsequent salient steering inputs. This indicated the lane change was due to a slow
drift and the driver’s intentional response could not be determined confidently. In 11
cases, drivers steered while braking hard and thus skidded such that steering had no
effect. In 1 case, a driver did not respond at all, and in another the driver’s response
could not be determined using the method described above.
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6.3 Results and Discussion
The results from this study will be presented with the aid of two types of graphs:
the first graph relates to the timing of drivers’ response and shows take-over time
(x-axis, ttake−over) relative to action time (y-axis, taction), for example as illustrated in
Figure 6.6. If a data point falls on the dashed grey diagonal line, it indicates that
the driver began a collision avoidance manoeuvre at the same time as they resumed
control. The greater the distance along the y-axis between the data point and the
dashed diagonal line, the longer the time between when drivers resumed control and
initiated a manoeuvre. The red dashed lines on the x- and y-axes indicate the onset
of the vehicle brake light. The second graph relates to vehicle control and shows
Dmax (y-axis) relative to invTTC at the start of drivers’ response (x-axis), for example
as presented in Figure 6.7. This figure attempts to demonstrate the rate of drivers’
steering or braking input, during their collision avoidance manoeuvre, in relation to
the kinematic urgency faced by drivers when they began their manoeuvre (i.e. the
visual looming from the lead vehicle).
Results from a Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that, the lower the degree of visual
information available to drivers during automation (from left to right in Figure 6.6),
the slower they tended to take-over control (χ2(4) = 9.820, p <0.05), with mean rank
scores for ttake−over shown in Table 6.2. However, there was no difference between the
groups regarding when drivers began their collision avoidance manoeuvre (taction, p =
.784), which suggests that, the further OoTL drivers were, the higher the likelihood of
a simultaneous take-over and manoeuvre initiation.
Figure 6.6 also shows that drivers who had access to all visual information pre-
take-over (No Fog group), were most likely to resume control before the onset of
the lead vehicle braking, suggesting more anticipatory responses. However, when
drivers were either engaged in a non-driving related task and/or had some or all
visual information withheld from them pre-take-over, they were more likely to resume
control after the lead vehicle braked. These results suggest that the more OoTL drivers
were, the more they reacted to external traffic than to system information, following
the cessation of the OoTL manipulations.
Taking the situation kinematics into account, it is clear from Figure 6.7 that the
lower the degree of visual information available to drivers, the more likely they were
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Table 6.2: Mean (SD) of take-over time and action time for the five OoTL condi-
tions.
No Fog No Fog + n-
back
Light Fog Heavy Fog +
Task
Heavy Fog
ttake−over (s) 3.70 (1.22) 4.11 (1.07) 4.13 (1.11) 4.39 (1.03) 4.53 (.51)
Mean rank scores
for ttake−over
46.31 63.96 58.23 68.11 75.39
taction (s) 4.95 (0.91) 4.93 (0.99) 4.68 (0.72) 4.96 (1.02) 5.10 (.87)
to respond at invTTC of over 0.3 s−1. It is also evident that the majority of drivers
across the groups responded before the criticality of the situation reached a value
of invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1. This is consistent with the findings of Victor et al. (2015) and
Markkula et al. (2016), who showed that, during manual driving, drivers reacted
within 1 s of the kinematic urgency of the scenario, reaching values of invTTC ≈ 0.2
s−1. Overall, as the situation became increasingly critical, drivers scaled the rate of
their avoidance response to the criticality of the situation, just as in manual driving,
both for braking (Markkula et al., 2016) and steering (Markkula et al., 2014). Tau values
shown in Figure 6.7 suggest that the rates of drivers’ responses were less scattered the
lower the degree of available visual information, which goes against our hypotheses.
We proposed that Tau may be a good measure of scatter, however, considering the
distribution of the data across the groups, Tau may not be the ideal measure, as it
is sensitive to how much of the invTTC range is covered. Therefore, larger data sets
with better coverage of the invTTC spectrum and/or more detailed analysis methods
might clarify this further. Qualitative inspection of the plots in Figure 6.7 suggest that
the general nature of the perceptual-motor scaling, in terms of slope and intercept,
was rather similar between the OoTL manipulations.
For all cases that resulted in a collision, drivers began their avoidance manoeuvre
when the situation criticality exceeded invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1. However, this cannot fully
account for why drivers crashed in some cases, as in other cases drivers responded at
the same criticality and avoided a collision. Further explanation can be derived from
the type of response adopted by drivers after the take-over.
Results showed that, in the majority of cases, drivers mainly steered in response to
the lead vehicle (68/124), while in 36/124 cases drivers mainly braked, and in 20/124
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cases drivers braked then steered (Figure 6.8). This is consistent with findings of Gold
et al. (2013) and Blommer et al. (2017), who also found that a high proportion of
drivers steered in crash-imminent situations, following a take-over, despite the fact
that previous studies have shown braking to be the more common response in manual
driving (Adams, 1994). Figure 6.9 shows that drivers who braked after the situation
criticality reached invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1, were unable to avoid a collision, despite clearly
scaling the rate of their brake response to the higher criticality of the situation. This
is not surprising, as it is a well known aspect of road vehicle dynamics that steering
collision avoidance remains a feasible option for a longer time than braking avoidance,
during the run-up to a potential collision (Rice and Dell’Amico, 1974; Lechner and
Malaterre, 2015).
Figure 6.8: Combined frequency of drivers’ responses in CE1 and CE2.
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Figure 6.9: Dmax of response relative to invTTC at taction for the three response
categories. Triangles show collisions and circles show non-collisions. The blue
lines are for illustration purposes only, showing the outcome of robust linear
regression.
In terms of actual number of collisions with the lead vehicle, Figure 6.10 shows
that all collisions occurred in Critical Event 1 (CE1). While there were five cases in
Critical Event 2 (CE2) where drivers responded after the criticality reached invTTC ≈
0.3 s−1, it is likely that the previous exposure might have helped these drivers make
the correct decision to apply steering. In none of the cases that resulted in collisions,
did drivers resume control or initiate a response before the onset of the lead vehicle
braking, which could indicate increased decision-making time to take-over control.
However, in 14 of the 108 non-collision, drivers resumed control (13 cases) or initiated
a response (1 case) before the onset of the lead vehicle braking, which could indicate
more anticipatory responses. Finally, Figure 6.10 shows that regressions were similar
between the CE1 and CE2, which suggests that drivers’ motor-control was largely
unaffected by whether they had previously experienced a critical event.
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Figure 6.10: Dmax of response relative to invTTC at taction for Critical Event 1 and
Critical Event 2. Triangles show collisions and circles show non-collisions. The
blue lines are for illustration purposes only, showing the outcome of robust linear
regression.
6.4 Conclusions
The analyses presented here provide some novel insights into the importance of visual
information for drivers’ perceptual-motor performance in critical situations during
the resumption of control from automation.
Previously, we reported that the OoTL manipulations influenced the location of
drivers’ first eye-fixations after the manipulations ended, but that the effects resolved
within 2 s (Louw et al., 2016). However, it was not clear whether the effect of the
manipulations ended there or if they had an effect on drivers’ perceptual-motor control.
One important finding from this study is that, despite there being no differences
regarding where drivers directed their visual attention, the less visual information
available to drivers during automation, the later they took over control.
We hypothesised that the more OoTL drivers were, the less consistent their
perceptual-motor performance. However, there was no difference between the groups
regarding how long it took drivers to begin a collision avoidance manoeuvre, or,
indeed, whether they would experience a collision. In addition, the subsequent
kinematic analysis showed that the degree of visual information available to drivers
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pre-take-over did not influence whether and how drivers scaled the rate of their
response to the situation criticality, at least not in any way that could be detected
with the present data and analyses. This suggests that the level of drivers’ situation
awareness during automation has an impact on the timing of their take-over (ttake−over),
but not necessarily on when they began a collision avoidance manoeuvre (taction) or
the quality of their subsequent vehicle control (Dmax). This brings into question the
usefulness of take-over time as a measure of ’good’ performance in the take-over.
Another finding is that the majority of drivers responded below invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1,
which was common for cases that avoided a collision, while all cases that resulted in
a collision shared the following characteristics: First, for all collisions, drivers began
their evasive manoeuvre when the situation criticality was above invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1.
Second, drivers who crashed braked instead of steering, or braking then steering. Third,
all collisions occurred in the first critical event, which is in line with previous findings
that drivers’ familiarisation with the event and experience with the system, results in
fewer interaction errors, and safer outcomes (Engström et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2002;
Benderius et al., 2014).
Taken together, our results suggest that it is important that, following a take-over,
drivers act on any threat as early as possible in the kinematic scenario. While in the
current study the usefulness of take-over time has been questioned, situations giving
rise to take-over event will likely vary widely, and what is important is that drivers
are able respond to system feedback in a timely manner. Therefore, the fact that
the OoTL manipulations influenced how quickly drivers disengaged the automated
driving systems has important HMI design implications for automated vehicles. For
instance, HMIs that emphasise situation-relevant information before the take-over
may facilitate safer take-over situations. With increasing situation criticality, drivers
clearly attempted to adjust the rate of their collision avoidance response. Despite this,
in many cases drivers were unsuccessful at avoiding a collision. This indicates that,
should a system-initiated take-over be required, automated driving systems must
support drivers during the transfer of physical vehicle control, by providing either
advanced warning or vehicle control that reduces the situation criticality, via, for
example, haptic shared control, Collision Mitigation by Braking (CMbB) or Emergency
Steer Assist (ESA). A supportive HMI could also encourage drivers who respond late
in the kinematic scenario to apply steering avoidance (the situation permitting, such
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as the one under investigation here).
The current study sets out some avenues for future work. For example, the
scattered gaze-fixations of colliders (Louw et al., 2016), possibly contributed to their
braking response starting late in the situation kinematics, and further work is required
to ratify this link, which, if found to be true, strengthens the argument for an HMI
that is able to direct drivers’ attention to relevant information. Furthermore, what
constitutes ’quality’ regarding driver performance in the transition will vary according
to the level of responsibility being transferred as well as the road traffic situation itself,
which motivates the need to evaluate a range of real-world take-over scenarios.
Finally, it is important to understand further how automation impacts on the
kinematic-dependencies of driver responses to critical events, as recent work by
Blommer et al. (2017) has shown that avoidance responses come later after a transition
out of automated driving than in manual driving. It remains an open question
whether or not drivers’ scaling of avoidance responses to kinematics also change
between manual and automated modes of driving.
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CHAPTER 7
FINAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Final Discussion
This research was conducted as part of the Human Factors sub-project of the AdaptIVe
(Automated driving applications and technologies for Intelligent Vehicles) project,
co-funded by the European Union, under the 7th Framework Programme (AdaptIVe
Project, 2014). The overall goal of the AdaptIVe project was to develop various
automated driving functions for daily traffic, by dynamically adapting the level of
automation, to the situation and driver status.
The specific objective of the Human Factors sub-project was to develop high-
level use cases for test and development throughout the project and collect research
issues on the interaction of drivers with automated vehicles, that currently remain
unresolved. A further objective was to conduct experiments in different laboratory
settings, including dynamic driving simulators, and, if suitable, also instrumented
test vehicles, and based on the evaluated results create functional requirements and
decision strategies for collaboration between the human driver and the automated
driving system, in particular situations.
Thus, the focus of this thesis was on the assessment of the effect of vehicle
automation on the human driver and not of the technology underlying the automation.
The studies in this thesis were not designed to propose and evaluate prototypical
automated driving systems or human-machine interfaces (HMI) nor reflect precise
real-world use-cases.
The design of the experimental work was guided, on the one hand, by the desire
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to answer practical questions that arose from the literature regarding how drivers
interact with an automated driving system, and, on the other hand, the desire to better
understand the physical and cognitive/attentional aspects underlying the human
out-of-the-loop problem. The results obtained have allowed us to draw practical
conclusions regarding the effect of automation on driver behaviour, but also, more
fundamentally about the nature of the driver out-of-the-loop phenomenon in the
context of highly automated driving.
7.2 Review of experimental investigations
Five specific research questions were posed for investigation in Chapter 1, and the
series of papers reported in this thesis and discussed below have addressed these.
1. How does automation affect drivers’ performance in transition situations,
requiring control- and tactical-level responses?
2. How does automation affect drivers’ behaviour in automation, compared
to manual driving?
The literature on transitions in automated driving is dominated by experiments
assessing driver behaviour in scenarios requiring only control-level responses, i.e.
maintaining lane position, while relatively little has been conducted on how drivers
can handle scenarios that represent tactical and strategic levels of driving, as per
Michon (1985). This gap acted as the starting point to this research.
One of the challenges of comparing performance across control- and tactical-level
driving scenarios is that the dynamics of the scenarios (also referred to as ’kinematics’
in the literature) themselves are often dissimilar, for example, maintaining lane position
compared to deciding whether to brake or change lane to avoid a collision. Therefore,
it is hard to ascertain whether changes in driving performance are due to differences
in road and traffic layout, or drivers’ ability to navigate them. The study presented
in Chapter 2 overcame this shortfall by examining the effect of scenarios requiring
both control-level and tactical-level responses on driver behaviour, by introducing
different rule-based instructions for how to respond to the same situation (stationary
lead vehicle) during a transition. A secondary aim of this study was to assess whether
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any observed differences were due to either the physical or attentional aspects of not
being in control as a result of automation. Therefore, the experiment also required
drivers to either maintain visual attention towards the road centre throughout the
experimental drive, or to read from an iPad to the side of the steering wheel while
automated driving was active, and before requests for resumption of control.
Overall, findings showed that drivers experiencing automation in two conditions
(no distractions and distracted by reading task) performed worse when avoiding a
collision, compared to a manual condition, which was in line with previous findings
(Young and Stanton, 2007; Merat and Jamson, 2009; Merat et al., 2012). However, the
short (1-minute) periods of automation used in this study did not impede drivers’
ability to complete simple operational and tactical-level driving tasks, following a
system-initiated take-over request. That there were differences between the man-
ual drive and both automation drives, but not between the automation conditions
themselves, led to the hypothesis that the OoTL phenomenon encompasses a strong
element of physical control, with the effects of attention possibly a more subtle aspect.
However, the possible priming of the repeated-measures design suggests that any
observed effects of being out of the cognitive control loop were conservative. Therefore,
the particular contribution of the attentional aspect of the OoTL problem remained
unclear, and this provided impetus for the study presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 investigated the attentional dimensions of the OoTL problem in the
transition. To achieve this, I artificially induced two driver OoTL states, by manipu-
lating the degree of visual information available to drivers during automation, both
regarding the dashboard displays in the vehicle and also the road environment. Based
on Endlsey’s (1995) definition of Situation Awareness (SA) and Kienle et al.’s (2009)
definition of an OoTL driver, I hypothesised that, by restricting drivers’ access to
system and environmental information during automation, and before an automation
uncertainty event, drivers would have a reduced ability to recognise and respond
to a critical scenario. In two conditions, drivers either had access to no system or
environmental information during automation (Heavy Fog condition), or only limited
visibility of environmental information (Light Fog condition), which was hypothesised
to take drivers OoTL, and help us understand whether the information drivers had ac-
cess to during automation would change how they interacted with automation during
and after the transition. To detect whether drivers were only taking back control in
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response to a take-over request, or responding to some system or environmental cue,
I introduced an ’uncertainty alert’ in place of the more common ’take-over request’.
This invited drivers to monitor the road rather than instructed them to resume control.
The results on vehicle control in Chapter 3 corroborated and extended those pre-
sented in Chapter 2, showing that drivers’ response profile to a potential collision
scenario was less controlled and resulted in more collisions in the critical events,
compared to when they were in manual control. However, there were no differences
between the two OoTL manipulation groups, which implied either that the amount of
visual information available to drivers was not as important as being in physical con-
trol, that the methodology was not appropriate, or that the vehicle-based measures, or
analysis thereof, used to test this hypothesis were robust to any underlying differences.
This is discussed further in Section 7.4. Yet, crash outcomes provided some indication
that, by withholding driving-relevant information, using the OoTL manipulations, I
was at least successful at taking drivers out-of-the-loop during automation, because
the Heavy Fog condition resulted in significantly more collisions than the Light Fog
condition, which, in turn, resulted in more collisions than the Manual condition. Re-
sults also showed that, with repeated exposure to the transition events, drivers became
less engaged in the driving task once automation was re-activated. However, this left
questions about the effect of non-driving related tasks, both visual and cognitive, and
whether these would support or augment drivers’ ability to safely resume manual
control. These concerns motivated the focus for papers presented in Chapters 4-6.
3. What is the pattern of drivers’ visual attention distribution during au-
tomation?
In Chapter 4, additional OoTL screen manipulation conditions were added, in-
cluding one which had no manipulations and one which removed all system and
environmental information as well as presenting drivers with a visual task. Driver
gaze dispersion in each condition was assessed, to determine what information from
the system and road environment drivers attend to during automated driving, given
the limits imposed on them by the OoTL manipulations.
Results showed that, during automation, drivers’ horizontal gaze was more dis-
persed than during manual driving, which is in line with findings of Carsten et al.
(2012) and Damböck et al. (2013). Both horizontal and vertical gaze dispersion were
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differentially affected by the OoTL manipulations, while they were active. However,
while these short 3 minute periods of OoTL manipulations seemed to have a noticeable
effect on drivers’ visual attention allocation, they did not appear to have a long-lasting
effect once they ceased, at least regarding gaze dispersion. However, quite how quickly
these differences subsided was unclear, and I concluded by tentatively proposing that
any information presented to drivers during automation should be placed near the
centre of the road scene and that other measures should be used to evaluate other
possible differences. The papers presented in subsequent chapters aimed to assess
this hypothesis by analysing the distribution of drivers’ fixations in the transition, as
well their perceptual-motor performance upon the resumption of manual control.
4. How does automation affect drivers’ visual attention distribution during
and immediately after the transition?
Chapter 6 showed the OoTL manipulations influenced drivers’ first point of gaze
fixation after they were asked to attend to an evolving event. Differences resolved
within one second, and visual attention allocation adapted with repeated events, yet
the crash outcome was not different between OoTL manipulation groups. Interestingly,
drivers who crashed in the first critical event had a lower number of eye fixations
towards the road centre before brake light onset and a higher number following brake
light onset. However, those who did not crash demonstrated a more stable pattern,
fixating towards the road centre early on in the unfolding event, and sampling it
consistently as the situation unfolded. These findings led to the recommendation that
automated vehicle systems should warn drivers no less than 6 s before reaching a
system limit and that drivers should be aware that looking away from the road centre
for too long could be dangerous in Level 2 automated driving systems. The remaining
questions were whether the effect of the OoTL manipulations would manifest as
differences in vehicle control, and how best one might define and measure ’safe’
performance in the transition. For this, a kinematics-dependent analysis of drivers’
perceptual-motor performance (i.e. the timing and magnitude of drivers’ responses)
during approach to the two critical events, in automation was conducted.
5. How does automation affect drivers’ perceptual-motor performance in
the transition?
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Results in Chapter 6 indicated that the less visual information is available to
drivers during automation the longer their take-over time, but this did not predict
collision outcome, which was instead predicted by kinematically late initiation of
avoidance manoeuvring. Furthermore, results suggested that take-over time and the
timing and quality of avoidance appear to be largely independent phenomena and that
kinematically early avoidance response may be more important for safety than short
take-over times. These findings have clear implications for the design and placement
of in-vehicle infotainment systems in highly automated vehicles. Systems potentially
obstructing drivers’ view of unfolding events or important driving-related information
may negatively influence their ability to react promptly. These results offer suggestive
evidence that heads-up display (HUD) type interfaces should be avoided in Level 2
systems.
In summary, it is clear that the OoTL manipulations affected drivers’ eye gaze
dispersion during automation, as well as the uniformity of the location of drivers’
first fixations once the manipulations ended. However, within three seconds of the
manipulations ending, while drivers’ were evaluating the state of the environment
and automated driving system, the differences between the conditions resolved, and
in many cases, this was before drivers resumed control. Interestingly, differences
between the OoTL manipulations emerged once again regarding the timing of drivers’
initial response (take-over time). There was a significant difference in how long drivers
in the different conditions took to resume control, though there was no difference
in the quality of the subsequent vehicle control. Therefore, the OoTL manipulations
appeared to have some effect on when drivers chose to intervene, even while there
were no differences in the allocation of their visual attention. Clearly, this disconnect
between drivers’ visual attention and their perceptual-motor performance requires
more detailed investigation. HAD systems should, therefore, afford drivers additional
time and/or vehicle control support (e.g. haptic shared control) based on how
disengaged they were from the driving task, in the lead up to a take-over request. This
suggests that being in the loop or out of the loop cannot simply be a binary distinction.
Of course, there may be instances where drivers are fully in the loop or fully OoTL,
but in most cases, they will find themselves somewhere in between, and where along
that continuum will depend on a combination of factors, which are discussed in more
detail in Section 7.4.
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The relative contributions of the above results on driver performance in the transi-
tion are still unclear, but Section 7.4 lays a basis for future experiments to investigate
this further. What follows is a discussion of the merits of the methodologies and
analyses used in these studies.
7.3 Reflection on methodology and measures
Methodology used
A key limitation of the study presented in Chapter 2 was that drivers were perhaps
over-exposed to critical incidents, resulting in a learning effect and reducing the power
of following scenarios. While this shortcoming was addressed during the design of
the studies presented in Chapters 3-6, it could not be removed altogether. For instance,
only 25% of those cases in the automated drive resulting in a collision experienced the
manual drive first.
The screen methodologies used in Chapters 3-6 presented a novel means of in-
ducing the OoTL state and studying its effects on driver behaviour. However, it
is important to reflect on questions around its usefulness and validity. The first is
whether the manipulations were successful in taking drivers OoTL. Initial results
presented in Chapter 3, regarding glance behaviour to the HMI during automation,
provided some encouraging results about how engaged drivers were with the driving
task during automation, and as a consequence of the manipulations. These manipula-
tions were expanded in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, and their effects on gaze behaviour
and gaze fixations were clear. For instance, Chapter 4 showed the manipulations had
a differential effect on gaze dispersion during automation, and Chapter 6 revealed the
manipulations influenced the location of drivers’ first fixation during the transition,
but also that these differences resolved within 2 s. After the resolution of these
differences, there was no substantial effect of the manipulations on visual attention
allocation or vehicle-based measures.
One explanation is that the OoTL manipulations themselves were not strong
enough, regarding the duration of exposure, to have any significant lingering be-
havioural effects on physical control. An alternative explanation is that the ma-
nipulations were successful, but that the measures used to assess perceptual-motor
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performance in the transition may not have captured any underlying differences.
However, it may also be that the recovery period (time between the uncertainty alert
and the brake light onset) was sufficient for drivers to recover SA, and so the effects of
the manipulations did not manifest as deficiencies in manual control.
A reviewer for the paper presented in Chapter 3, argued that using fog-like
manipulations do not practically represent an OoTL condition during real automated
driving conditions, as the typical OoTL state is more of a volunteer behaviour (e.g.,
distraction), while the fog conditions are more of a forced behaviour (i.e., information
is blocked). The reviewer went on to suggest that these two behaviour styles may
result in different focus points for drivers’ attention. It is important to note that the
OoTL manipulations were never intended to represent real-world settings. While
voluntary disengagement may exacerbate the OoTL state, the core factor contributing
to the development of the state itself is feedback, as argued by Endsley and Kiris,
(1995), Kienle et al. (2009), and Norman (1990). Therefore, whether feedback is limited
voluntarily or involuntarily, the end result will be similar. That the manipulations
cause limited feedback involuntarily, and that voluntary disengagement cannot be
controlled suggests that our data only underestimate the possible real-world effects.
Eye-tracking measures
A large proportion of the work conducted for this thesis involved the analysis of
drivers’ eye movements (e.g. Gold et al., 2013; Zeeb et al., 2015), and the faceLAB
eye-tracker used was not without its limitations.
The faceLAB eye-tracker uses a combination of image processing techniques in
conjunction with infra-red reflection on the iris, to localise the pupil of the user
and calculate the gaze focus point. The quality of the eye gaze data point being
collected (at 60 Hz) is graded based on the quality of the information available to
the system. While the faceLAB always endeavours to achieve the highest possible
gaze quality level, there are times where the tracking confidence is degraded, and
gaze estimates can only be extracted using video or, in the worst-case scenario, head
position. Given the importance of precision in my analysis, only data with the highest
gaze quality level was used. However, in some cases, this meant that if a particular
driver’s eye-tracking data were poor quality, then they would be under-represented
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in the dataset. Moreover, while this is a pragmatic approach to ensuring that only
high-quality eye-tracking data is used, the resulting analysis does not account for the
missing data and is therefore also at risk of over-representing the reported data. A
more transparent approach would have been to report the proportion of eye-tracking
data that was excluded from the analysis.
A further limitation of the system is that the faceLAB eye-tracker does not contain
a world-map of the driving scene, which made it difficult to assess the exact point
of drivers’ fixations in the environment. Therefore, the PRC technique was used to
evaluate the general allocation of drivers’ visual attention. In particular, the central
region of the areas of interest was used because that was the general location of the
lead vehicle. While this proved useful in separating colliders and non-colliders in
Chapter 5, there are still some concerns over the accuracy of this analysis method,
particularly since not containing a world map means that is it difficult to link gaze
points to moving objects. The 6◦ circular radius used, enveloped the rear-end of the
lead vehicle at the start of the uncertainty alert. However, as the lead vehicle braked it
would have expanded in the forward visual field, which meant that, at some point,
the circular region would not have captured the entirety of the rear of the lead vehicle.
Moreover, using the central region may have been more or less accurate depending
drivers’ deceleration rate and collision avoidance manoeuvre (brake or change lane).
Given the limitations of the faceLAB system, and the method of analysis used as a
compromise to these, a more accurate approach to determining whether drivers were
fixating on the lead vehicle may have been to adjust the radius of the central region
according to the size of the of lead vehicle (based on distance headway) in relation
to drivers’ position. Also, the time windows used could have been adjusted to only
include the period when the driver was in the middle lane.
As mentioned in previous chapters, the mapping of the areas of interest onto the
road scene was achieved by calculating the position of the central region, for each
participant. The middle of the central region was anchored to the x y coordinates
of the mode of each driver’s fixations (based on a 200 ms threshold with a standard
deviation of gaze position below 1◦) during a 90 s period of manual driving on a
straight road. In the PRC technique, this point is assumed to represent the centre of
the road. However, this method cannot ensure that the central region and the road
centre are perfectly aligned. A more exact method would have been to conduct a
178 7.3 REFLECTION ON METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES
calibration session before testing, for each participant, where they are asked to fixate
on the road centre for a few moments. These fixations could then be used as a more
accurate reference point for a central region anchor point. It is also challenging to use
the faceLab eye-tracker to accurately link gaze points to static objects in the scene by
only using only the PRC technique because the position of static objects relative to
the location of the central area of interest varies between participants. Therefore, a
calibration session before testing, for each participant, could be expanded to include
reference points for other areas of interest in the cabin, for example, wing mirrors or
dashboard.
Driving simulator
There are a number advantages and disadvantages when using driving simulators
compared to real vehicles to examine driver performance. Simulators offer a con-
trollable virtual environment with the ability to expose drivers to dangerous driving
scenarios without putting them at risk (De Winter et al., 2012). Moreover, as there are
few real-world examples of Level 2 and Level 3 automated driving systems, simulators
are useful for mocking up these future systems. There is evidence to suggest that, for
manual driving, simulator measures are predictive of on-road performance (Allen et
al., 2007). However, it is unclear whether the same applies for how drivers would use
automated driving systems on the road, as behaviour in this context may be more
dependent on drivers’ experience with the system, which is hard to emulate in a
controlled testing environment.
The motion-based University of Leeds Driving Simulator provides a high degree
of physical, perceptual, and behavioural fidelity. However, there were some issues
encountered during the experimental testing. The first was that the simulator steering
wheel does not have the ability to self-correct while in automated driving mode, which
posed a problem when drivers attempted to resume manual control. For instance, if
there were a steering wheel offset and drivers disengaged automation by depressing
the brake pedal then the vehicle would adjust its trajectory to the steering wheel angle
as soon as automation disengaged. Alternatively, if there were a steering wheel offset
and drivers attempted disengage the automation by steering, then a proportion of
drivers’ subsequent steering action would have been to stabilise vehicle control. The
second issue was that the simulator does not have an automatic braking system, which
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means that, in some cases, while drivers had the brake engaged in response to the lead
vehicle, they were unable to steer. These two limitations resulted in some cases being
excluded from the analysis, either because drivers were able to avoid a collision based
on a large initial steering wheel angle at the point of take-over, or because drivers
collided with the lead vehicle but not because of their own actions.
Performance measures
When analysing driver performance in automation, two approaches can be taken.
First, one can observe behaviour and compare performance against some pre-defined
estimates/measures. However, given that ’good’ performance in automation is a
relative unknown, at least regarding the traditional metrics, such as accelerations
and steering measures, this approach may be redundant. This analysis approach
was taken in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and its limitation was highlighted in both
instances, which spurred the work presented in Chapter 6. That is, not simply how
did drivers perform, i.e. what was their maximum lateral acceleration, but rather how
did drivers perform relative to some meaningful expectation, i.e. could drivers match
their response to the criticality of the event.
Second, once can use a well-known and accepted safety outcome, for example,
collision outcome, as was used in Chapter 5. However, collisions are rare, and their
frequency may equally be a reflection of system design, and experimental scenario
under investigation. Perhaps, a more accurate approach might have been to assess
a continuous safety outcome variable, such as minimum time to collision (minTTC)
for drivers who do not crash (Jonasson and Rootzén, 2014) and DeltaV for those who
do crash (Buzeman et al. 1998; Kusano and Gabler, 2010; Viano and Parentea, 2010).
minTTC and DeltaV are well-established scales of outcome severity for near crashes
and crashes, respectively. Such an approach would be useful to understand with
greater accuracy what measures contribute to an unsafe outcome, but also what is an
acceptable level of risk.
As argued in Chapter 6, although ttake−over and the associated taction provide a
general indication of drivers’ responsiveness, they do not necessarily provide a holistic
view of whether drivers were prepared to resume manual control. Regarding crash
outcome, our results seem to suggest drivers’ ability to match their response to the
180 7.4 CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD AND OUTLOOK
event criticality was not as significant as I had proposed initially, which questions the
weight placed on the recovery of physical vehicle control following the transition, by
previous studies (e.g. Russell et al., 2016). Perhaps, as is implied in the concern within
the aviation domain, that de-skilling of pilots’ manual control as a result of excessive
use of automation, is a longer-term adaptation (Wiener, 1988).
7.4 Contribution to the field and outlook
Investigating drivers’ behaviour in, and interaction with, automated vehicle systems
presents a challenge for human factors researchers. These can be confounded by some
factors relating to technological advancement, policy implementation, and legal and
ethical issues. The work presented in this thesis has contributed to an area suffering
from a paucity of research, and while there has been a recent surge in this field, there is
still a lack of consensus, on many of the most important human factors related issues.
The work presented in this thesis does not provide a comprehensive investigation into
all of these factors, and further work is required to build a consensus appreciating the
dependencies of all related factors, though an overview of my proposition is given in
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 expands on the OoTL schematic presented in Chapter 3, to incorporate
findings from this thesis into a larger framework, considering both Driver and Vehi-
cle/Environment factors that are deemed to have an effect on driver performance in
the transition. Here, the argument is maintained that Situation awareness and Physical
control are the two key underlying factors to consider when investigating driver’s ca-
pabilities and limitations in the transition. These can, however, be influenced by some
Driver and Vehicle/Environment factors, which themselves may have interdependen-
cies. The following section presents a brief exposition on these. Note that this model
is not intended to represent or supplant a "joint" DVE (Driver-Vehicle-Environment)
cognitive system, such as those presented in (Carsten, 2007) or (Cacciabue et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the model does not account for all factors that will influence
performance in the transition.
CHAPTER 7. FINAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 181
Effect on Driver 
Performance in 
the Transition
Situation 
Awareness
Physical 
Control
Perceptual-motor 
Performance
• Reaction Time
• Manual Driving Experience
Psychological Factors
• Trust
• Mental Model
Individual Differences
• Driver State
• Individual Traits
• System Experience
Driver Factors
Vehicle/Environment Factors
Vehicle Factors
• Human Machine Interface
• Level of Automation
• Automation Driving Style
Environment Factors
• Traffic Scenario
• Situation Kinematics
• Use-case
Figure 7.1: Studying the transition in highly automated driving.
7.4.1 Driver Factors
This thesis has mainly considered the Driver factors influencing driver performance
in the transition.
Physical control
First and foremost, automation decouples drivers from the Physical control loop
of the driving task. The successful re-coupling of drivers to the physical control
loop will depend on their Perceptual motor performance, which describes their
capacity to match the physical control response to the requirements of the situation,
as investigated in Chapter 6. This thesis has shown that L2 and L3 automated
driving systems will, under certain circumstances, negatively influence how drivers
can perceive and respond to unexpected events in automation. However, here and
elsewhere these findings are often interpreted with the assumption that Driving skill
and their Manual driving experience will remain intact. Future work should consider
how these may be vulnerable to decay through a lack of experience just as pilots’
manual flying skills have been shown to deteriorate following the prolonged use of
autopilot systems (Wiener, 1988). Indeed, evidence is emerging in support of driver
training, for specific scenarios in automation (Hergeth et al., 2016), but quite how such
programs can be designed to be most effective requires investigation.
An additional factor relating to drivers’ physical responses is their ability to
respond in a timely and safe manner (Reaction Time). While in this thesis, the
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usefulness of the take-over time measure (and Reaction time measures in general) has
been questioned, it is amongst only a few providing insight into drivers’ behaviour in
the transition, and, therefore, deserves regular attention. In parallel, however, future
work should build on work presented in this thesis, to develop new analyses for
establishing ’good’ performance in the transition. Whether or not drivers are engaged
in physical vehicle control will have some influence over how engaged they are in the
driving task (Carsten et al., 2012), which will also have an impact on drivers situation
awareness.
Situation Awareness
The second major Driver factor, as proposed in Chapter 3, is drivers’ Situation aware-
ness, which is defined as "the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in
the near future" (Endsley, 1995). Within the context of transitions in highly automated
driving, there are a number of Psychological factors that may influence driver SA,
such as Driver state, for example, attentional control, stress, fatigue, and workload,
but also drivers’ Mental model of the system and their Trust in it.
While it was not a direct focus of this thesis, drivers’ Mental model of the systems
they are operating is clearly an important factor to consider. With no clear international
regulations governing the type or consistency of the systems used to enable automated
driving technologies, a vast array of systems and products available to consumers will
soon emerge, each with slight variations in their capabilities and operation. Therefore,
on the one hand, it is important that engineers and designers understand what their
users understand and are capable of, but on the contrary, it is essential that drivers are
educated about the capabilities and limitations of the system they are using (Hollnagel
and Woods, 2005).
Linked to Mental models, drivers’ Situation Awareness will also be mediated by
their Trust in the automated driving system, which has received some attention in
recent years (cf. Beukel and Voort, 2014; Gold, et al., 2015), and where over-trust has
been observed to have a negative effect in the context of system failures in automation
(Shen and Neyens, 2014). It is important that studies acknowledge and calibrate
the level of drivers’ trust in the automated driving systems with which they will be
interacting.
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Individual differences Finally, it is important to acknowledge that Individual differ-
ences may have an effect on both Situation awareness and Physical control. Individual
differences can relate to drivers’ Individual traits, for example, personality, demo-
graphics, and trust propensity. Also, drivers’ System Experience will have a mediating
effect on their Mental Model, but also regarding their physical control response when
resuming control, i.e. understanding what steering torque will help contribute to
corrections of heading errors. Certainly, there is evidence that behavioural adaptation
to support systems changes over time (Markkula et al., 2012), and recently evidence
has suggested the same for L2 and L3 automation (cf. Gold and Bengler, 2014; Beukel
and Voort, 2014; Carsten et al., 2012; Petermann-Stock et al., 2013). The studies
presented in this thesis capture behaviour and performance of drivers who have little
or no short-term or long-term exposure to these automated driving systems, yet, a
clear learning effect has been found in almost all scenarios considered. Not only is
it important to understand longer-term behavioural adaptations, but also how they
develop in more naturalistic settings. While a driving simulator provides a controlled
environment ideal for studying safety critical situations, it does not capture the com-
plexities of real-world driving, which the driver would be subject to, in naturalistic
settings.
7.4.2 Vehicle/Environment Factors
The Vehicle/Environment Factors relate to the road and traffic scenario factors and the
vehicle design factors that are hypothesised to have an effect on performance in the
transition, in terms of drivers’ ability to perceive, comprehend, and predict (situation
awareness) the unfolding event, but also their ability to react to it (perceptual-motor
performance).
Vehicle factors
Vehicle factors relate to the Human-machine interface, the Level of automation being
transitioned to or from, and the system’s Automated driving style.
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) comprises of the interface design, which
determines the quality of system feedback it provides to drivers, as well as the
interaction design, which specifies interaction principles and how control is arbitrated,
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for instance the dynamic distribution of control proposed in the H-mode project
(Flemisch, 2003; Bengler and Flemisch, 2011). A number of HMI concepts to improve
driver performance in the transition have been evaluated in a range of settings (e.g.
Petermeijer et al., 2015, and see Manca et al., 2015 for a review), but this thesis has
shown that the information drivers have available to them during the transition is
an important aspect to consider. Therefore, further work will need to find more
driver-centric HMI solutions.
It follows that systems will vary regarding the degree to which they are able to
assume control of the driving task (Levels of automation). It is well established that
the extent to which a task is automated influences how users interact with that task,
therefore, it is important to consider how this behaviour influences performance in
the transition.
Automated driving style refers to the system-based principles of vehicle control,
for example, the trajectory and acceleration profile adopted by the automated driving
system. Future work should consider whether drivers prefer HAD control charac-
teristics that are human-like or not, as this may influence system acceptance and
use.
Environment factors
relate to the urgency of the unfolding situations, which may be affected by the Road
Type, for example, highway, rural, or sub(urban) roads, and Traffic scenario, for
instance, traffic density, or position relative to surrounding vehicles (especially visual
looming). Recent simulator studies have not found consensus on the effect of different
traffic situations on performance in the transition (Radlmayr et al., 2014; Naujoks et
al., 2014). However, many of these will require constant reassessment as new L2 and
L3 systems with different capabilities and characteristics are released to the market.
In comparison to studies of manual driving, investigations related to the tactical- and
strategic- levels of driver performance in the transition in automated driving are some-
what limited. Besides, and as outlined above, the experimental use-cases and HMI
used in these studies are as varied as their findings. Consequently, a clearer picture of
drivers’ capabilities and limitations in their interaction with vehicle automation can
be achieved by more similar methodologies. In addition to the above, it is important
to consider the kinematics of the situation under investigation Situation kinematics, as
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this may not only help compare results from studies with slightly different take-over
situations, but it also provides a means to analyse performance based on drivers’
response to some threat in the road environment. Finally, adverse Weather conditions
may also have some impact on drivers’ performance in the transition. For example,
rain can obscure the vision of onboard cameras and reduce the range and accuracy of
laser-based Lidar sensors, which would potentially trigger a high workload transition
scenario.
7.5 Final conclusion
The main theme throughout this work is that automation affects the cognitive (visual
attention) and physical (perceptual-motor) aspects of driver vehicle control in the
transition. Under some conditions, automation had a stronger effect on the cognitive
aspects, while in others the physical aspect dominated. As such, they should be
considered in concert to gain a holistic understanding of the effect of automation on
driver performance in the transition.
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